

Ālayavijñāna

*On the Origin and the Early Development
of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy*

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of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy

Part I: Text

Lambert Schmithausen

Tokyo
The International Institute for Buddhist Studies
of
The International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies
2007

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**Reprint
with Addenda and Corrigenda**

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Correspondence regarding all editorial matters should be sent to the Director of the International Institute for Buddhist Studies in Tokyo.

To my wife

without whose patience and active support
this work could not have been completed

P r e f a c e

The present study was originally conceived as a short paper, but has by far outgrown the limits intended for it because the author was, alas, unable to stop in time the exuberant proliferations (prapañca!) of the problems involved. Even so, the result presented here remains unsatisfactory, and the author is well aware of numerous shortcomings: incompleteness of the primary and, still more, the secondary sources utilized, imbalance of presentation, and, especially, complete lack of what is called philosophical depth, for which the author, being, on the one hand, hopelessly enmeshed in the historico-philological method and its presuppositions and, on the other, existentially committed in the meantime to problems of an altogether different kind, has neither the qualification nor the ambition. I admit that in view of these defects I ought to have improved the work or simply withheld it; yet for both external and internal reasons I am unable to dedicate more time to it; and since, thoughtlessly, I promised to submit it, I have no choice but to publish it as it stands. All the same, I hope that at least the essentials of my view are correct — though even in this case they will certainly not meet with unanimous assent, either because I have failed to present them in a way convincing to all, or because, who knows, there is perhaps no such thing as universally binding evidence. But even in case the picture I have drawn turns out to be imperfect (as it certainly will in some points) or even erroneous, I hope that at least some of the observations on which it is based will still be found worthwhile.

In order to avoid a too heavy presentation of the materials and to spare the less specialized reader the trouble of going into too many details, documentation as well as more specific points and discussions have deliberately been relegated to the notes (vol. II). Moreover, the treatment proper of the subject-matter is

VIII

complete with chapter 5. Chapters 6 and 7 have a supplementary function, and this is equally true of the supplements proper (§§ 8-12), dedicated to special problems, and of the appendices containing editions (and, in the case of App. II, an annotated translation) of relevant text portions.

For the sake of convenience, I have frequently but not consistently isolated the elements of Sanskrit compounds by introducing hyphens, and I have sometimes indicated Sandhi (both internal and external) by using the circumflex. When distinguishing a word from a concept, I frequently use inverted commas, but not in Appendix II where that would have been going too far. References without further specification refer to sections or notes of the present study, e.g. § 1.7 to p. 14f., n. 52 to vol. II p. 254, or *H.a* (as a reference within n. 1477) to p. 563. In original texts, additions appear within angle brackets, whereas words to be deleted are put within square brackets. In English translations, square brackets indicate that what they include is my addition.

This study would not even have reached the present (admittedly unsatisfactory) state of completion without the various kinds of support I received from my friend Dr. Akira Yuyama, Director of the International Institute for Buddhist Studies, Tokyo. Thanks to him and to the generosity of the President of the Reiyukai, Dr. Tsugunari Kubo, I had, in 1979, the opportunity of a three months' stay in Japan, with all the facilities to become fully acquainted with the scholarly achievements of Japanese Buddhology. Even after my stay, Dr. Yuyama, like many other Japanese friends and colleagues to whom my hearty thanks are due, has never tired of supplying me with Japanese books and articles which would otherwise have remained inaccessible to me. Besides, I have to thank the German Research Association (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) for having, in addition to former support, granted me also, in Summer 1985, a research term without which I should hardly have been able to finish this work; and no less have I to thank once more A. Yuyama who in spite of his many duties readily assumed, for that term, the burden of teaching at the University of Hamburg

in my stead. I also express my sincere gratitude to my friends and colleagues Fumio Enomoto, Oskar von Hinüber, Junko Sakamoto-Goto, Katsumi Mimaki, David Seyfort Ruegg, Ernst Steinkellner, Tilmann Vetter and Albrecht Wezler for having read the manuscript or parts of it and made valuable suggestions, and to N. Aramaki for generously giving me of his time to discuss various problems provoked by my study. My special thanks are, however, due to S. A. Srinivasan who took the trouble to check my English and in the process often encouraged me and made me conscious of problems I had not paid enough attention to. I am further bound to Dr. A. Yuyama - once again - and to the International Institute for Buddhist Studies for accepting this book for the *Studia Philologica Buddhica*; to Mrs. Christa Stegemann for her constant friendliness and help in typing the manuscript; to Dr. Inge Wezler for her most sympathetic approach and her high technical competence in resolving the many problems the preparation of the offset copy posed. Above all, I have to thank my wife, Helga, to whom I am most indebted, for it was she who read all the proofs with untiring patience and energy.

PREFACE TO THE REPRINT

It gives me great pleasure to witness the publication of the reprint of my book on the *ālayavijñāna*. I avail myself of this opportunity to express my heartfelt gratitude to the editorial committee and the staff of the International Institute for Buddhist Studies, especially to its director, Professor Junkichi Imanishi.

At the same time, I must confess that this occasion is also attended by a tinge of embarrassment at an unaccomplished duty. Not surprisingly, a few basic aspects of my reconstruction of the origin and development of the *ālayavijñāna* concept have not met with unanimous assent. Quite naturally, readers might expect me to either admit failure or defend my position. Indeed, originally, I did hope I could produce a second edition of the book which would have seen the fulfilment of this scholarly obligation. Unfortunately, however, time constraints and other research priorities have not allowed me to embark upon any attempt, be it brief or detailed, to discuss the diverging views expressed so far.

On the other hand, I must say that some factors would seem to plead for less haste in such an undertaking on my part. New theories on the history of the *ālayavijñāna*, which deal with my study in a more or less critical way, continue to be advanced. I am aware of at least one such major contribution awaiting its publication. Furthermore, in recent years, I have allowed myself to get sidetracked and have become engaged in various research projects which make it imperative for me to give priority to the presentation of their results. Before venturing into formulating my response, which I still hope to achieve some day, more time will therefore be needed.

The only thing I can do for the time being is to offer a short list of addenda and corrigenda, with no claim, however, of being exhaustive. This is merely intended to correct a number of misprints and minor errors as well as to add a few references which I have sporadically noted down over the years.

2 January 2007

Contents of Vol. I

Preface	VII
1. Introductory, programmatic and methodological remarks	1
2. First introduction and original meaning of ālayavijñāna	18
3. Development of ālayavijñāna to the basic constituent of a living being	34
4. Development of the negative aspects of ālayavijñāna	66
5. Ālayavijñāna as a veritable vijñāna	85
6. Evaluation of the other occurrences of ālaya- vijñāna in the Basic Section of the Yogācārabhūmi	109
7. Discussion of some divergent theories on the origin of ālayavijñāna	144
8. Supplement I: Reconsideration of some aspects of the methodology of exploring the history of early Yogācāra literature	183
9. Supplement II: Preliminary analysis of the Proof Portion	194
10. Supplement III: Mystical experience, elimination of ālayavijñāna and the question of vijñaptimātratā in the ālayavijñāna Treatise in the beginning of the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī	197
11. Supplement IV: Two remarks on the structure of the Nivṛtti Portion	208
12. Supplement V: Remark on two quotations from the Nagarasūtra	214
Appendix I: The Sacittikā and Acittikā Bhūmiḥ of the Yogācārabhūmi	220
Appendix II: Paramārthagāthās 28-41 and their Commentary	223

1. Introductory, programmatic and methodological remarks

1.1 As is well known, one of the specific features of the philosophy of the Yogācāra school is the theory that in addition to the traditional six kinds of mind, viz. the five sense-perceptions and non-sensory cognition (*manovijñāna*), there are two new, more or less subliminal forms, viz. *kliṣṭa-manas* and *ālayavijñāna*. The former is a continuous, subtle notion or feeling of 'I', whereas the latter, in accordance with the frequent Chinese rendering 藏識,¹ i.e. "store mind", "connaissance-réceptacle",² may, in a preliminary way, be characterized as the container or store-house of the latent residues or Impressions of previous actions (*karman*) and mind processes, or, following the usual³ Tibetan translation *kun gzi rnam par śes pa* ("fundamental mind", "Grunderkennen"⁴), as the basic layer of mind processes or even the very basic constituent of the whole living being.⁵ It should be kept in mind that (at least in the "orthodox" Yogācāra school) *ālayavijñāna* is strictly person-bound, each living being having its own *ālayavijñāna*.

The present essay, though also including a few remarks on the origin of *kliṣṭa-manas* (see § 7.1A.2.2), is primarily concerned with the problem of the origin and development of *ālayavijñāna*. Yet, my treatment of this matter is not exhaustive either. I have rather confined myself to dealing with the problem of the origin of *ālayavijñāna* in a rather limited sense (see § 1.4), and to an attempt to deduce, from my starting-point and the data available in the oldest materials, certain crucial aspects of the early development of this concept.

In accordance with the limited scope of the present essay, I feel it justified to confine myself, as for previous research, to a short systematic outline of the essential aspects of what it has contributed to the question of the formation of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* (§ 1.3). Though I admit that a full account of the history of research on *ālayavi-*

jñāna would be useful, it would take much more time than I can afford, and anyway it should, in view of the fact that most pertinent works are in Japanese, be written by a Japanese scholar. Nevertheless, apart from specific references in the notes, a few recent theories on the origin of ālayavijñāna will be discussed in detail in § 7, because they advocate solutions considerably differing from mine, and because I should scarcely be justified in setting up a theory of my own if I did not give my reasons for not adopting one or the other of those already set forth.

1.2 As for the question of the origin of the concept of ālayavijñāna, the solution presented in this essay must remain a hypothetical one. In view of the fact that even basic problems of the literary history of the older Yogācāra texts, esp. of the Yogācārabhūmi, are still unsolved or controversial and since some early materials are known only from fragments - and there may have been others no longer extant in explicit quotations -, statements on the early history of Yogācāra thought are almost inevitably, at least for the time being, bound to be hypothetical. But I think Suguro⁶ is right in emphasizing that we have no choice but to try to reconstruct the historical development of Yogācāra thought if we want to re-enact it, as it were, as a dynamic, living process, and not merely take stock of the petrified (and often incoherent) results. Besides, even preliminary observations in terms of a history of ideas may, if handled with caution, on their part be helpful in resolving problems of literary history. But what I consider essential is that, even if we cannot (or cannot yet?), in our hypotheses on matters of the history of ideas (as well as of the literary history) of uncertain periods like early Yogācāra, reach certainty, we are none the less clearly called upon to proceed from mere possibility or non-committal plausibility to probability; i.e. we should try to find out criteria which permit us to single out, from among the at times consider-

able number of possible explanations, the one which is (or at least those few which are) probable; and it is precisely this that I intend to do in the present essay.

1.3.0 Modern scholars have tried to explain the introduction of ālayavijñāna by pointing out that in certain systematic (§ 1.3.1) and exegetical (§ 1.3.2) contexts⁷ the assumption of this concept had become inevitable or at least useful, and they have also drawn attention to certain related notions - occurring either in the canonical texts⁸ or in the dogmatic elaborations of some of the traditional schools (§ 1.3.4), or even in the earliest Yogācāra sources themselves⁹ (§ 1.3.5) -, which may be regarded as more or less close precursors or starting-points of ālayavijñāna. Some scholars, though not denying the importance of the systematical and historical background, have expressed the opinion that the main motive for the introduction of the concept of ālayavijñāna has to be sought in a (direct) yogic experience of a subliminal layer of mind.¹⁰

1.3.1 There are several systematical contexts in connection with which the introduction of ālayavijñāna is regarded to have been helpful if not indispensable. In a system that rejects - as most Buddhist schools unambiguously do - the existence of Self (*ātman*) as a substantial, i.e. permanent and unchangeable nucleus of the individual, a non-eternal but continuous element of personality like ālayavijñāna appears to be required or at least convenient. Accordingly, modern scholars most frequently adduce, in connection with the introduction of ālayavijñāna, issues centering, more or less, around the problem of the continuity of personality.¹¹ In these contexts as well as in some others, ālayavijñāna is in fact employed by the Yogācāras themselves, and in most of these contexts they have tried to show the indispensability of ālayavijñāna by moulding them into proofs of its existence. What

follows is only a preliminary list of such issues:¹²

- 1) the issue of a continuous and homogeneous "subject" or, more precisely, individual substratum, of *saṃsāra*¹³ and, in a sense, even of the process of liberation;¹⁴
- 2) the issue of a connecting link between *karman* and its result;¹⁵
- 3) the issue of a connecting link between the last moment of mind before and the first one after unconscious states like *nīrodha-samāpatti*;¹⁶
- 4) the issue of an entity suitable for receiving Impressions (*vāsanā*) and supporting the Seeds (*bīja*), or being itself the Seed, of future effects;¹⁷

This last is involved not only in the phenomena of memory and recollection¹⁸ but also in the preceding issues of *karman* and its fruition¹⁹ and of the reappearance of consciousness after periods of interruption,²⁰ and it is involved even in the issue of the substratum of *saṃsāra* and liberation, if *saṃsāra* is understood as rebirth due to *karman* and to D e f i l e m e n t s²¹ (*kleśa*) liable to re-emerge even after periods of latency,²² and if the process of liberation is taken as the origination and growth of wholesome factors²³ or at least as the abandonment even of l a t e n t Defilements.²⁴

In all these cases, the situation appears to have come to a critical point on account of the rejection of the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of the existence of the past and the future (which had allowed to derive later fruition d i r e c t l y from the past deed,²⁵ the re-emerging consciousness directly from its past antecedent,²⁶ or recollection directly from the past awareness²⁷ and from the past object²⁸) or on account of the rejection of hypostatized entities like Possession (*prāpti*) (due to which a non-saint is fettered by Defilements even while they do not actually occur²⁹). Some schools, especially the Sautrāntikas³⁰ and perhaps also the Mahīśāsakas,³¹

had tried to solve these problems by assuming dormant forces or Seeds (*bīja*) as gap-bridgers, but the Yogācāras pointed out that in a traditional Buddhist system (i.e. without ālayavijñāna) both the impression (or reinforcement) and the preservation of these Seeds involve serious difficulties.

- 5) the issue of a primary and homogeneous objective basis of the notion or feeling of 'I' or Clinging to Self;³²
- 6) the issue of a principle which - after death, and in accordance with, or as the result of, the Maturation (*vipāka*)³³ of previous karman - takes possession, or becomes the basis, of a new existence³⁴ and which, uninterruptedly continuing until death as the homogeneous basic layer of this existence,³⁵ guarantees that throughout a given life-span a living being is affiliated to one and the same way or form of existence (*gati/yonī*) or cosmic level (*dhātu, āyatana*),³⁶ a guarantee that holds even in the absence of other suitable factors;³⁷
- 7) the issue of mind as the principle of life, which throughout a given life-span continuously pervades³⁸ and "appropriates" (*upādāna*) corporeal matter,³⁹ esp. in unconscious states where the ordinary *vijñānas* are absent.⁴⁰

Two more issues in which ālayavijñāna figures appear to be closely connected with the preceding one:

- 8) the issue of mind (*vijñāna*) entering the womb and coalescing (*saṃmūrch-*) with proto-embryonic matter at the moment of Linking up (*pratīsandhi*) a new existence as a human being (or womb-born animal),⁴¹ and
- 9) the issue that in the process of death the body is said to grow cold part by part, due to a gradual withdrawing of mind (*vijñāna*).⁴²

There is still another issue involving ālayavijñāna which belongs to this "somatic" context, viz.

- 10) the issue of certain corporeal experiences the occurrence of which is said to be hardly explicable except if ālayavijñāna is accepted,⁴³ including the issue of pleasant corporeal

sensations in states of deep concentration.⁴⁴

Another issue which would seem to point to the existence of ālayavijñāna is

- 11) that the perception of objects is said to be always accompanied by a perception of the surrounding world (*bhājana*) and of one's own corporeal basis (*āśraya*).⁴⁵

Finally, ālayavijñāna figures, in some sources – but, as far as I can see, never in formal proofs of its existence –,

- 12) as the basic principle of Pollution (*saṃkleśa*),⁴⁶
- 13) as the seat or sum of Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*),⁴⁷ and
- 14) as constituting, or having the nature of, ultimate unsatisfactoriness (*saṃskāra-duḥkhatā*) or the Truth of Suffering (*duḥkha-satya*).⁴⁸

1.3.2 Apart from these systematical problems, exegetical reasons, too, are occasionally surmised to have had a decisive impact on the introduction of ālayavijñāna,⁴⁹ and at any rate it was in fact used by the Yogācāras themselves for solving such difficulties as⁵⁰ the question of how to interpret

- 1) the dependence of *viññāna* on *saṃskāras*⁵¹ and of *bhava* on *upādāna*⁵² in the twelve-membered *pratītyasamutpāda* formula;
- 2) the mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa* which was set forth in the *Naḍakalāpikāsūtra*⁵³ and, according to a passage of the *Yogācārabhūmi*,⁵⁴ also indicated by the *Nagarasūtra*;⁵⁵
- 3) the statement of the *Dharmadinnāsūtra*, etc.,⁵⁶ that in *nirodhasamāpatti* mind (*viññāna*) has not departed from the body;⁵⁷
- 4) the statement of the mutual support and concomitance of life(-force) (*āyus*), [bodily] heat (*uṣman*) and mind (*viññāna*);⁵⁸
- 5) the canonical concept of the Nourishment "mind" (*viññānāhāra*).⁵⁹

One may also add:

- 6) the exegesis of the canonical reference to mind entering the womb at the moment of conception,⁶⁰

which has already been listed as a systematical context.⁶¹

1.3.3 It is important to make it clear that although most of these systematical and exegetical contexts may render the introduction of ālayavijñāna plausible, they cannot *eo ipso* be acknowledged to have in fact led to, or even merely contributed to, this event. It is equally possible, nay, even highly probable, that, even though the real motive(s) will be included among these contexts, yet in many of them ālayavijñāna was rather found convenient and made use of only after it had been introduced for some other reason.

1.3.4 As for historical starting-points and precursors of ālayavijñāna, previous research has made two suggestions:

1.3.4.1 On the one hand, it has, in accordance with the exegetical tradition of the Yogācāras themselves,⁶² pointed to the *vijñāna* of the canonical *pratītyasamutpāda* formula,⁶³ which is occasionally taught to enter the womb at the moment of conception and to keep, by its presence, the embryo and the child growing,⁶⁴ and which may be identified with the *vijñāna* which, along with life-span or life-force (*āyus*) and bodily heat (*uṣman*), maintains the body alive⁶⁵ and withdraws from it at the moment of death.⁶⁶

1.3.4.2 On the other hand, Abhidharmic concepts like *mūlavijñāna*, **āsaṃsārīka-skandha* and *bhavāṅga-vijñāna*⁶⁷ ascribed to various traditional schools have been acknowledged as Śrāvakayānist forerunners of ālayavijñāna not only by modern scholars but also by the Yogācāras themselves, partly as early as in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*.⁶⁸ The existence of such concepts may, to be sure, have increased, on the part of the Yogācāras, the readiness to introduce a related concept. However, the historical relations of the earliest Yogācāra literature to these schools still pose unresolved problems.⁶⁹ Thus, one cannot exclude the possibility that those Śrāvakayānist concepts, as also, almost certainly,⁷⁰ a few canoni-

cal passages like AN II 131 (using the term '*ālaya*')⁷¹ or the Akṣarāśisūtra,⁷² were adduced only afterwards for the sake of averting the reproach of innovativeness.⁷³

1.3.5 However no such possibility is there with regard to the above-mentioned *viññāna* of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula nor with regard to another set of related notions, namely Seeds (*bīja*),⁷⁴ Badness (*daṣṭhulya*),⁷⁵ or Mind-containing-all-Seeds (*sarvabījakaṃ viññānam*),⁷⁶ Mind which is [the result of the] Maturation [of previous karman (and delight in worldly existence⁷⁷)] (*vipāka-viññāna*),⁷⁸ [Result-of-]Maturation containing all Seeds (*sarvabījako vipākaḥ*),⁷⁹ Mind appropriating the gross elements of the sense-faculties (**indriya-mahābhūtōpādātṛ viññānam*),⁸⁰ or Mind under the sway of Clinging (*sopādānaṃ viññānam*).⁸¹ Most of these notions, too, have, in the Yogācāra sources, been expressly identified or connected with, or at least *de facto* used as quasi-synonyms of, *ālayaviññāna*,⁸² but they are, besides, clearly recognizable as key-terms of, or as closely associated with, one or the other of the systematical contexts in which *ālayaviññāna* came to play a central rôle (see § 1.3.1). What is more: they do occur, already in the oldest Yogācāra source and even in its earliest, pre-*ālayaviññānic* layers (see § 1.6), precisely in such contexts where one would expect *ālayaviññāna*, only that it is just not mentioned or mentioned in such a way that it is clearly additional.⁸³ The significance of these notions for the theory of *ālayaviññāna* is thus beyond doubt. The question is, however, whether they, or at least one or the other of them, were - and if so: in which way they were - directly influential on the very introduction of *ālayaviññāna*, or whether instead they influenced the further development of this concept, being, as it were, the loose ends of speculation which came to be integrated into *ālayaviññāna* after its introduction for some other reason, upon which they too were developed in terms concurring with the innovation. However this may be, it is clear that for a comprehensive understanding of the

genesis and early development of ālayavijñāna in its wider context, a careful investigation of each of these concepts and the motives due to which they came up, as well as a precise determination of their relation to ālayavijñāna, is indispensable.

The notion of *bījas* and their rôle as a precursor of ālayavijñāna has already been discussed by several scholars,⁸⁴ but a comprehensive and perceptive description and historical evaluation of the considerably diverging *bīja* theories met with in the *Yogācārabhūmi*⁸⁵ has, to my knowledge, not yet been published. Recently, attention has been focussed on *vijñāna* in the context of *pratītyasamutpāda*⁸⁶ and on the notions of *sopādānaṃ vijñānam* and *upādāna*,⁸⁷ yielding valuable information on these aspects of the background of the formation of the ālayavijñāna theory. On the other hand, a similar investigation into the notions of *vipāka* and *vipākavijñāna* (cp. § 3.12) as well as into the concept of Badness (*dausṭhulya*)⁸⁸ is, as far as I know, still a desideratum.

1.4 It is thus obvious that for a comprehensive reconstruction of the genesis of the ālayavijñāna theory an exhaustive investigation of all these notions - including, of course, a re-evaluation of previous research - is indispensable; and it is no less obvious that this holds good also for the Śrāvakayānist precursors of ālayavijñāna as well as for all those systematical and exegetical contexts in which it came to play a part. However, such an effort is definitely beyond the scope of the present study. To be sure, when tracing the original meaning(s) or connotation(s) of the term 'ālayavijñāna' and the original character of the entity it denotes, and especially when discussing the early development of both the term and the concept of ālayavijñāna, I shall have to take into account, though admittedly in a preliminary way, at least those related concepts and contexts which appear to foreshadow ālayavijñāna within the Yogācāra tradition itself. But as for the question of the origin of ālayavijñāna, I shall lighten my task by narrowing it down to the question of its very birth, i.e. to the specific

question of why and in which context ālayavijñāna as a peculiar type of *viññāna*, clearly distinguished from at least the ordinary forms⁸⁹ of the six traditional *viññānas*, and also expressly called 'ālayavijñāna', was first introduced. Taken in this way, the question does not concern the origin of the mere expression 'ālayavijñāna' if at all it was used at an earlier stage, as some scholars believe,⁹⁰ in a sense not referring to a peculiar type of mind different from the traditional six *viññānas*; nor does it concern the origin of any other *viññāna* distinguished from the ordinary six but not (yet) called 'ālayavijñāna'; for even as a close precursor of ālayavijñāna - not to mention distant forerunners - this other *viññāna* could still have been introduced for reasons different from those which led to its transformation into ālayavijñāna or to its merely receiving the name 'ālayavijñāna'.

1.5 As the problem of the origin of ālayavijñāna in the strict sense of § 1.4 is bound to the term 'ālayavijñāna', it seems admissible to approach it by starting from text passages in which this term actually occurs.

One possible procedure would be to start from such passages which expressly state a reason why ālayavijñāna has to be adopted, i.e. from the proofs the Yogācāras give for the existence of ālayavijñāna, a first set of which is presented in the *Proof Portion*⁹¹ of the ālayavijñāna treatise in the beginning of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*⁹² (henceforward: *VinSg ālay. Treatise*), and another one (which, among other things, in view of its greater complexity and systematization is obviously somewhat later) in the first chapter of the *Mahāyānasamgraha*.⁹³ These proofs no doubt yield valuable information about the systematical and exegetical functions ālayavijñāna had acquired at that stage of development. But it should be borne in mind that such sets of formal proofs are usually established only after a given theory has been advanced,⁹⁴ and that they may, but need not necessarily, include the original

motive(s).⁹⁵ At any rate, singling out the original motive(s) would require additional evidence, to be obtained by a meticulous investigation into the doctrino-historical presuppositions of all the systematical and exegetical contexts involved in the various proofs - a task which would, once again, exceed the limits of this study.

I therefore prefer to approach the problem by scrutinizing the occurrences of (the term) 'ālayavijñāna' in the earliest pertinent Yogācāra source.

To be sure, later works could scarcely be neglected in a definitive treatment of the problem, at least if they may be expected to contain older materials or reminiscences of an older stage in the history of ālayavijñāna, for we cannot exclude *a priori* that the original motive(s) for introducing the notion, while lacking in the earliest pertinent source (deliberately or by accident), is (or are) nevertheless preserved in some later work. However, this is less probable, and as a first step it would thus seem natural to start from the earliest, or at least earliest available, source.

1.6.1 In most contributions to the question of the origin of ālayavijñāna as well as elsewhere, what is asserted or presupposed to be the earliest Yogācāra source, at least the earliest source in which ālayavijñāna is found, is the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (esp. its Vth chapter),⁹⁶ the (Mahāyāna-)Abhidharmasūtra sometimes being listed as the next earliest text,⁹⁷ in its turn followed by the Śāstras, especially the Yogācārabhūmi,⁹⁸ the Hsienyang-shêng-chiao-lun,⁹⁹ the works of "Maitreya" (viz. Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, Madhyāntavibhāga and Dharmadharmatāvibhāga), the Mahāyānasamgraha and the Abhidharmasamuccaya,¹⁰⁰ and the works of Vasubandhu.¹⁰¹ Yet, such a view, which appears to be, partly at least, due to the prejudice that, in principle, Sūtras can be expected to precede Śāstras,¹⁰² is, I think, bound to lead us astray.

1.6.2 Thus the *Abhidharma sūtra*¹⁰³ is not quoted or mentioned in the *Yogācārabhūmi* nor in any other text before the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.¹⁰⁴ From the doctrinal point of view, it¹⁰⁵ clearly represents an advanced stage of development quite close to that of the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* itself.¹⁰⁶ Therefore, it is probably not much older than the latter. Anyway, it seems to be later than the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*.¹⁰⁷

1.6.3 The *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, in its turn, is, to be sure, quoted, and even wholly incorporated, in the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* Section of the *Yogācārabhūmi*.¹⁰⁸ But, as I have tried to show in an earlier paper¹⁰⁹ and as has been demonstrated independently by Sh. Suguro¹¹⁰ and come to be accepted by several Japanese scholars,¹¹¹ it does not seem to be known to, or presupposed by, at least most¹¹² of the *Basic Section* (*Saptadaśabhūmika*,¹¹³ 本事分),¹¹⁴ nor, as far as I know, the *Vastu-saṃgrahaṇī*.¹¹⁵ The *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* seems rather to presuppose some of the peculiar concepts and doctrines of the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*.¹¹⁶

1.6.4 One of these concepts is *ālayavijñāna*. Usually, the new kind of *vijñāna* distinguished from the ordinary six is, in those chapters of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* where it occurs,¹¹⁷ called '*ādānavijñāna*'. But in one passage¹¹⁸ it is stated to be also called '*ālayavijñāna*'. This looks like an "inclusivistic" identification of the *Sūtra*'s own concept with an already existing concept of another, somehow related but perhaps also rivalling group. In any case, it would seem improbable that one single new concept should have been given two new names right from the outset. Besides, in the case of the opposite assumption, viz. that the *Yogācārabhūmi* borrowed *ālayavijñāna* from the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, one would hardly be able to explain the fact that the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* consistently uses '*ālayavijñāna*', i.e. the term which is margin-

al in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, but nowhere the main term 'āḍānavijñāna',¹¹⁹ which is found only in the Vinīścayasamgrahaṇī, its occurrences being, however, limited, even there, to quotations from the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra.¹²⁰ Therefore, the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, at least the portions concerned with the new kind of vijñāna distinguished from the ordinary six, was most probably composed before the Vinīścayasamgrahaṇī but after the *Basic Section* of the Yogācārabhūmi.¹²¹

1.6.5 Such a view presupposes, however, that the Yogācārabhūmi is a compilation consisting of several (or at least two) heterogeneous (or at any rate chronologically distinct) layers¹²² and is not, as A. Mukai¹²³ assumes, an entirely coherent work executed, and planned in advance to the last detail, by one single author. Indeed, the latter possibility appears to me highly improbable,¹²⁴ all the more since the present investigation will show that the ālayavijñāna theory of (at least a part of) the initial portion of the Vinīścayasamgrahaṇī is not, as Mukai asserts,¹²⁵ a full treatment of this concept in complete harmony with the brief statements on the matter in the *Basic Section*, but involves rather a concept of ālayavijñāna which is altogether different from, nay incompatible with, that of the *Basic Section*.¹²⁶ Moreover, it would be quite strange, upon Mukai's presuppositions, that in the Samāhitā Bhūmiḥ of the *Basic Section* (see § 2.1) the presence of ālayavijñāna in nirodhasamāpatti is expressly taught to be indispensable, whereas in a subsequent chapter (viz. the Śrāvakabhūmi) no mention is made of it when this same state is defined (see § 2.3 + n. 156). I therefore continue to prefer the "compilation hypothesis" as the most probable one.¹²⁷

1.6.6 For the present investigation it does not matter whether, as N. Hakamaya stresses,¹²⁸ Aśaṅga was the compiler of the Yogācārabhūmi or at least involved in the compilation process (and, if he was, in which way). What matters is that the

compilation rests on materials that are heterogeneous to a certain extent (heterogeneity being presumably due to difference of not only time but also ambience, etc.), and that it took place in more than one step. In the present context, it may be sufficient to distinguish, roughly, three main layers:¹²⁹

- 1) portions - probably the oldest layer(s) - not containing any reference to ālayavijñāna: parts of the *Basic Section*, esp. the Śrāvakabhūmi and the Bodhisattvabhūmi, and the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī;
- 2) the rest of the *Basic Section*, with sporadic occurrences of ālayavijñāna but no reference to the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra;
- 3) the Vinīścayasamgrahaṇī containing a detailed treatment of ālayavijñāna and the same time quoting and making use of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra.

1.6.7 This distinction of layers does not imply that each layer is homogeneous in itself. Nor does it mean that later layers may not also include some fairly old materials; for it is obvious that the Vinīścayasamgrahaṇī, e.g., contains also such materials as precede or at least altogether ignore the (pertinent parts of the) Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra¹³⁰ or the ālayavijñāna theory.¹³¹ Nor does it exclude that the earlier layers may contain sporadic additions by the (or a) later compiler or redactor; for a few passages of the *Basic Section* actually show isolated occurrences of concepts not found except in the post-Saṃdhinirmocana materials of the Vinīścayasamgrahaṇī.¹³² But apart from these very few exceptions it is the *Basic Section* of the Yogācārabhūmi that should, in our case, be regarded as the earliest source, and it is therefore the pertinent passages in this text that should be investigated first.

1.7 What is, in my opinion, required in order to proceed from mere plausibility to historical certainty or at least well-founded probability is to check each passage or context that might be supposed to have given birth to ālayavijñāna (in the sense of § 1.4) against the following criteria:

- (1) Either the systematical/dogmatical or exegetical situation must be shown to have clearly reached a stage at which the introduction of a new type of *viññāna* became inevitable, or there must be unambiguous evidence for direct psychological or mystical experience of such a new type of *viññāna*;
- (2) The specific quality or function of this new type of *viññāna* must render fully plausible the choice of the term 'ālayaviññāna'.

1.8 In this connection, it should be borne in mind that there is no unanimous tradition as to the literal meaning of the term 'ālayaviññāna'. There is no explicit explanation of its literal meaning in the *Yogācārabhūmi*¹³³ but only an implicit one (see § 6.2.2.d) which is, however, hardly original (§ 6.2.3, esp. a). The oldest available explanation,¹³⁴ at least the oldest explicit explanation, is rather the one that is found in the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*.¹³⁵ Other important early sources explaining the term 'ālayaviññāna' are: *Abhidharmasūtra*,¹³⁶ *Mahāyānasamgraha*,¹³⁷ and Vasubandhu's *Karmasiddhi*,¹³⁸ *Pratītyasamutpādayākhyā* (*Pratītyasamutpādādivibhaṅganirdeśa*)¹³⁹ and *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa*.¹⁴⁰ The explanations, however, diverge considerably, probably due to doctrinal developments,¹⁴¹ but also to the very ambiguity of the word 'ālaya' which, though preferably used in the sense of "Clinging" or "that to which one clings" in the canonical texts,¹⁴² was variously concretized by the *Ābhidhārmikas*¹⁴³ and may, on top of that, have been used by the *Yogācāras* in any meaning current in ordinary Sanskrit.¹⁴⁴

1.9 It cannot of course be ruled out *a priori* that an investigation on the lines of the criteria stipulated in § 1.7 might have a negative result in the case of all the occurrences of *ālayaviññāna* in the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. In that event, it would be reasonable to assume, with Suguro,¹⁴⁵ that the notion of *ālayaviññāna* was formed outside the *Yogācārabhūmi* (or the materials incorporated in its *Basic Section*)

and taken over by it as a ready concept already alienated from its original meaning and context, or at least that this original context was, for some reason or by accident, not included in the materials compiled. In order to discover the original meaning and context of ālayavijñāna one would, in this case, depend on inference or, at best, on scrutinizing later sources in the hope of finding the original meaning and context of ālayavijñāna still preserved, by some lucky chance, in one or the other of them. Yet, the result would, in any case, be more doubtful than if a passage satisfying the requirements of § 1.7 could be found in the *Basic Section* itself.

It is the aim of the subsequent part of this paper to show that at least one such passage does in fact exist - a passage, by the way, which so far seems to have escaped the attention of scholars, or at least has not been recognized in its full significance.

The fact that this passage can be shown to actually satisfy both the requirements stipulated in § 1.7 and thus permits to derive from it a hypothesis on the origin (in the strict sense of § 1.4) and early development of the ālayavijñāna theory does not *eo ipso* exclude that other passages or contexts - even from the *Basic Section* of the Yogācārabhūmi, not to mention later sources - might also satisfy these requirements and could therefore likewise claim to explain the origin of ālayavijñāna. Theoretically speaking, ālayavijñāna may have been introduced in order to cover several functions from the very beginning. Yet, for the time being I have to confine myself to presenting a preliminary examination of the other pertinent passages from the *Basic Section* only (§ 6). An evaluation of later sources, which of course may contain additional contexts of ālayavijñāna satisfying the requirements of § 1.7, is beyond the scope of this paper (for an exception see § 7.3). Their evidential strength would in any case be inferior to that of passages from the *Basic Section*, except if it could be shown beyond doubt that they constitute or at any rate faithfully represent materials of at least the same

antiquity as those contained in the latter, the *onus probandi* being incumbent on him who advocates such a thesis.

2. Introduction and original meaning of ālayavijñāna

2.1 The passage which I take to represent the starting-point of the ālayavijñāna theory - and which appears not to have received so far the attention it deserves - is found in the Samāhitā Bhūmiḥ of the *Basic Section* of the Yogācārabhūmi:¹⁴⁶

"When [a person] has entered [Absorption into] Cessation (*nirodha(samāpatti)*), his mind and mental [factors] have ceased; how, then, is it that [his] mind (*vijñāna*) has not withdrawn from [his] body? - [Answer: No problem;] for [in] his [case] ā l a y a v i j ñ ā n a has not ceased [to be present] in the material sense-faculties, which are unimpaired: [ālayavijñāna] which comprises (/possesses / has received)¹⁴⁷ the Seeds of the forthcoming [forms of] mind (*pravṛttivijñāna*), so that they are bound to re-arise in future (i.e. after emerging from absorption)."

2.2 To be sure, this passage (which I shall henceforward call *Initial Passage*) does not expressly introduce ālayavijñāna as a new concept, and therefore does not look like a spontaneous verbalization of its discovery, jotted down, as it were, immediately after the idea of ālayavijñāna had been conceived for the first time. Rather the passage gives the impression of an adaptation of this discovery to the forms of a dogmatic discussion or catechizing. But it cannot simply be taken for granted that a spontaneous, non-formalized verbalization of the discovery of ālayavijñāna was ever - so to speak - officially promulgated; and even if this were the case, the spontaneous verbalization does not seem to have been preserved as such but only in the formalized guise of the present passage, which is thus the only available starting-point for investigation and at any rate in this sense the *Initial Passage*.

2.3 At any rate, it is obvious that my *Initial Passage*, which was moulded into a formal proof of ālayavijñāna in the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* (see § 1.5),¹⁴⁸ satisfies the first of the two requirements stipulated in § 1.7, viz. it contains a cogent motive for the introduction of a new type of *vijñāna* different from the six traditional *vijñānas*. For it virtually refers to a passage from a canonical Sūtra¹⁴⁹ where the difference between death and Absorption into the Cessation of Notions (or: Ideations¹⁵⁰) and Sensations (*saṃjñā-vedayita-nirodha-samāpatti*) is said to be based on the fact that in the latter state, in contrast to death, life-force (*āyus*) is not yet exhausted, bodily heat (*uṣman*) is not yet extinguished, the sense-faculties are unimpaired, and *vijñāna* has not withdrawn from the body. That this Sūtra passage makes the assumption of some *vijñāna* in *nirodhasamāpatti* almost¹⁵¹ inevitable is also documented by the fact that according to Vasubandhu¹⁵² it is on this same passage that Vasumitra,¹⁵³ in a lost work called *Paripṛcchā*, based his thesis that in *nirodhasamāpatti* mind (*citta*) continues to exist.¹⁵⁴ But, according to the Abhidharma of the "orthodox" Sarvāstivādins/Vaibhāṣikas,¹⁵⁵ in *nirodhasamāpatti* all kinds of mind (*citta/vijñāna*) and mental factors (*caitta*) - i.e. the six traditional kinds of *vijñāna* and their associates - are interrupted, and precisely the same view had also been adopted by the earliest Yogācāras.¹⁵⁶ Thus, the only way out of the difficulty was to declare the *vijñāna* which has not withdrawn from the body in *nirodhasamāpatti* to be an o t h e r, subliminal type of *vijñāna*, which, as sense-perception is excluded from all meditative absorption, could either be determined as an u n u s u a l f o r m of *manovijñāna*¹⁵⁷ or more convincingly¹⁵⁸ - and this is how the Yogācāras decided or quite soon came to decide - as an e n t i r e l y n e w k i n d of *vijñāna* completely different from the ordinary six.¹⁵⁹

2.4 Yet one may raise the question why the Sarvāstivādins did not feel the same need. The answer is simple enough: because their version of the Sūtra passage¹⁶⁰ (as also that of the Pāli

school¹⁶¹) did not contain the crucial reference to *viññāna* (*viññānam cāsyā kāyād anapakrāntaṃ bhavati*¹⁶²) but only mentioned life-force, bodily heat and sense-faculties. To be sure, this version of the Sarvāstivādins (and Theravādins) may be authentic in view of the original character of *nirodhasamāpatti* as a kind of mystical anticipation of Nirvāṇa-after-death,¹⁶³ which would seem to imply the cessation also of *viññāna*.¹⁶⁴ But it does not harmonize with the preceding paragraph of the Sūtra; for according to all versions known to me, this preceding paragraph proclaims life-force, bodily heat and *viññāna* to be the principles of life, which by withdrawing from the body render it a corpse.¹⁶⁵ Thus, if, in the subsequent paragraph of the Sūtra, the words '*viññānam cāsyā kāyād anapakrāntaṃ bhavati*' in the version followed by the Yogācārabhūmi (and by Vasumitra: see § 2.3) - which is almost certainly that of the Mūlasarvāstivādins¹⁶⁶ - are in fact an addition, they were almost certainly motivated by the intention of harmonizing this paragraph of the Sūtra with the preceding one.

To be sure, even the preceding paragraph of the Sūtra, as a general statement that life depends on life-force, bodily heat and *viññāna*, might have been found to imply continuous presence of (subtle) *viññāna* even in unconscious states;¹⁶⁷ but the assumption of some kind of *viññāna* in *nirodhasamāpatti* was, on the basis of this passage, far less imperative than on the basis of an express statement as is found in the Mūlasarvāstivāda version of the Sūtra. Thus, it was only for the followers of the Mūlasarvāstivāda tradition (or of traditions with similar versions, if there were any) that the problem arose that even in the state of *nirodhasamāpatti* where all ordinary *viññānas* were absent some other form of *viññāna* was nevertheless required, although there are passages¹⁶⁸ which show that the Yogācāras do not seem to have become aware of this problem right from the outset but only after pertinent dogmatic speculation had deepened, and even then perhaps not all of them at the same time.¹⁶⁹

2.5 In order to solve the problem, the Yogācāras, according to my *Initial Passage* (§ 2.1), seem to have recurred to the theory, sometimes ascribed to "certain Sautrāntikas",¹⁷⁰ that (the body and) the material sense-faculties (*rūpīndriya*) on the one hand and mind (*citta*, *viññāna*) on the other contain their own Seeds (*bīja*) as well as the Seeds of each other.¹⁷¹ This theory which is also found transmitted in the Yogācārabhūmi¹⁷² appears, to be sure, to have been developed in the context of the different problem of how mind can re-a-r-i-s-e a-f-t-e-r unconscious (*acittaka*) states,^{172a} and corporeal matter after existence in the immaterial sphere (*ārūpyadhātu*).^{172b} But, since one of these unconscious states is *nirodha-samāpatti*, it implied the view that in this state the Seeds of mind continue to exist in the material sense-faculties. It is this aspect of the theory that was recurred to by the *Initial Passage*,¹⁷³ as is confirmed by the explicit addition of the attribute "material" (*rūpin*) to the sense-faculties - an attribute which is missing in the Sūtra passage the text refers to¹⁷⁴ - as also by the reference to the Seeds of the pravṛttivijñānas and their later reappearance (which is not called for by the question!). Yet, the different problem posed by the Sūtra passage to which the *Initial Passage* alludes (viz. that *viññāna* must not have withdrawn from the body, i.e. must be present in *nirodhasamāpatti*) could not be solved by merely referring to the presence of the Seeds of mind in *nirodhasamāpatti*. At least if the wording of the Sūtra was taken seriously, it rather could be solved only if the Seeds of mind, which according to the above-mentioned *bīja* theory continue to exist in the state of *nirodhasamāpatti*, were understood as or developed into a special form of mind proper, into a *viññāna* on its own, and this is precisely what the Yogācāras have done.¹⁷⁵

2.6 It is in the light of the connection of the *Initial Passage* with the above-mentioned *bīja* theory (§ 2.5) that I have, in § 2.1, translated the locative *rūpiṣv indriyeṣv aparīṇateṣu* not

as an absolute one ("for [in] his [case] - his material sense-faculties being unimpaired - ālayavijñāna ... has not ceased") but as a true locative, taking the text to mean that ālayavijñāna, comprising the Seeds of the ordinary forms of mind, continues to exist in the material sense-faculties which (or: since they) are [still] unimpaired,¹⁷⁶ as do the Seeds themselves in the above-mentioned *bīja* theory.

2.7 If this interpretation, supported by both the Tibetan¹⁷⁷ and the Chinese¹⁷⁸ translation, is accepted, it becomes obvious that the *Initial Passage* also meets the second requirement of § 1.7, i.e. it renders the choice of the term 'ālayavijñāna' plausible. For in it, this term would be most appropriate if taken to mean "the (or, if the term is new, perhaps better: a) [form of] mind [that is characterized by] sticking [in the material sense-faculties]", in the sense of being hidden in them¹⁷⁹ - a meaning which moreover would contrast perfectly with the term '*pravṛttivijñāna*', i.e. mind as it comes forth or manifests itself in a [cognitive] act.

2.8 This interpretation of the term 'ālayavijñāna' would seem to be confirmed, at any rate in substance,¹⁸⁰ by what appears to be the oldest extant explanation, or at least explicit explanation, of its literal meaning (see § 1.8), viz. *Samdh* V.3,¹⁸¹ where we read that the *vijñāna* taught in the preceding paragraph of the text, viz. Mind-containing-all-Seeds (**sarvabījakam cittam*), "is also called 'ālayavijñāna', because it sticks to and dissolves into or hides¹⁸² in the body,¹⁸³ in the sense of sharing its destiny¹⁸⁴ (i.e. becoming closely united with it)". Similarly, according to the third explanation of the term in the *Pañcaskandhaka*, ālayavijñāna is called 'ālayavijñāna' because it sticks to, or hides in, the body (**kāyālayanatām upādāya*)¹⁸⁵.

2.9 In view of the preceding observations, and provided I am right in taking the *Initial Passage* to represent the situation which gave birth to ālayavijñāna (in the strict sense: see § 1.4), my earlier explanation of the original meaning of the term 'ālayavijñāna' as "mind [the function of which is] clinging to (i.e. appropriation of) [the body]"¹⁸⁶ will need correction. That explanation was based on a less probable interpretation of Saṃdh V.3, on the related term 'āḍānavijñāna' used in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, on the quasi-synonymity of 'ālaya' and 'upādāna' taught in Y 26,18, and on the fact that, in the Yogācārabhūmi, one of the central functions of ālayavijñāna is to appropriate and keep appropriated the corporeal basis of one's personal existence (i.e. the body including the material sense-faculties¹⁸⁷) (āśrayopādāna).¹⁸⁸ To be sure, the present context, though not suggesting such an explanation, would not be incompatible with it either, because the reason why vijñāna must not withdraw from the body in nirodhasamāpatti is of course the fact that corporeal matter has to be kept appropriated (upātta) by mind in order to remain an intact, living body instead of rotting like a corpse.¹⁸⁹ As one may safely presuppose that the early Yogācāras were familiar with the canonical meaning of 'ālaya' (see § 1.8), one might be inclined to assume that the ambiguous term 'ālayavijñāna' was chosen deliberately in order to include the nuance that the "hidden" vijñāna continuing to exist during nirodhasamāpatti functions at the same time as the vijñāna that appropriates, or keeps appropriated, corporeal matter.¹⁹⁰ But I doubt that 'ālaya', in the traditional meaning of "clinging", is, except for late texts,¹⁹¹ actually used in this "biological" sense. Both the Mahāyānasamgraha,¹⁹² the Vibhāṣā¹⁹³ and the Pāli commentaries¹⁹⁴ point to "clinging" in a psychological, spiritually negative sense, as does also a definition found in the Śrutamayī Bhūmiḥ of the Yogācārabhūmi, according to which ālaya means longing for the past, eagerly looking forward to the future, and clinging to the present.¹⁹⁵ Thus, 'ālaya' in the traditional sense seems to correspond to 'upādāna' not in the

meaning of biological appropriation¹⁹⁶ but in the sense of spiritually negative Clinging, i.e. of *chandarāga*.¹⁹⁷ But precisely this latter aspect would seem to be practically excluded in the context of *nirodhasamāpatti* which, in addition to being unconscious, is accessible to Noble Ones (*ārya*; more precisely: *anāgāmins*) and Saints (*arhat*) only¹⁹⁸ (and was, originally, a kind of mystical anticipation of final Nirvāṇa,¹⁹⁹ as being similar to which it is qualified even in some later texts²⁰⁰). Therefore, in my *Initial Passage*, provided that it actually represents the situation in which ālayavijñāna was born (in the strict sense of § 1.4), the term 'ālayavijñāna' as such almost certainly does not include the nuance of biological appropriation nor that of spiritually negative Clinging.

2.10 Yet, like other semantically related concepts²⁰¹ 'ālaya' (in typically Buddhist usage) was employed not only as an action-noun but, as has already been indicated in § 1.8, also in a locative or p a s s i v e / o b j e c t i v e meaning,²⁰² i.e. in the sense of "that which is clung to", "that to which one clings", taken, by the commentators and exegetes, to designate either saṃsāric existence as a whole, or the objects of sensuality,²⁰³ or the *upādāna-skandhas*,²⁰⁴ i.e. the constituents of person-ality to which one clings because (or even in the very sense that) one believes them to be one's Self or one's own.²⁰⁵

As will be shown in detail later on (§ 3.11.2-4), there are, in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, passages where the [basis-of-]personal-existence (*ātmabhāva*), the [Result-of-]Maturation containing all Seeds (*sarvabīja(ak) o vipākaḥ*) or even the Seeds (*bīja*) are expressly stated to be the objective basis of the notion of 'I' or of the belief in Self, and even equated with *ālaya* in the passive sense. One might, therefore, assume that the *Initial Passage*, by choosing the term 'ālayavijñāna', may have intended to suggest that what has to be understood as the ultimate objective basis of the notion or feeling of and attachment to Ego is not the basis-of-personal-existence (*ātmabhāva*) in the traditional sense but rather the new kind of *vijñāna*.

But there is no proof that this was what did in fact happen. On the contrary, there are rather telling clues against such a possibility: If the term 'ālayavijñāna' had, from the outset, been intended to express, or at least to suggest, the new *vijñāna*'s being the object of Clinging to Ego, one would expect the earliest explanations of the term to make this meaning explicit. Yet, this is not the case, neither in the explanation of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra (§ 2.8) nor in the - implicit - "etymology" supplied by the *Basic Section* of the Yogācārabhūmi (for which see § 6.2.2.d), the oldest available source interpreting 'ālayavijñāna' as "mind that is clung to [as Self]" being the Mahāyānasamgraha (see § 3.11.8). Apart from this (which regards the term 'ālayavijñāna'), even the idea that ālayavijñāna is the objective basis of a (spontaneous) notion or feeling of Ego (in all ordinary people) is not explicitly stated before the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī (see § 3.11.5-7). It thus appears that this idea arose only some time after the introduction of ālayavijñāna, probably only after this concept had undergone an important change (see § 3.11.5). Thus, the term 'ālayavijñāna' can, in the *Initial Passage*, hardly be intended for the main purpose of indicating that the new *vijñāna* is "that which is clung to as Self".

At best, by coining the term 'ālayavijñāna', the *Initial Passage* may have intended to suggest, as a secondary nuance, that the new kind of *vijñāna* was a part of the basis-of-personal-existence (*ātmabhāva*) which is clung to as Self by ordinary people (cp. § 3.11.2 and 4). But at any rate such a nuance was, in case it had in fact been intended, not crucial to the specific context of the passage, and was hence not made explicit and developed except later on. It is thus equally possible, if not even probable, that such a nuance was, originally, not intended but came to be evoked afterwards automatically due to the predominant use of 'ālaya' in Buddhist texts, especially when the close connection of ālayavijñāna with *nirodhasamāpatti* or similar states (§ 3.1-3) had weakened. Such a subsequent association of the term 'ālayavijñāna' with the typically Buddhist meaning of

'ālaya' may have started in the prose explanation of the Pa-ramārthagāthās, where 'ālayavijñāna' may mean "vijñāna stuck to [as (the primary element of?) one's basis-of-personal-existence]" (see §§ 6.7.2 [1.b and 2.b] and 7.1B.2.2.1); and this association may have even been one of the factors which decisively contributed to some of the fundamental modifications of the c o n c e p t of ālayavijñāna.

2.11 Another nuance to be considered as possibly intended already in the *Initial Passage* by the term 'ālaya(vijñāna)' regards the relation of the new kind of mind to S e e d s , since such a relation is in fact expressed by the text itself when it declares ālayavijñāna to be possessed of, or to comprise (-pari-grhīta), the Seeds of the pravṛttivijñānas. And although an express explanation of 'ālayavijñāna' in the sense of "mind that is the abode or receptacle of Seeds" is not unambiguously documented²⁰⁶ before Vasubandhu the Kośakāra,²⁰⁷ one of the implicit "etymologies" of ālaya(vijñāna) in the *Basic Section* of the Yogācārabhūmi (see § 6.2.2.d) refers to its being furnished (-upagata) with Seeds. Actually, in a passage of the Savitarkādi-Bhūmi the expression that the Seed of something (x) is contained (-pari-grhīta) in something else (y)²⁰⁸ is equivalent to the expression that y is "approached by" or furnished with (-upagata) the Seed of x,²⁰⁹ and 'upagata' is, in its turn, a quasi-synonym of 'ālīna'.²¹⁰ Besides, the Seeds (bīja) are sometimes qualified as sticking (-sanniviṣṭa) in mind,²¹¹ and '(san)niviṣṭa' is another quasi-synonym of 'ālīna'.²¹⁰ Thus, the possibility that in the *Initial Passage* 'ālayavijñāna' may mean "mind to (or: in) which [the Seeds] stick", would seem to deserve consideration.

Yet, though, as an e x e g e t e , one might be able to justify such a use of the term 'ālayavijñāna' a p o s t e r i o r i , it is hardly conceivable how anybody could have c o i n - e d precisely this term for no more than designating the function of containing or comprising Seeds. For in contrast to related expressions like 'sanniviṣṭa', 'upagata' and 'pari-grhīta', the

terms 'ālaya' or 'ālīna' are n e v e r used, in the Yogācārabhūmi, in connection with Seeds. Thus, if the new *viññāna* was to be named after its function of comprising Seeds, one might have called it 'bījavijñāna' or the like, whereas the choice of the term 'ālayavijñāna' would remain unintelligible if viewed from this angle only. Therefore, the aspect of being stuck to by Seeds, too, can at best be regarded as a secondary nuance, incidentally alluded to by a term which was primarily coined to signalize the new *viññāna*'s sticking, and lying hidden, in the material sense-faculties.

This is further confirmed by the fact that the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra explains the term o n l y in the latter sense and does not even mention the possibility of interpreting 'ālaya' as being stuck to by Seeds, although I do not see any reason why it might have concealed such an interpretation if it had known it. Even in the Mahāyānasamgraha - a text in which being furnished with Seeds is no doubt the central aspect of ālayavijñāna (see § 5.12.2) -, an explanation of 'ālayavijñāna' in the sense of "mind stuck to by Seeds" is not found. One may argue that this explanation may have been deliberately i g n o r e d by the author of the Mahāyānasamgraha because he felt it to imply too much of a d i f f e r e n c e between Seeds on the one hand and ālayavijñāna on the other, which may not have fitted in with his view. But such a difference does not appear to obtain in the *Initial Passage* either (see § 2.13.1). Thus, in the latter, too, the connotation "mind stuck to by Seeds" would seem to be fairly improbable, though I admit that no definitive judgement is possible since the *Initial Passage* may just as well have not yet been aware of the conceptual distinctions the matter itself does, to be sure, involve.

2.12 Yet - provided that the preceding interpretation of the original meaning of 'ālayavijñāna' is correct - is it not rather surprising that the Yogācāras, though demonstrably²¹² familiar with the traditional Buddhist use of the word 'ālaya', never-

theless, in coining the term 'ālayavijñāna', resorted instead to the basic meaning the verb *ā-lī-* has in standard Sanskrit, the traditional Buddhist sense being, at best, a subordinate nuance? Is it possible that, though the term '*ālaya-*' was, to be sure, taken from Buddhist tradition, yet the meaning, at least the primary meaning, rather reflects an influence from some other, non-Buddhist tradition? I cannot resist the impression that one should consider, in this case, the possibility of an impact - though perhaps merely an atmospheric one and a deliberately alienated one²¹³ at that - from the side of the brahmanical Sāṅkhya system which was already flourishing at the time of the compilation of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (as is testified by the reference to *Vārṣaganya* in Y 119,2) and had, moreover, a conceptual pattern which could easily be adapted for solving the *nīrodhasamāpatti* problem.

A typical idea of the Sāṅkhya system is the contrast between latency and manifestation, between the disappearance and emergence of physical as well as psychic phenomena, and among the terms expressing disappearance there are also the verb *lī-* and the nouns '*laya*' and '*pralaya*'.²¹⁴ Thus, the choice of the term '*ālaya-vijñāna*' for the latent continuity of mind during *nīrodhasamāpatti* may have been stimulated by Sāṅkhya terminology.

The more so since in calling the actual, "forthcoming" forms of mind '*pravṛtti-vijñāna*' - which appears to be another newly coined expression - my *Initial Passage* seems to be influenced by the Sāṅkhya term '*pravṛtti*', designating precisely the same phenomena, viz. the functions of the subtle faculty of perception-and-cognition, the *buddhi* (or *citta*, if I may include the terminology of the Sāṅkhyistic *Yogasūtras*), which in its turn is the counterpart of *ālayavijñāna* (which was, by the way, quite soon taken to be the *citta catexochen*).²¹⁵

Viewed from this angle, it would seem that the formation of the terms '*ālayavijñāna*' and '*pravṛttivijñāna*' was stimulated by the Sāṅkhya notions of *buddhi* and *buddhivṛtti*, the specific Sāṅkhya term '*buddhi*' being, of course, replaced by a Buddhist equi-

valent, viz. '*viññāna*'. But since a Buddhist system could not accept the substantialist presuppositions of the Sāṅkhya concept of *buddhi/citta* and its functions but rather had to take the latent and the manifest aspect of mind as two forms of mind, each existing on its own, the *buddhi-vṛttis* had to be changed into *vṛtti*- or, by way of a slight alienation, into *pravṛtti*- *viññāna*s, and *buddhi/viññāna* had to be expressly qualified as that form of mind which is latent (*laya*-) or - replacing the Sāṅkhya term by a Buddhist one and at the same time more closely adapting it to the context - lying hidden in (*ā-laya*-) the material sense-faculties.

The probability of Sāṅkhya influence in the case of ālaya-viññāna is increased by the fact that the introduction of the second kind of mind peculiar to the Yogācāras, viz. *manas* in the sense of a continuous notion or feeling of Ego (for which see § 7.1A.2.2), appears on its part also to have received at least an additional stimulus from the side of the Sāṅkhya system,²¹⁶ where the "notion of Ego" (*aḥaṃkāra*) is established as an entity on its own, placed, similar to the new *manas* of the Yogācāras, between the *buddhi* (somehow corresponding to ālayaviññāna) and *manas* which, as the organ that gathers and coordinates sense-data and as the faculty of thought, corresponds to the *manoviññāna* of the Yogācāras.

2.13 After having tried to fix - on the basis of my *Initial Passage* - the original meaning of the term '*ālaya-viññāna*', I shall now attempt to establish its original nature and properties, once again starting from the presupposition that my *Initial Passage* has, in principle, faithfully preserved the original context of the introduction of ālaya-viññāna. This means that we should not all too readily supplement the information we can get out of the present passage by what we merely know from other - presumably later - descriptions or definitions of the concept. But it will be legitimate to take into account, with due caution, "pre-ālayaviññāna" materials and

see if - as in the case of the *bīja* theory mentioned in § 2.5 - they are presupposed by the *Initial Passage*.

2.13.1 The *Initial Passage* is unambiguous in associating ālayavijñāna with *Seeds* (*bīja*), more precisely: with the Seeds of the forthcoming or manifest forms of mind (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*). The term by which the *Initial Passage* expresses the relation between ālayavijñāna and Seeds, viz. *-parigrhīta*, is however too ambiguous to allow us to determine the precise nature of this relation. At least as far as I can see (cp. n. 147), it admits of being understood not only in the sense that ālayavijñāna possesses or contains the Seeds, implying that it is, itself, something more, but also in the sense that ālayavijñāna merely comprises them, being hardly anything else but their sum or totality.²¹⁷ In other words: There does not seem to exist, in the *Initial Passage*, any reliable clue for assuming that it did anything else but hypostatize the Seeds of mind lying hidden in corporeal matter to a new form of mind proper (see § 2.5), this new form of mind hardly, or, at best, but dimly, acquiring as yet an essence of its own, not to speak of the character of a veritable *vijñāna* (see § 5). Nor does the passage offer a reliable hint as to whether ālayavijñāna also contains other Seeds than those of the *pravṛttivijñānas* - a question which is, however, not relevant to the context of the *Initial Passage* and may, therefore, have come to be considered only afterwards (cp. § 3.13).

2.13.2 An important point of the ālayavijñāna concept of my *Initial Passage* is that ālayavijñāna is conceived of as sticking or hiding in the material sense-faculties. In view of the specific *bīja* theory which seems to have provided the basis for the ālayavijñāna idea (see § 2.5), this conception can be regarded as directly (though not unambiguously) expressed by the wording of the *Initial Passage* (see § 2.6) and as suggested by the term 'ālayavijñāna' (see § 2.7).

2.13.3 A further property of ālayavijñāna, which is not expressly stated in the *Initial Passage* but inevitably implied by ālayavijñāna's presence in *nirodhasamāpatti* and also indicated by its name (see § 2.7), is its being s u b t l e (*sūkṣma*)²¹⁸ or s u b l i m i n a l .

2.13.4 Moreover, as has already been hinted at (§ 2.9), the context of the Sūtra sentence, which is quoted in the *Initial Passage* and due to which the introduction of ālayavijñāna became imperative (§ 2.3), i m p l i e s that ālayavijñāna - as the *viññāna* which, by not withdrawing from the body, keeps it alive and prevents the person who has entered *nirodhasamāpatti* from dying - performs, in this state at least, the function of biological a p p r o p r i a t i o n (*upādāna*), which is actually ascribed to it in the first two chapters of the *Basic Section* (see § 3.5).

2.13.5 There is no statement, in the *Initial Passage*, as to the moral character of ālayavijñāna. To be sure, there may hardly be any reasonable alternative to its being qualified (as it actually is in other passages of the *Basic Section* (see § 3.3.1.4)) as "falling under [the category of Result-of-]Maturation [of previous karman]" (*vipākaśaṃgrhīta*) - which implies its being morally neutral (*avyākṛta*) -; but the issue may well have become thematic only somewhat after the introduction of ālayavijñāna (cp. §§ 3.3.1.4 and 3.12). Yet, if the term 'ālayavijñāna' had contained, from the outset, the nuance of the new *viññāna* being (part of) what is clung to as Self (see § 2.10), this would imply that already in the *Initial Passage* ālayavijñāna was probably regarded as part of the basis-of-personal-existence (*ātmabhāva*) in so far as it is [Result-of-]Maturation (*vipāka*) and the object of the notion of Self and of the feeling of identity (see § 3.11.2).

2.13.6 In the *Initial Passage*, ālayavijñāna is taught to be present, and to prevent death, in *nirodhasamāpatti*, but the passage does n o t tell us anything about its occurrence o u t s i d e *nirodhasamāpatti*. It may well be that ālayavijñāna

was, initially, conceived of as a kind of "gap-bridger", but hardly in such a way that its occurrence in ordinary states had been denied. It is more probable that this question had, at first, simply not yet become a conscious issue; and had it become a conscious issue already in the initial phase, probably ālayavijñāna would have been taken to be present in ordinary states also; for it appears that in the specific *bīja* theory on the basis of which the notion of ālayavijñāna seems to have been modelled in the *Initial Passage* (see § 2.5) the Seeds of mind lying hidden in the material sense-faculties were conceived of as a continuous series, present - at least throughout existence in the common, material world - even when the mental series, too, is functioning.²¹⁹ The possibility that ālayavijñāna was conceived of as a continuous entity already in the *Initial Passage* would almost turn into certainty in the - to be sure unlikely - case that the term 'ālayavijñāna' was, already in this passage, actually intended to include the nuance of "mind which is clung to [as Self]" (§ 2.10), because Clinging to Self can hardly take place in the state of *nirodhasamāpatti*²²⁰ but must refer rather to ordinary states of mind, and preferably to ordinary persons at that.

2.13.7 Like almost the whole of the Yogācārabhūmi²²¹ and even many parts of other early Yogācāra texts,²²² the *Initial Passage* does not show any trace of idealism or spiritualism, but on the contrary plainly contradicts such a position, since as already pointed out (§ 2.13.2) the sense-faculties are not only not taught to be mere images in ālayavijñāna but, on the contrary, ālayavijñāna is expressly taught to stick in the material sense-faculties. Besides, our passage only mentions, as arising from Seeds in ālayavijñāna, the pravṛttivijñānas, but not the material sense-faculties or the body or even the external world. And even if it did, this would not *eo ipso* imply their being nothing but mind or mental images.²²³ Rather we have to take into account the view that material

things may originate from mind, just as in the *bīja* theory presupposed by our passage (see § 2.5), and that this fact does by no means jeopardize their materiality and involve their ideality, no more than the complementary thesis of the afore-mentioned *bīja* theory, viz. that mind may, in certain situations, originate from matter, is intended to imply materialism. Thus, the origin of the *ālayavijñāna* theory does not seem to have any material connection with the origin of the doctrine of *vijñāptimātratā*,²²⁴ nor do, as far as I can see, the *Yogācārabhūmi* passages where *ālayavijñāna* occurs show any significant relation to *Mahāyāna*.²²⁵

3. Development of ālayavijñāna to the basic constituent of a living being

3.0.1 After having presented and discussed in § 2 what I consider to be the passage representing, in principle at least, the original context of the introduction of ālayavijñāna, I shall now try to show, on the basis of the earliest materials, how the newly introduced concept was subsequently developed. To be sure, this reconstruction of the early developments of the concept of ālayavijñāna is, once again, a hypothetical one, the more so since it presupposes an at least partly hypothetical chronology of the pertinent sources and takes as its starting point a passage only hypothetically initial. But, apart from the fact that I hope to have demonstrated the probability of the two hypotheses on which my reconstruction is based: if I should succeed in showing that the major subsequent developments can be reconstructed in a consistent and unstrained way on the basis of these hypotheses, this would be in its turn a further proof that they are correct. At any rate, some of the observations to be made in the course of reconstructing the subsequent developments of the ālayavijñāna concept may be worthwhile in their own right and will probably remain valid even if future research were to show that the line of development proposed by me needs correction.

3.0.2 In the present paragraph, I shall describe what one might call the straight or linear development of ālayavijñāna - its development from what appears to have been, primarily, a "gap-bridger" into the very basis of personal existence and, finally, even of all phenomena -, whereas the development of its negative (especially spiritually negative) aspects and the specific problems of its vijñāna nature will be treated in separate chapters (viz. §§ 4 and 5, respectively). In all cases, I mainly confine myself to the early period (*Basic Section* of the Yogācārabhūmi, Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and Viniścayasamgrahaṇī), with occa-

sional but short excursions into later developments (especially at the end of ch. 5, [viz. §§ 5.1off.], but cp. also §§ 3.11.8, 3.12.6-7, 3.13.5ff., and 4.8.5-6).

3.1 Whatever one may consider to be already implied, or not yet implied, by the *Initial Passage*, other passages of the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* make it certain that it was at any rate realized quite soon that the new concept of *ālayavijñāna* did not only solve the problem of *nirodhasamāpatti* but was applicable to other situations as well, and that it was, moreover, well suited for the purpose of tying up and at the same time further developing several loose ends of previous speculation.

3.2.1 To begin with, it was self-evident that the same difficulty as in *nirodhasamāpatti* - viz. that without the presence of some kind of *vijñāna* to appropriate, i.e. keep alive, corporeal matter the person entering this state would die - obtains no less in the case of the other state of unconscious absorption, viz. "absorption into [the state of] an unconscious [being]" (*asaṃjñīsamāpatti*). Therefore, although there was in this case, in contrast to *nirodhasamāpatti*, no Sūtra passage expressly stating the presence of a *vijñāna*, the similarity of the situation from the systematical point of view strongly suggested that in the case of *asaṃjñīsamāpatti*, too, it was the presence of *ālayavijñāna* that prevented death. Indeed, this conclusion is actually documented in a paragraph of the *Proof Portion*²²⁶ of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* (see § 1.5), where the existence of *ālayavijñāna* is proved by pointing out that otherwise unconscious absorption, expressly specified as *nirodha-* and *asaṃjñī-* *samāpatti*, would not be possible,²²⁷ the Sūtra passage that in *nirodhasamāpatti* *vijñāna* has not left the body being quoted here - in an unspecific form lacking the express reference to *nirodhasamāpatti* - merely as scriptural evidence corroborating the (dogmatic) argument.

3.2.2 The fact that the extension of ālayavijñāna from *nirodha-* to *asaṃjñīsamāpatti* has been documented, in the preceding paragraph, only from the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* does not mean that this step, in spite of being all too obvious, was taken comparatively late. Rather it shows that the *Proof Portion* includes fairly old elements.²²⁸ For not only for this step but even for what would seem to be a further one, viz. the explicit extension of the presence of ālayavijñāna to other comparable states, there is clear proof already in the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. For the *Sacittikā-and-Acittikā Bhūmiḥ*²²⁹ teaches that ālayavijñāna is present in five of the six unconscious states, i.e. not only in *nirodha-* and *asaṃjñīsamāpatti* but also in an existence as an unconscious [heavenly] being (*āsaṃjñīka*, the cosmic pendant to *asaṃjñīsamāpatti*) as well as in deep sleep and deep swoon,²³⁰ and that it is only missing in the state of Extinction where no "possessions" (i.e. skandhas) remain (*nirupadhiśeṣo nirvāṇadhātuḥ*).

3.3.0 Other states for which at least f a i n t n e s s of consciousness was regarded to be typical are the moment of r e b i r t h - more precisely: of Linking up (*pratisandhi*) a new existence, which in the case of human beings and "higher" animals means: at the moment of conception - and the moment of d e a t h .²³¹ According to the *Vaibhāṣikas*, this faint consciousness was a *manovijñāna*,²³² and originally this appears to have been the view of the *Yogācāras*, too.²³³ It is even reported to have been advocated by later representatives of this school.²³⁴ Yet, it would seem that ālayavijñāna - like *bhavaṅga-viññāna* in *Theravāda* dogmatics²³⁵ - was better calculated to explain these two states also. In fact, in late *Yogācāra* sources the view is expressed that at the moment of conception as well as at that of death there is no *manovijñāna* but only²³⁶ ālayavijñāna.²³⁷ In the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, however, there is no mention of ālayavijñāna in connection with the moment of death or process of dying (apart, of course, from the fact that its presence in *nirodhasamāpatti* p r e v e n t s death), but it does occur in

the context of rebirth/conception, though even here it is not so much the psychological aspect but rather the biological function of mind which appears to have entailed its introduction.

3.3.1.1 This biological function of mind (*viññāna*) at the moment of conception is already expressed by the canonical statement²³⁸ that if *viññāna* did not enter the mother's womb, *nāmarūpa* (largely = mind and matter) would not be able to coalesce (*saṃ-mūrch-*)²³⁹, or the father's semen and the mother's blood^{239a} (which have amalgamated there) would not be able to coalesce [with mind] or/and coagulate, so as to become the proto-embryo (*kalala*). Similar formulations can be found in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*²⁴⁰ and the *Basic Section*²⁴¹ of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. But in one passage of the *Basic Section*²⁴² as well as in later *Yogācāra* sources²⁴³ and even in later quotations of the canonical statement²⁴⁴ the phraseology is slightly changed to the effect that it is now mind (*viññāna*) that is stated to coalesce with, or merge into (*saṃ-mūrch-*), the mixture of semen and blood.

3.3.1.2 It is evident that this *viññāna* merging into the initial stage of corporeal matter was almost predestinated to be - and, in the *Manobhūmi* of the *Basic Section*,²⁴⁵ in fact was - identified with *ālayaviññāna*, "mind [characterized by] sticking in [the material sense-faculties]". The more so since, similar to *ālayaviññāna* present in *nirodhasamāpatti*, which is, in the *Initial Passage*, stated to comprise the Seeds (*bīja*) of the *pravṛttiviññānas* (§ 2.13.1), mind at the moment of conception too is taught to contain all Seeds (*sarvabīja(ka)*).²⁴⁶ Moreover, by merging into semen-cum-blood it causes the next moment²⁴⁷ of this series of material factors to be furnished with the sense of touch (*kāyendriya*),²⁴⁸ i.e. to be a sensitive, living organism; and the coalescing of proto-embryonic matter and mind - which means that they become so closely united as to share each other's destiny (*anyonyayogakṣema*)²⁴⁹ - has the effect that mind prevents embryonic matter from putrefying,²⁵⁰ which in its turn means nothing else than that the *viññāna* arising at the moment of conception

initiates biological appropriation (*upādāna*),²⁵¹ which was also implied as an essential function of ālayavijñāna in *nīrodhasamāpatti* (see § 2.13.4). Finally, the merging of *viññāna* into semen-cum-blood at the moment of conception should also include the aspect - typical of ālayavijñāna in *nīrodhasamāpatti* - of hiding there, since the term *saṃ-mūrch-*, when predicated of *viññāna*, suggests also the nuance of "fainting".²⁵²

3.3.1.3 Yet, it would seem that in spite of these agreements the context of entering the womb at the moment of conception entails, at the same time, a slight shift of meaning of the term 'ālayavijñāna'; for in contrast to the *Initial Passage* (§ 2.1), where the state of being hidden in the material sense faculties appears to be the predominant aspect, in the context of mind entering the womb at the moment of conception what is in the foreground is rather the act or process of merging into, or of becoming closely united with, the germinal state of the body as a whole, and it seems to be to this context that the explanation of the term 'ālayavijñāna' in the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* (see § 2.8) refers.²⁵³

3.3.1.4 Finally, it may have been in the context of its (explicit) identification with the *viññāna* arising at the moment of conception that ālayavijñāna came to be expressly regarded as "falling under [the category of what is a result of the] Maturation [of previous karman (and Delight in worldly existence)]"²⁵⁴ (*vipākasamgrhīta*). For at least in an analysis of *pratītyasamutpāda*, found both in the *Basic Section* and in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*,²⁵⁵ the *viññāna* which is produced at the time of Linking up (*pratisandhiphalaviññāna*) in the very first moment of the new existence is expressly taught to be [Result-of-]Maturation (*vipāka*),²⁵⁶ as in Theravāda Abhidharma²⁵⁷ but contrary to the Vaibhāṣikas²⁵⁸ and even to at least one (pre- or at any rate non-ālayavijñānic) passage of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*.²⁵⁹ At any rate, in the passage of the *Manobhūmi* of the *Basic Section* where it has expressly taken the place of mind merging with semen-cum-

blood at the moment of conception, ālayavijñāna is explicitly qualified as belonging to the category of [Result-of-]Maturation.²⁶⁰

3.3.2.1 As has already been stated (§ 3.3.0), in the *Basic Section* of the Yogācārabhūmi ālayavijñāna has not yet been introduced into the context of the moment of death or process of dying. As far as the psychological aspect is concerned, the *Basic Section* says, on the one hand, that one may die either in a good (*kuśala*) or a bad (*akuśala*) or a neutral (*avyākṛta*) state of mind²⁶¹ (which is also the doctrine of the Vaibhāṣikas)²⁶². On the other hand, it is said that in a dying man, at least if he is an ordinary person,²⁶³ there arises self-love (*ātmasneha*), followed by welcoming or desiring a [new] basis-of-personal-existence (*ātmabhāvābhinandanā*)²⁶⁴,²⁶⁵ and this would seem to entail that mind at the moment of death is always defiled (*kliṣṭa*).²⁶⁶ In both passages, the dying person may, before actually dying, lapse into a state of faint (*sūkṣma*), indistinct (*avispaṣṭa*) consciousness (*saṃjñā*)²⁶⁷ which in the first is taught to be morally neutral (*avyākṛta*)²⁶⁸ and in the second may well include a kind of half-conscious continuation of desire for a new basis-of-personal-existence,²⁶⁹ although one has to admit that the text of the Yogācārabhūmi does not explicitly say so.²⁷⁰ In a pre- or non-ālayavijñānic piece of the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī an altogether different view is advocated, according to which mind at the moment of death is, as in Theravāda,²⁷¹ exclusively [Result-of-]Maturation (*vipāka*) and therefore morally neutral and not obstructed [by Defilements] (*anivṛtāvyākṛta*).²⁷² And even in those portions of the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī which make use of ālayavijñāna it is only in the special case of the Arhat who is going to enter the state of Extinction where no "possessions" (i.e. skandhas) remain (*nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇadhātu*) that, in one passage,²⁷³ mind at the moment of death is unambiguously implied to be nothing but ālayavijñāna because the Arhat dies in the state of *nirōdhasamāpatti* where only ālayavijñāna is left.

In the case of ordinary persons, however, the presence of *mano-vijñāna* at death seems to be explicitly stated even in one of the "ālayavijñānic" portions of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*.²⁷⁴

3.3.2.2 Once again, it is rather under the biological aspect that ālayavijñāna appears to have, in a general way, come to be introduced into the context of death. To be sure, the mere fact that at the moment of death mind (*vijñāna*) is said to abandon the body (or the corporeal basis of personal existence) it had kept appropriated throughout life²⁷⁵ may be taken to suggest that this function should have been ascribed to ālayavijñāna at least as soon as the latter had expressly become identified with the *vijñāna* initiating the appropriation of the (germinal state of the) body at the moment of conception. But there was no compulsion to do so as long as the presence of another kind of *vijñāna* at the moment of death was not called into question (cp. § 3.3.2.1) and as long as biological appropriation had not expressly become the exclusive function of ālayavijñāna (an exclusiveness which appears difficult to prove for the initial period and would presuppose the continuity of ālayavijñāna (see § 2.13.6)). It is rather a specific aspect of this biological function of *vijñāna* at death that may have favoured its attribution to ālayavijñāna: viz. the fact that, at least in the case of gradual death (*kramacyuti*),²⁷⁶ *vijñāna* was considered to abandon the body in steps, starting - in accordance with one's karman and signaling, by the direction of its movement, the direction of rebirth - either from the upper or from the lower part of the body, the withdrawal of *vijñāna* being indicated by a corresponding disappearance of bodily heat.²⁷⁷ It is obvious that such a process lends itself to being explained in terms of a "somatic" *vijñāna* which was, like ālayavijñāna, regarded as sticking in, or pervading, the body and could easily be imagined to withdraw from it, step by step, in the process of dying. Yet, even in this context the *Basic Section*²⁷⁸ does not introduce ālayavijñāna but merely uses the inspecific

term '*viññāna*', as do also the Vaibhāṣika sources which advocate a similar view²⁷⁹ and do not seem to have felt any difficulty either, the gradual withdrawal of mind and disappearance of bodily heat being explained by a gradual shrinking of the sense of touch (*kāyendriya*).²⁸⁰ It is only in the *Proof Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* that the body's becoming gradually cold in the process of dying is explained to be due to a gradual withdrawal of ālayaviññāna as the subject of biological appropriation.²⁸¹ Under these circumstances, it would seem doubtful that the fact that ālayaviññāna came to be employed in the context of the biological aspect of mind in the process of dying further contributed to expressly regarding it as a continuous entity of which biological appropriation is the exclusive function (let alone the possibility that it might have been in this context that ālayaviññāna was first conceived); it would appear more likely that ālayaviññāna was rather resorted to for a better explanation of the biological functions of *viññāna* at death only after it had already clearly come to be conceived of as the continuous and exclusive subject of biological appropriation, as seems to be the case already in some passages of the *Basic Section* (see § 3.5).

3.4.1 To be sure, ālayaviññāna may well have been conceived of as continuous from the outset, but in the absence of an explicit statement to this effect in the *Initial Passage* we cannot be sure of this (see § 2.13.6). Even the fact that ālayaviññāna is, in other passages, declared to occur not only in *nīrodhasamāpatti* but also in other states where consciousness is lacking or is faint (§§ 3.1-2 and 3.3.1) does not necessarily imply its continuity, as is shown by the counter-evidence of *bhavaṅgaviññāna* which, though functioning in all kinds of gaps,²⁸² is yet regarded to be interrupted as soon as conscious mind processes arise.²⁸³ But *bhavaṅgaviññāna*, in contrast to ālayaviññāna, has nothing to do with Seeds (*bīja*), which do not figure in the Theravāda system. Therefore, it may not be unreasonable to suppose that the idea of

the continuity of ālayavijñāna somehow derives from its association with Seeds; how precisely, is, however, a question which I can answer only in a rather speculative way (§§ 3.4.2-3).

3.4.2 One possibility is that the idea of the continuity of ālayavijñāna may have been provoked, or at any rate reinforced, by the fact that it came to be identified with, or to supersede, "Mind-containing-all-Seeds" (*sarvabīja(ka)m vijñānam*)²⁸⁴ since in an older version of the (materials compiled in the) first two chapters of the *Basic Section* (see § 6.1 and 6.3) the latter appears to have fulfilled functions in two contexts with which ālayavijñāna had already been, or could easily come to be, associated: viz. as the basis in the sense of Seed (*bījāśraya*)²⁸⁵ of sense perceptions and *manovijñāna*²⁸⁶ and as the *vijñāna* merging into semen-cum-blood at the moment of conception.²⁸⁷ Now, it appears that Mind-containing-all-Seeds is something like the mind series (*vijñānasantāna*) in so far as it contains all Seeds: not yet conceived of as a new kind of mind in its own right but at best on the point of developing in this direction (see § 7.3.6.3.3). If this is correct, Mind-containing-all-Seeds - being, in substance, identical with the mind series - would be largely (i.e. apart from states like *nīrodhasamāpatti* which may simply have not been envisaged) continuous. Thus, when ālayavijñāna came to supersede Mind-containing-all-Seeds, it should, in addition to incorporating the Seeds contained in mind, have also inherited the approximative continuity of Mind-containing-all-Seeds, and have at the same time supplemented it so as to reach complete continuity in so far as ālayavijñāna itself was conceived of as being present in precisely those occasional unconscious states where the ordinary mind series was interrupted.

3.4.3 Yet, it appears likewise possible that ālayavijñāna was conceived as being continuous even before it came to take the place of Mind-containing-all-Seeds. As already suggested in § 2.13.6, the Seeds of mind sticking in the material sense-faculties

- by hypostatizing which into a new kind of *viññāna* the concept of ālayaviññāna appears to have arisen (§ 2.5) - seem to have been considered a more or less continuous series, which means that even from the very outset ālayaviññāna, too, may have been conceived as being continuous, at least by tendency. Whether this was the case or not, continuity may, at any rate, have come in or been reinforced by the fact that, just as the Seeds of mind contained in corporeal matter, so also the Seeds of mind contained in the mind series (*viññānasantāna*) - which, apart from sporadic interruptions as in *nirodhasamāpatti*, definitely form a continuous flow - could, with the same right, be hypostatized²⁸⁸ and even declared to be a subliminal form of mind in their own right; or, since there is no reason to assume two such new kinds of mind with identical functions, they could simply be added to ālayaviññāna. The latter would thus have come to comprise both sets of Seeds, thereby virtually becoming identical with the beginningless and continuous series of Seeds (*bīja-santāna-prabandho 'nādikālikah*)²⁸⁹ sticking in the basis-of-personal-existence as a whole,²⁹⁰ and it would likewise naturally have come to supersede the less elaborate concept of Mind-containing-all-Seeds (see § 3.4.2).

3.5 In view of the preceding considerations it would seem legitimate to understand ālayaviññāna in the first three chapters of the *Basic Section*,²⁹¹ even in the absence of an express statement to that effect, as a continuous entity which, as the result of the Maturation (*vipāka*) of previous karman, enters the mother's womb at the moment of conception and merges into semen-cum-blood, appropriating (*upādātṛ*) it so as to constitute it as a living organism, and keeping it appropriated throughout life, even in unconscious states, and which, comprising all Seeds (*sarvabījaka*), functions throughout life as the basis in the sense of Seed (*bījāśraya*) of every kind²⁹² of sense-perception and mental cognition (*manoviññāna*).

3.6 This is, at any rate, the unequivocal position of the (basic layer of)²⁹³ the *Proof Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*, where the picture is, moreover, completed by the information that the *viññāna* which - step by step - abandons the body at the time of death cannot be anything else but the *viññāna* which had, throughout life, kept it appropriated, i.e. *ālayaviññāna* (see § 3.3.2.2).

3.7.1 In the *Proof Portion* (especially its basic layer), biological appropriation, i.e. being the principle of life sticking in, and pervading, the body, is clearly the predominant function of *ālayaviññāna*. The "somatic" character of *ālayaviññāna* is, in the *Proof Portion*, moreover manifest in the idea that the existence of *ālayaviññāna* is evident from (i.e. - as I understand it - that its presence in the body reveals itself through) manifold (or: diffuse?) corporeal experience (*kāyiko 'nubhavaḥ*), or experiences of the body [arising] in the body²⁹⁴ (*kāye kāyānubhavaḥ*), as they occur in meditative absorption or in ordinary states of concentrated reflection,²⁹⁵ where a functioning of sense-perception (including tactile experience) is excluded.²⁹⁶

3.7.2 A special case of such corporeal experiences due to *ālayaviññāna* appears to be touched upon in the Hsien-yang-shêng-chiao-lun.²⁹⁷ This text states that - in contrast to joy (*p r i - t i*) which is m e n t a l pleasure based on "forthcoming" mind (*pravṛttiviññāna*, in this case = *manoviññāna*) - the pleasant [corporeal] sensation (*s u k h a*) experienced in the first or second dhyāna is an agreeable feeling consisting in a furthering of the b o d y (*āśraya*), a sense of bodily well-being, based on (and somehow manifested by) ā l a y a viññāna. This probably²⁹⁸ means that in the first and second dhyāna *ālayaviññāna*, sticking in the body, suffuses the latter with E a s e (*praśrabdhi*)²⁹⁹, which had come to replace the Badness (*daṣṭhulya*) - of which *ālayaviññāna* had consisted before - when the basis-of-personal-existence (i.e. the body, or body-and-mind) was transmuted at the time of attaining dhyāna.³⁰⁰

3.8.1 Taking ālayavijñāna as a continuous entity (§ 3.5) inevitably implies that - apart from unconscious states like *nirodhasamāpatti* - one has to assume the simultaneous occurrence of at least two *vijñānas*: one or the other of the ordinary *vijñānas*, and ālayavijñāna. But this was problematic since there is explicit evidence showing that the pre-ālayavijñānic materials of the *Yogācārabhūmi*³⁰¹ share the view of most Abhidharma schools³⁰² that in one and the same stream-of-personality several *vijñānas* cannot arise simultaneously.³⁰³ To be sure, ālayavijñāna is, in the *Basic Section*, hardly anything but *Seeds* (*bīja*) hypostatized into a new, subliminal kind of mind, and there is no objection to the simultaneous occurrence of the mind series (*vijñānasantāna*) and an (uninterrupted)³⁰⁴ series of Seeds accompanying it,³⁰⁵ which means that in the case of ālayavijñāna simultaneity with one or the other of the actual *vijñānas* may, at that stage, have been felt to be inoffensive. Yet, in so far as Seeds had been hypostatized into a new kind of *vijñāna*, the principle of non-simultaneity of *vijñānas* came to be at least formally violated when ālayavijñāna was assumed to be continuous. A more or less distinct awareness of this difficulty, and a shrinking back from open conflict with the afore-mentioned principle, may well account for the fact that, in the *Basic Section*, an explicit statement is lacking not only for the simultaneity of ālayavijñāna and "forthcoming" *vijñānas* but even for the continuity of ālayavijñāna, if one disregards one unambiguous but still indirect reference in the commentary on the *Paramārthagāthās*³⁰⁶ (which I tend to assign to the latest layer of the *Basic Section*)³⁰⁷.

3.8.2 The situation has, however, changed in the *Proof Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*. To be sure, in the basic material (i.e. what I have called layer A1 and A2 in § 9.2) the continuity of ālayavijñāna is, even here, not expressly stated, but it is unequivocally presupposed by ālayavijñāna being contrasted with the non-continuous *pravṛttivijñānas*.³⁰⁸ But, in contradistinction to the *Basic Section*, in the *Proof Portion* the

inevitable corollary of continuity, viz. the simultaneousity of ālayavijñāna and pravṛttivijñānas, is not only taken for granted³⁰⁹ but - in the subsidiary material (layer B1 and B2 in § 9.2) - explicitly realized and defended.³¹⁰

3.8.3 The arguments adduced for this purpose - I disregard the third one (layer B2) which is still more advanced (see § 9) - try to vindicate simultaneity by pointing out that even simultaneous occurrence of several pravṛttivijñānas has to be accepted.³¹¹ From the point of view of the pre- or non-ālayavijñānic materials of the Yogācārabhūmi, this amounts to exorcizing the devil by Beelzebub. But a similar theory of simultaneous occurrence not only of a continuous subliminal form of mind with actual *vijñānas* but - given the necessary conditions - also of several actual *vijñānas* (occasionally even of all the six kinds of them) is, as is well-known, categorically affirmed in the Vth chapter of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra.³¹² As this text appears to stem from a somewhat different milieu,³¹³ it is more likely to have introduced such a basically different pattern than the *Proof Portion*, or it may even have inherited or adapted it, for the view that in one stream-of-personality several *vijñānas* may occur simultaneously is in fact documented to have been advocated by the (or certain ?) Mahāśāṃghika s³¹⁴.³¹⁵ The close relation between the pertinent passages of the *Proof Portion* and the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra is, at any rate, evident from the reference, in both texts, to the peculiar notion of an apperceptive *manovijñāna* simultaneously accompanying (*sahānucara*) sense-perception.³¹⁶

3.9.1 Provided that we disregard the Mahāyānist surmounting of all diversity at the end of the text,³¹⁷ the Vth chapter of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra looks like a first attempt at redrawing the theory of mind (*cittaṃ mano vijñānam*)³¹⁸ by making the recently introduced new kind of mind containing all Seeds (*sarvabīja(ka)*)³¹⁹ - which is, in Saṃdh V, for the first time expressly taught to be subtle

(*sūkṣma*, i.e. subliminal)³²⁰ and continuous³²¹ - its central concept. The text does not even mention the special problem of mind in *nirodhasamāpatti* (which according to my hypothesis was the starting point for introducing the concept of *ālayavijñāna* and is, in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the most frequent context of the concept's occurrence)³²². Rather *Samdh V* focusses on the fundamental processes of rebirth and perception / cognition. Now since these are exactly the same as those where *ālayavijñāna* figures in the first two *Bhūmis* of the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*,³²³ the (nuclear portion of the) *Vth* chapter of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* may have even been written with the very intention of superseding the corresponding portions of the *Basic Section*³²⁴ (and it was superseded, in its turn, by the way, by the *Pravṛtti Portion* and, in a sense, also by the *Nivṛtti Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* (see § 5.5.2)). In fact, the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* develops or modifies the statements of the *Basic Section* in several regards:

3.9.2.1 In its treatment of rebirth (or Linking up), the *Sūtra*³²⁵ specifies that in whichever condition living beings enter upon a new personal (esp. corporeal) existence (*ātma-bhāva*),³²⁶ the fact that Mind-containing-all-Seeds (*sarvabījakaṃ cittam*) is reproduced as the result of karmic Maturation (*vi-pac-*), merges (*saṃ-mūrch-*),³²⁷ grows and thrives,³²⁸ is dependent on two kinds of *upādāna*. These two kinds of *upādāna* - one of which is (biological appropriation of) corporeal matter - will be discussed later (see § 4.4). What is, however, relevant to the present discussion is the fact that the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* does not merely deal with rebirth as a man etc. - which involves the *vijñāna*'s entering the mother's womb and its coalescence with proto-embryonic matter - or even other forms of rebirth in world-spheres where too there is corporeal matter,³²⁹ but expressly includes the possibility of being reborn in the immaterial world-sphere (*ārūpyadhātu*).³³⁰

3.9.2.2 This case is, to be sure, explicitly touched upon in a pre-ālayavijñānic analysis of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the Savitarkādi-bhūmi and Vastusaṃgrahaṇī³³¹ and briefly referred to even in the Manobhūmi.³³² But this reference in the latter text belongs to a stratum where what contains all Seeds is the [basis-of-]personal-existence (*ātmabhāva*), and not ālayavijñāna, and is thus entirely disconnected with the reference to ālayavijñāna; for the latter only occurs in a context concerning rebirth as a womb-born living being³³³ - a fact which is highly significant since accepting the presence of ālayavijñāna in *ārūpyadhātu* (i.e. in the world-sphere characterized by lack of matter, especially of corporeal matter) inevitably implies that ālayavijñāna has to transcend its original character of mind sticking or hiding in corporeal matter (§ 2.13.2), which is also the rationale of its name (§ 2.7). To be sure, such a consequence was inevitable after ālayavijñāna had incorporated also the Seeds (of mind) contained in mind (§ 3.4.3) and taken the place of Mind-containing-all-Seeds (*sarvabījakaṃ vijñānam*). But it appears that this consequence was not realized or even shunned in the *Basic Section* and even in the *Proof Portion*.

3.9.2.3 Even in the Saṃdhinirmocana passage under discussion, all that has happened is that Mind-containing-all-Seeds, expressly identified, in the next paragraph (Saṃdh V.3), with ālayavijñāna, is explicitly stated to be the central element undergoing rebirth (i.e. the "subject" of saṃsāra), including rebirth in *ārūpyadhātu*. But the above-mentioned consequence, obvious though it is, is not drawn, for in Saṃdh V.3 the term 'ālayavijñāna' is still explained to mean "mind that sticks or hides in the body, in the sense of sharing its destiny" (§ 2.8) - a meaning which, though obviously referring to the situation not of *nirodhasamāpatti* but of conception (§ 3.3.1.3), yet unmistakably preserves the close relation of ālayavijñāna to corporeal matter.

3.9.2.4 Certainly, this explanation of the term 'ālayavijñāna' may have been simply taken over, without change and along with the term itself (see § 1.6.4), from the Yogācārabhūmi milieu. But this is hardly possible in the case of the term by which the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra usually designates the new, subliminal kind of mind, viz. 'ā d ā n a v i j ñ ā n a'. This term the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra cannot have borrowed from the Yogācārabhūmi (see § 1.6.4); it will rather have been newly coined by the Sūtra itself, probably for the sake of a clearer expression of what it considered to be the main function(s) of this *vijñāna* and/or for the sake of setting itself off against the terminology of the Yogācārabhūmi.³³⁴

3.9.2.5 As Y. Sasaki has shown,³³⁵ the primary meaning of the term 'ādānavijñāna' seems to refer to the function of taking possession of a new body or (basis-of-personal-)existence at the moment of Linking up (*pratisandhi*)³³⁶ - a function which is expressed by 'parigraha'³³⁷ or 'upādāna'³³⁸, but also by 'ādāna', both in canonical³³⁹ and in Yogācāra texts.³⁴⁰ To be sure, 'ādāna' in 'ādānavijñāna' may, in addition, include to other kinds of "taking", too,³⁴¹ especially to biological appropriation designated by the related term 'upādāna' (but, as far as I can see, never by simple 'ādāna')^{342, 343} and this connotation is expressly confirmed by later sources like the Mahāyānasamgraha³⁴⁴ and perhaps also implied in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra's own explanation of the term 'ādānavijñāna'.³⁴⁵ But "taking possession" is certainly the primary function referred to by the term 'ādānavijñāna',³⁴⁶ and this function is distinguished from biological appropriation in a twofold manner: On the one hand, "taking possession" specifically refers to the initial moment of an existence,³⁴⁷ whereas biological appropriation, although it may, to be sure, include the initial phase and thus overlap with "taking possession",³⁴⁸ mainly, and sometimes perhaps even exclusively,³⁴⁹ refers to keeping corporeal matter appropriated throughout life. On the other hand - and this is more important - "taking possession" is applicable to existence in

the i m m a t e r i a l world-sphere (*ārūpyadhātu*) as well,³⁵⁰ where biological appropriation - referring, as it does, to corporeal matter - does not, of course, occur.³⁵¹

3.9.2.6 Thus, one would expect the term '*ādānavijñāna*' to include (and perhaps even to have deliberately been chosen to replace *ālayavijñāna* for the purpose of including) the case of rebirth in the immaterial world-sphere. Yet, the explanation of *ādānavijñāna* given by the Sūtra itself³⁵² refers its function to the b o d y only. This means that even the Vth chapter of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, in spite of expressly touching upon the case of rebirth in *ārūpyadhātu*, nevertheless appears to have not yet fully recognized, whatever may be the reason,³⁵³ the consequence that *ālayavijñāna*/*ādānavijñāna* cannot always, and hence c a n - n o t e s s e n t i a l l y , be conceived of as sticking in the body. Yet, it is clear that, in view of the express mention, in Saṃdh V.2-3, of the immaterial world-sphere in connection with mind - explicitly identified with *ālayavijñāna* - taking and maintaining possession of all kinds of personal existence, it could have been but a small step to realize that *ālayavijñāna* was not essentially dependent on the body but could exist as a kind of basis-of-personal-existence on its own.

3.9.3 The development of such a view would seem to have been further favoured by the new outline of p s y c h o l o - g y , of a theory of cognitive and perceptive processes, which the Vth chapter of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra presents. For this outline differs from that of the *Basic Section* not only by explicitly stating the continuity of the subliminal *vijñāna* containing all Seeds and its simultaneity with the supraliminal, ordinary forms of mind³⁵⁴ and by even admitting the simultaneous occurrence of several of these ordinary forms of mind, but also by describing subliminal mind as the b a s i s of the ordinary perceptions and cognitions, and this not merely (as in the *Basic Section*) in the sense of being their Seed but also, and even primarily,^{354a} as a kind of simultaneous s u b s t r a t u m or fundamental layer,

on the basis (*saṃmiśritya pratiṣṭhāya*) of which, given the necessary conditions (viz. intact sense-faculty and a corresponding object), sense-perceptions and cognitions arise like waves on the surface of a river or like images reflected in a mirror.³⁵⁵

3.10.1 This substratum function of ālayavijñāna is expressly distinguished from its Seed function in the *Pravṛtti Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*³⁵⁶ and put on a par with the function of simultaneous basis (*sahabhū-āśraya*) the material sense-faculties have with regard to sense-perceptions (though it is at the same time qualified as obtaining, in a direct form, only with regard to *manas*³⁵⁷ and *manovijñāna*, whereas with reference to sense-perceptions ālayavijñāna is said to function as a support only indirectly by way of appropriating the material sense-faculties).³⁵⁸

3.10.2 The *Pravṛtti Portion* also repeatedly touches upon the presence of ālayavijñāna in the immaterial world-sphere (*ārūpyadhātu*).³⁵⁹ But although mentioning, in passing, ālayavijñāna's function of biological appropriation,³⁶⁰ the *Pravṛtti Portion*, in contradistinction to the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, does not, at least not explicitly,³⁶¹ refer to, let alone define, ālayavijñāna as sticking or hiding in the body or in the material sense-faculties. Therefore, it would seem that in the *Pravṛtti Portion*³⁶² ālayavijñāna has, at least *de facto*, transcended its original feature of essentially being bound, and somehow subordinate, to corporeal matter, and has rather in its turn become a fundamental constituent of personality, on a par with corporeal matter³⁶³ and eventually even superseding the latter in its function of basis[-of-personal-existence] (*āśraya*).

3.10.3 This development of ālayavijñāna to a basic constituent of personality, if not to the most fundamental one, was, to be sure, called forth already by the equation of ālayavijñāna with Mind-containing-all-Seeds (*sarvabījakaṃ vijñānam*) (cp. n. 428), was foreshadowed in a few passages of the *Basic Section* (see

§§ 6.5.4 and 6.7.4.2), and is fairly palpable in the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra (§ 3.9.3) and in the *Pravṛtti Portion* (§ 3.10.1-2). There is, however, as far as I can see, only one passage in the Yogācārabhūmi (and in its *Basic Section* at that)³⁶⁴ which explicitly documents the stage where ālayavijñāna had become the basis(-of-personal-existence) catexochen, ousting the body from this position; but this passage - which also tries to reinterpret the term 'ālayavijñāna' accordingly (see § 6.2.2. d) - can be shown to be a secondary addition to the text (see § 6.2.3-4), and at any rate it represents (or anticipates?) the position of somewhat later sources.³⁶⁵ This position becomes particularly manifest when ālayavijñāna - not the Six Senses (ṣaḍāyatana)³⁶⁶ - is taught to be the basic entity constituting a living being (maulam sattva-dravyam).³⁶⁷ It was, of course, reinforced by the introduction of the mind-only doctrine which reduced corporeal matter to a mere "representation" in mind.

3.11.1 It appears that it was only in connection with this emancipation of ālayavijñāna from corporeal matter and its development into a basic constituent-of-personality on its own, finally even superseding corporeal matter in its function of basis[-of-personal-existence] (āśraya), that the idea was formed that ālayavijñāna, though because of its unsatisfactoriness (see § 4.1.4) it is not, of course, really Self (ātman), is nevertheless the ultimate or deepest objective basis to which the notion of Ego or Self (ahaṃkāra, etc.), the feeling of identity (asmimāna) and self-love (ātma-sneha, etc.) refer. To be sure, it cannot be excluded that from the very outset ālayavijñāna had somehow been conceived of as (part of) the object of Clinging to Self (see §§ 2.10 and 2.13.5). But there is no explicit statement to this effect in the *Basic Section* of the Yogācārabhūmi. On the other hand, there are a couple of (almost certainly pre-ālayavijñānic) passages concerning the object of the notion of 'I', etc., which obviously paved the way for ālayavijñāna to take over this function, too.

3.11.2 A passage of the Manobhūmi³⁶⁸ states that with regard to the basis-of-personal-existence (*ātmabhāva*)³⁶⁹, in spite of its being, as the Noble Ones know, ultimately unsatisfactory³⁷⁰ (and therefore n o t Self), immature (i.e. ordinary) people form the notion of 'I' or 'mine' or '[this] I am'. This would hardly seem to go beyond canonical statements³⁷¹ if *ātmabhāva* is taken to mean the totality of the psycho-physical constituents of personality, i.e. the five skandhas.³⁷² The surrounding passages,³⁷³ however, point to a further development by taking *ātmabhāva* in the narrower sense of constituents of personal existence in so far only as they are the result of karmic M a t u r a t i o n (or, more precisely, in so far as they are, though also caused by karman, p r i m a r i l y the result of d e l i g h t in wordly existence (*prapañcābhirati*))³⁷⁴, and this is a restriction confirmed by the Śrāvakabhūmi interpreting *ātmabhāva* as the Six Senses (*ṣaḍāyatana*) - viz. the five material sense-faculties (plus their gross support, i.e. the body?) and mind³⁷⁵ - which (or: in so far as they?) have arisen from [the process of karmic] Maturation.³⁷⁶ Besides, this *ātmabhāva* is, in the pertinent passages of the Manobhūmi, specified as "containing all Seeds" (*sarvabījaka*)³⁷⁷ or the Seeds of all [possible bases-of-]personal-existence (*sarvātmabhāvabījaka*³⁷⁸ or *-bījopagata*³⁷⁹).

3.11.3 In the Paramārthagāthās,³⁸⁰ the [Result-of-]Maturation which contains all Seeds (*sarvabījo vipākaḥ*) and is the object of the notion of Self, is characterized as shapeless (*arūpin*) and invisible (or: incommunicable [to others])³⁸¹ (*anidarśana*), and hence accessible to personal experience only (*pratyātma-vedanīya*), and stated to be imagined, by immature people, to be their i n t e r n a l Self (*antarātman*). This means that the notion of "[Result-of-]Maturation containing all Seeds" (*sarvabījo vipākaḥ*) can n o t include the visible b o d y . Yet, if *arūpin* is not understood in its technical meaning of "immaterial" but rather in the more original sense of "without visible shape", there would be no obstacle to interpreting "[Result-of-]Maturation containing all Seeds" in a way which coincides with, or at least

comes close to, the *ātmabhāva* of the *Manobhūmi* (see § 3.11.2), that is to say, to interpreting it as the Six Senses (*ṣaḍāyatana*) arisen from Maturation, provided that this is understood to comprise the five invisible sense-faculties but not their gross support, as is fairly probable in view of the fact that in the beginning of the *Manobhūmi*³⁸² the Six Senses (*ṣaḍāyatana*) are, like the Seeds (*bīja*), listed among the specific objects of *mano vijñāna*, which means that they are not accessible to the external senses.

3.11.4 With this conception of the objective basis of the notion of 'I' and feeling of identity (*asmimāna*), *ālayavijñāna* as conceived in the *Initial Passage* would fit in only as a part of the Seeds (viz. those sticking in the material sense-faculties: see § 2.5). In so far, however, as *ālayavijñāna* is these Seeds hypostatized into a new kind of *vijñāna* (ib.), it would also form part of the somewhat vague mental component contained in the Six Senses (*ṣaḍāyatana*). After coming to be regarded as comprising all Seeds and as being continuous, it may have come to cover the whole *vijñāna* component and all Seeds, but even so it still was only a part of the objective basis of the notion of 'I', side by side with the material sense-faculties. Yet, already the pre-*ālayavijñānic* materials of the *Basic Section* appear to contain at least two starting-points for the development of the view that *ālayavijñāna* alone is the ultimate objective basis of the notion of 'I' and of the feeling of identity:

3.11.4.1 On the one hand, the "[Result-of-]Maturation containing all Seeds" (*sarvabījo vipākaḥ*), stated in the *Paramārthagāthās* (see § 3.11.3) to be regarded as the inner Self (*antarātman*), is, in the *Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā Bhūmiḥ*,³⁸³ identified with Mind-containing-all-Seeds. This would seem to correspond to a tradition according to which only mind (and mental factors) but not material entities are the result of Maturation (*vipāka*),³⁸⁴ and would imply that mind alone is the objective basis

of the notion of 'I', in accordance, perhaps, with an old tradition according to which mind (*citta*, *viññāna*) - which is, besides, like the *sarvabījo vipākaḥ* of PG 28-29, sometimes qualified as "shapeless and invisible/incommunicable" (*arūpya anidarśanam*)³⁸⁵ - is the foremost object of the notion of 'I'.³⁸⁶ In addition, in the received version of the *Pañcaviññānakāyaśamprayuktā Bhūmiḥ*, *sarvabījakaṃ viññānam* has, in its turn, come to be superseded by *ālayaviññāna* (see §§ 6.1.3 and 6.8). Again, in the *Paramārthagāthās* we find the notion of "what is stuck or clung to" (*niveśanam kṛtam*) by ordinary people although it is Suffering (*duḥkha*, i.e. ultimately unsatisfactory),³⁸⁷ and this is obviously³⁸⁸ equivalent to the *sarvabījako vipākaḥ* which is the objective basis of the notion of 'I' (see § 3.11.3). Now what is significant is that this notion of "what is stuck to" - transposed, to be sure, to the context of taking possession of a new existence (*ātmabhāva-parigraha*)³⁸⁹ - is identified with *ālayaviññāna*³⁹⁰ in the commentary on the verses in question.

3.11.4.2 On the other hand, in the *Manobhūmi* of the *Basic Section*³⁹¹ the objective basis of the wrong notion of Ego (*satkāya-drṣṭy-adhiṣṭhāna*) and of the feeling of identity (*asmimānā-dhiṣṭhāna*) figure among the equivalents of Seeds (*bīja-paryāya*). To be sure, this equivalence was probably meant to indicate that the basis - of - personal - existence (*āśraya*, *ātmabhāva*) containing all Seeds it is which is the objective basis of the notion of 'I' and of the feeling of identity (as long as we presuppose that Seeds are not entities on their own and that therefore the thing itself may be called the Seed of an effect in so far as it is capable of producing the latter)³⁹². Yet, the wording of the passage might have lent itself to a different interpretation when the series of Seeds was, somehow or other, hypostatized, as in the case of *ālayaviññāna* (especially after it had come to comprise all Seeds); the more so since the list of equivalents includes '*ālaya*' (in the traditional sense of [*ātmabhāva* as] "what is clung to")³⁹³, which to a reader familiar with *ālayaviññāna* may easily have suggested

the idea that the equivalents, including "objective basis of the notion of 'I'" and "objective basis of the feeling of identity", refer to *ālaya vijñāna*.

3.11.5 Yet, in spite of these favourable circumstances *ālayavijñāna* is, as was stated above, nowhere in the *Basic Section* explicitly stated to be the objective basis of the notion of 'I', etc. To my mind, the reason for this somewhat astonishing fact is that in the *Basic Section*, despite nascent stages of the kind (see § 3.10.3), *ālayavijñāna* has not yet fully emancipated itself from its original character of sticking in, and thus essentially being dependent on, corporeal matter. It is, rather, only after (at least *de facto*) superseding corporeal matter in its function of being (the primary component of) the basis-of-personal-existence that *ālayavijñāna* appears to have come to be explicitly regarded as the ultimate objective Basis of the notion of 'I', etc.

3.11.6 Significantly enough, the Vth chapter of the *Samdhinirmo-
canasūtra* is, as in the question of the emancipation of *ālayavijñāna* from corporeal matter, at best a half-way house in this question, too. For it says that the Buddha has not so far proclaimed the continuous, subliminal form of mind (*ādānavijñāna*, i.e. *ālayavijñāna*: see § 1.6.4) lest the immature should imagine (*mā haiva ... parikalpayeyuḥ*) it to be Self (*ātman*).³⁹⁴ This passage, though stating the possibility that ordinary people might imagine *ādānavijñāna* as their Self, at the same time implies that they normally do not. It does not therefore document the idea that *ālayavijñāna* is the objective basis of the notion of 'I' in the sense of the ordinary, spontaneous, unreflected, non-speculative notion of 'I'; nay, it may even be taken to indicate that such an idea had not yet developed.³⁹⁵

3.11.7 On the other hand, in the *Pravṛtti Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*, where *ālayavijñāna* is clearly conceived of as essentially independent of corporeal matter and appears to

have, at any rate *de facto*, superseded the latter as the fundamental constituent of personality, it is expressly stated to be the object of a spontaneous and largely continuous notion of Ego (*ahaṃkāra*) and feeling of identity (*asmimāna*).³⁹⁶

3.11.8 On the basis of this conception, the term 'ālayavijñāna' could, when its original meaning of "mind sticking in [corporeal matter]" was found to be no longer adequate, easily be explained, in the sense of the traditional Buddhist use of 'ālaya', as "mind which is clung to [as Self]"; the more so since the typically Buddhist use of 'ālaya' may even have been one of the factors which favoured the transformation of the concept of ālayavijñāna (cp. §§ 2.10 and 3.11.4.2). Yet, although an explanation of ālayavijñāna as "mind clung to [as Self]" would appear perfectly suitable already for the *Pravṛtti Portion*, it is, nevertheless, not documented before the *Mahāyānasamgraha*³⁹⁷ (where, in view of the mind-only position, the predominance of ālayavijñāna over corporeal matter is still more obvious, and where, accordingly, the original meaning of the term, presupposing a dependence of ālayavijñāna on corporeal matter, may have appeared especially inappropriate).

3.12 A problem with which (as will have become manifest in § 3.11.2) the issue of the objective basis of the notion of 'I' is closely connected and which appears to have undergone a similar development in so far as it refers to ālayavijñāna, is the question of what is [the result of] *M a t u r a t i o n* (*vipāka*) of previous karman (and delight in worldly existence)³⁹⁸; however, the following remarks (as also those of § 3.13) cannot but be exceptionally preliminary.

3.12.1 As was stated above (§ 3.11.2-3), in some pre-ālayavijñānic materials of the *Basic Section* it is the *p s y - c h o - p h y s i c a l* basis or nucleus of personal existence that is the result of *Maturation* (*vipāka(ja)*)³⁹⁹ containing all Seeds. Within the framework of this view (of which the Seed theory

presupposed by the *Initial Passage*, viz. that corporeal matter and mind contain their own and each other's Seed, could be taken to be a kind of concretization or elaboration), ālayavijñāna, when introduced, could only be regarded as a p a r t of the Result-of-Maturation, viz. as (a part of) the Seeds and (a part of) the mental component (see § 3.11.4). This may be indicated by the fact that ālayavijñāna is, in its *de facto* definition in the beginning of the *Basic Section*,⁴⁰⁰ characterized as " c o m p r i s e d i n [the category of Result-of-]Maturation [of karman, etc.]" (*vipākasaṃgrhīta*), an expression which at least s u g g e s t s that it is n o t yet considered to be the o n l y entity to be regarded as *vipāka*,⁴⁰¹ as it came to be later on. Once again, circumstances which could have favoured this change can be pointed out even in pre-ālayavijñānic materials:

3.12.2.1 One text to be mentioned in this connection is a passage of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*⁴⁰² which unmistakably presupposes the usual view that the mind series is "one-layered" and which is thus, at least in substance, pre-ālayavijñānic. According to this text, it is, firstly, certain states of mind (*citta*) that are stated to be "[Result-of-]Maturation" and even called "[Result-of-]Maturation containing all Seeds" (*sarvabījako vipākaḥ*), viz. mind at the moment of death, the state of mind immediately following upon the first moment of mind which has the function of linking up [a new existence] (*pratisandhi*), and all later states of mind which are "unaltered"⁴⁰³ (**prakṛtistha*), i.e. neither good (*kuśala*) nor defiled (*kliṣṭa*) nor neutral-but-active (**sābhisaṃskāram avyākṛtam?*) but rather neutral and not obstructed [by Defilements] (*anivṛtāvyākṛta*).⁴⁰⁴ All other states of mind (good, bad or neutral ones) are qualified as "arising from [the Result-of-]Maturation (*vipākaja*).⁴⁰⁵ Secondly, the text includes, into the category of *vipāka*, the neither-painful-nor-pleasant sensation (*aduḥkhāsukhā vedanā*)⁴⁰⁶ associated with the states of mind that are [Result-of-]Maturation (or at least with the first two of them).⁴⁰⁷ Once again, all the other sensations - especially

agreeable and disagreeable ones - have to be classified not as *vipāka* but as *vipākaja*.⁴⁰⁸ The text does not mention corporeal entities, which are, here, obviously regarded as not falling under the category of [Result-of-]Maturation.⁴⁰⁹

3.12.2.2 On this latter point, the text appears to agree with the Pañcavijñānakāyaśamprayuktā Bhūmiḥ of the *Basic Section* which equates the [Result-of-]Maturation containing all Seeds (*sarvabījako vipākaḥ*) with Mind-containing-all-Seeds,⁴¹⁰ which, according to the Manobhūmi,⁴¹¹ merges with semen-cum-blood at the moment of conception. Besides, another passage in the Manobhūmi⁴¹² comes close⁴¹³ to the above-quoted text by stating that neither-painful-nor-pleasant sensation, which is the natural state during the embryonic phase (*garbhāvasthāyām*), is the only one to fall under the category of "[Result-of-]Maturation" (*vipāka*), in the sense of the primary result of Maturation, all other sensations being qualified as either "[secondarily] arising from [the primary Result-of-]Maturation" (*vipākaja*) or "being conditioned by [contact with] objects" (*viṣayapratyaya*).

3.12.3 Such passages, suggesting as they do a narrowing down of *vipāka* to mind and sensation in so far as they are, just as at the moment of and immediately after conception, the direct and primary Result-of-Maturation (which in its turn contains the Seeds of all further, indirect or secondary effects), ought to have led almost inevitably to a change in the concept of ālayavijñāna; for when the latter came to supersede Mind-containing-all-Seeds and take the place of mind at the moment of conception, it (as well as the sensation associated with it: see § 5.9) was bound to become, like Mind-containing-all-Seeds, the only entity to be called '*vipāka*' in the strict sense of the primary Result-of-Maturation.

3.12.4.1 Yet, as stated above (§ 3.12.1), the passages in the beginning of the *Basic Section* where ālayavijñāna has occupied the position of Mind-containing-all-Seeds, do not document such a development, suggesting rather that ālayavijñāna is

only one among several entities falling under the category of *vipāka*. As another entity to fall under this category, one may, to be sure, envisage neither-painful-nor-pleasant sensation (see § 3.12.2); but the main reason is, to my mind, that *ālayavijñāna* was still felt to be essentially bound to, and in a sense dependent on and subordinate to, corporeal matter or the material sense-faculties, which in this line of tradition appear to have been regarded as forming part of *vipāka* (see § 3.12.1).⁴¹⁴

3.12.4.2 Even the *Proof Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* ⁴¹⁵

does not go beyond stating that among the six traditional forms of mind there is no variety which can be subsumed under the category of [Result-of-]Maturation (*vipāka-saṃgrhīta*) (and that therefore for this rôle *ālayavijñāna* has to be assumed) - a statement which does not imply that the material sense-faculties, e.g., are excluded from the category of *vipāka*, nay, it may even be taken to suggest the opposite.

3.12.5 To be sure, the tendency to conceive of *ālayavijñāna* as the primary Result-of-Maturation (and hence not to conceive of it any longer as subordinate to corporeal matter) seems to have started already in two of the later occurrences of *ālayavijñāna* in the *Basic Section*;⁴¹⁶ but it is, once again, in the *Pravṛtti Portion* that this tendency appears to have, at any rate *de facto*, fully asserted itself. When discussing the influence the "forthcoming" forms of mind (*pravṛttivijñāna*) exert on *ālayavijñāna*, the *Pravṛtti Portion* states that they may also stamp *ālayavijñāna* with an Impression (*vāsanā*) which [does not, otherwise than the first kind of Impression discussed in the text, lead to further occurrences of *pravṛttivijñānas* in this life but instead] causes *ālayavijñāna* itself to take possession (*parigraha*) in future (i.e. after death) of [the Result-of-]Maturation (*vipāka*).⁴¹⁷ Since this passage is meant to elaborate on the preceding statement that *pravṛttivijñānas* also condition *ālayavijñāna* by causing it to receive the Seeds for its [own] future reproduction (*abhinirvṛtti*),⁴¹⁸ it would

seem that in the *Pravṛtti Portion* rebirth is, as in the *Triṃśīkā*,⁴¹⁹ understood in terms of a reproduction or new arrangement of ālayavijñāna as the only primary Result-of-Maturation (*vipāka*).⁴²⁰

3.12.6 This does not, however, mean that mental factors like sensation are entirely excluded from this category; for in the *Pravṛtti Portion* also the mental factors (*caitasikā dharmāḥ*) associated with ālayavijñāna (see §§ 5.2 and 5.9) are expressly characterized as falling under the category of '[Result-of-]Maturation' (*vipāka-saṃgrhīta*).⁴²¹ Out of these, sensation (*vedanā*) associated with ālayavijñāna, which is always neither-painful-nor-pleasant, is confirmed by the *Sacittikābhūmi-viniścaya*⁴²² and a passage of the *Hsien-yang-shêng-chiao-lun*⁴²³ to be *vipāka* in express contradistinction to other sensations. But it is, as far as I can see, only in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*⁴²⁴ that the category of *vipāka* is explicitly defined as consisting of ālayavijñāna and its mental associates only, all other dharmas being relegated to the category of "[secondarily] arising from [the primary Result-of-]Maturation" (*vipāka-ja*).

3.12.7 The commentary on this *Abhidharmasamuccaya* passage expressly includes, among the dharmas qualified as *vipāka-ja*, the material sense-faculties,⁴²⁵ and this would seem to mean that they, too, have to be regarded as arising from Seeds in ālayavijñāna (see § 3.13.4ff.). This does not necessarily mean that they have no real existence outside mind (see § 2.13.7). But it goes without saying that within the framework of the "mind-only" theory as developed in the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* corporeal matter, being nothing but a mental representation, necessarily derives from (ālaya)vijñāna and thus cannot but lose its function of an equal component of what is the (primary) Result-of-Maturation, thus leaving this position (and accordingly the rôle of being the ultimate objective basis of the notion of 'I': see §§ 3.11.2 and 3.11.8) to ālayavijñāna alone. Indeed,

in the Mahāyānasamgraha, ālayavijñāna is in fact often called 'vipāka-vijñāna',⁴²⁶ most probably in the sense (or at least with the nuance of) "mind which is [the only primary Result-of-]Maturation".

3.13.1 In the preceding paragraph I have suggested that classifying the material sense-faculties not as forming part of the primary Result-of-Maturation (*vipāka*) but only as secondarily arising from it (*vipākaja*) implies that they are regarded as arising from Seeds comprised or contained in ālayavijñāna. Yet, such a view, involving as it does a genetic dependence of the material sense-faculties (or even of corporeal matter as a whole) on ālayavijñāna, is, significantly enough, not explicitly stated anywhere in the *Basic Section* of the Yogācārabhūmi.⁴²⁷ It is rather, in spite of ālayavijñāna being termed as "containing all Seeds" (*sarvabījaka*)⁴²⁸, only the "forthcoming" forms of mind (*pravṛttivijñāna*),⁴²⁹ i.e. sense perceptions and *manovijñāna*,⁴³⁰ and, occasionally, the mental factors (*caitasikā dharmāḥ*) accompanying them,⁴³¹ that are explicitly⁴³² stated to arise from their Seeds comprised in ālayavijñāna (or from ālayavijñāna as their Seed)⁴³³. The same holds good for the *Proof Portion*⁴³⁴ and, substantially,⁴³⁵ probably⁴³⁶ also for the Vth chapter of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra⁴³⁷ and even for the *Pravṛtti Portion*.⁴³⁸ Even in the beginning of the Hsien-yang-shêng-chiaolun,⁴³⁹ it is only the other *vijñānas* (including the new *manas*) and mental factors (*caitasikā dharmāḥ*) that are stated to arise from Seeds in ālayavijñāna (or from ālayavijñāna as their Seed), whereas the material sense-faculties are only characterized as being appropriated (*upātta*) by ālayavijñāna.⁴⁴⁰

3.13.2 This is, however, fairly astonishing in view of the fact that already in some parts of the *Basic Section* of the Yogācārabhūmi mind is unequivocally taught to contain the Seeds not only of corporeal matter⁴⁴¹ but, occasionally, even of internal and external matter.⁴⁴² What is more, even

in the theory of Seeds which I take to be presupposed by the *Initial Passage* (see § 2.5) mind is asserted to contain also the Seeds of the material sense-faculties.⁴⁴³

3.13.3 Yet, it is precisely the connection of the origin of ālayavijñāna with this theory of Seeds that provides a satisfactory explanation of the striking time-lag till it came to be conceived of also as containing the Seeds of the material sense-faculties. For the *Initial Passage* suggests that ālayavijñāna was, originally, nothing but a hypostasis of the Seeds of mind sticking in the material sense-faculties (see § 2.5-6). This means that, even though the sense-faculties were dependent on ālayavijñāna biologically, i.e. were in need of being appropriated by it in order to be protected against decay (cp. § 2.13.4), yet ontologically ālayavijñāna, sticking in them and thus requiring them as its support, was rather in its turn dependent on, and subordinate to, the material sense-faculties (cp. § 2.13.7), and could not easily be considered to be their cause; the more so since it was, originally, conceived of as a hypostasis of the Seeds of mind (cp. § 2.5), not of corporeal matter. And even when, later on, ālayavijñāna came to incorporate "all Seeds" (i.e. also those which were contained in the mind series: cp. § 3.4.2-3), the principle that underlay the original hypostasis, viz. that the Seeds of mind may be regarded as a special form of mind proper, may still have continued to operate and, at the same time, retarded the inclusion of the Seeds of the material sense-faculties (let alone of other matter) since an analogous application of this principle to the Seeds of matter would rather have involved viewing them as a special form of matter and not as included in ālayavijñāna. Therefore, it would seem that ālayavijñāna could come to incorporate also the Seeds of the material sense-faculties or even of other material entities only after this "principle of hypostasis" and the connection of ālayavijñāna with the specific theory of Seeds from which it started had fallen into oblivion.

3.13.4 This appears to have happened in the *Nivṛtti Portion* where ālayavijñāna is taught to be the cause not only of the "forthcoming" forms of mind (*pravṛttivijñāna*) but also of the [material] sense-faculties along with their gross bases (**sādhīṣṭhāna*) and even of the surrounding world (*bhājana-loka*).⁴⁴⁴ This does not necessarily mean that corporeal matter or even the surrounding world were viewed as arising from ālayavijñāna containing their Seed in the sense of a kind of a natural faculty to produce them (as mind and matter would seem to arise from mind according to the *bīja* theory presupposed by my *Initial Passage*); and still less need this mean that they are merely mental images in ālayavijñāna: it is more likely that the idea is that they are the (indirect or by-)effect of karmic Impressions stored in ālayavijñāna (see § 10.3.1.3).

3.13.5 Likewise, in a passage of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*⁴⁴⁵ according to which ālayavijñāna is both the Seed of the "forthcoming" forms of mind (*cakṣurvijñāna*, etc.) and of the sense-faculties (*cakṣus*, etc.), it would seem that what is primarily intended is karmic Impressions, since the text distinguishes between two kinds of ālayavijñāna (= Seeds): a [freshly] accumulated one (*upacita*, from which *cakṣus*, etc., will arise in [a] future [existence])⁴⁴⁶, and one which is of the nature of [Result-of-]Maturation (*vaipākya*, from which the present *cakṣus*, etc., have arisen)⁴⁴⁷.⁴⁴⁸ The sense-objects are, in this passage, not derived from Seeds but stated to arise under the influence of the sense-faculties,⁴⁴⁹ which would, in view of the fact that the sense-faculties, in their turn, originate from ālayavijñāna, amount to an indirect origination of the sense-objects, too, from ālayavijñāna.

3.13.6 In other passages of the *Abhidharmasammucaya*,⁴⁵⁰ ālayavijñāna is said to be the Seed of, or to be impregnated with the Impression(s) of, (all) *skandhas*, *dhātus* and *āyatanas*. Likewise, in a passage of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* which appears to be an addition by the compiler himself,⁴⁵¹ ālayavijñāna is expressly stated to contain the Seeds of all *dharma*s.⁴⁵²

3.13.7 Such formulations appear to come fairly close to those current in sources like Mahāyānasamgraha and Abhidharmasūtra where ālayavijñāna is, more or less consistently, integrated into the "mind-only" system. In these sources, the question whether ālayavijñāna also comprises the Seeds of material dharmas or not has, of course, practically become irrelevant because material dharmas have been reduced to mental "representations" of which ālayavijñāna is or contains the Seeds anyway, and of which it is, in the sense of the Vth chapter of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and the *Pravṛtti Portion*, also the basis in the sense of being their fundamental support (cp. §§ 3.9.3 and 3.10). Thus, in the Abhidharmasūtra and in the Mahāyānasamgraha, ālayavijñāna is the Seed-basis or cause and the support not only of personal existence but of a l l dharmas, of the whole world as it appears to a given living being.⁴⁵³

3.13.8 Quite understandably, at this stage of development, the original meaning of the term 'ālayavijñāna' - "mind sticking or lying hidden [in the material sense-faculties]" - must have been found inappropriate, since the fundamental entity which ālayavijñāna had become can hardly be taken to stick in what is nothing but a mental representation proceeding from it. Accordingly, it was reinterpreted, especially in the sense of "mind to which [all (polluted) dharmas] stick [as its effects]", or "mind which sticks [to all (polluted) dharmas [as their cause]]."⁴⁵⁴

4. Development of the negative aspects of ālayavijñāna

4.1.1 In the passage from which I started (§ 2.1), ālayavijñāna had the positive function of keeping a person alive in the state of *nīrodhasamāpatti* (see § 2.13.4), and in other passages of the *Basic Section* and of the *Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* it is more or less clearly implied that ālayavijñāna plays this positive role throughout life (§ 3.5-6). Yet, in Buddhist tradition, life is ultimately unsatisfactory (*duḥkha*), not only because in it pain (*duḥkha* in the narrower sense) prevails,⁴⁵⁵ but also, in a more fundamental sense, because the constituents of a living being are impermanent (*anitya*) and subject to change (*vipariṇāmadharman*),⁴⁵⁶ and change is usually for the worse.⁴⁵⁷ It is in this sense that the canonical texts state that "in short, the five constituents-of-personality to which one clings are unsatisfactory".⁴⁵⁸

4.1.2 In the early Yogācāra sources, this statement is usually explained as expressing unsatisfactoriness in so far as it essentially inheres in conditioned entities as such (*saṃskāra-duḥkhatā*).⁴⁵⁹ But this their essentially inherent unsatisfactoriness is, according to the Yogācāras, not, or not primarily, based on their mere impermanence, lest even the supramundane but impermanent mental states like liberating insight should be unsatisfactory.⁴⁶⁰ It is, at least as far as conditioned entities are constitutive of a living being, based rather on their being stricken with Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*)⁴⁶¹ - a concept which, in this context, denotes 1) evilness or wickedness⁴⁶² as well as 2a) unwieldiness,⁴⁶³ stiffness⁴⁶⁴ or lack of controllability,⁴⁶⁵ and 2b) uneasiness⁴⁶⁶ or unsafeness,⁴⁶⁷ sometimes sensible but often more or less subliminal, and anyway continuously permeating the whole basis-of-existence (of ordinary persons),⁴⁶⁸ so that it constitutes, especially in view of the latter nuance, viz. subliminal uneasiness, a kind of intrinsic unsatisfactoriness or "Suffering". Accordingly, the Manobhūmi of the *Basic Section* of

the Yogācārabhūmi alludes to the above-quoted canonical passage by stating that "the Tathāgatas have designated the whole basis [-of-personal-existence] as Suffering (i.e. as unsatisfactory) in the sense of unsatisfactoriness essential to conditioned factors as such (*saṃskāra-duḥkhatā*), because [the whole basis] is stricken with, or essentially characterized by, Badness".⁴⁶⁹

4.1.3 Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*) is, to be sure, originally⁴⁷⁰ not identical with, or comprised in, Seeds (*bīja*), for in the Yogācārabhūmi it is sometimes mentioned side by side with,⁴⁷¹ or even in opposition to,⁴⁷² the latter. But at least in so far as Badness, too, is conceived of as a more or less latent or subliminal quality characterizing, permeating (*-anugata*), infesting (*-upagata*), or sticking in (*sanniviṣṭa*, etc.), the basis(-of-personal-existence)⁴⁷³ or the series (of personality)⁴⁷⁴ or the Six Senses (*ṣaḍ-āyatana*)⁴⁷⁵ or body (*kāya*) and mind (*citta*)⁴⁷⁶, it is somehow analogous to Seeds, the more so since it is sometimes expressly contrasted with actual occurrences of Defilements⁴⁷⁷ or said to be the cause of [actual] Defilements⁴⁷⁸ or Suffering⁴⁷⁹. Being, thus, in a sense similar to Seeds,⁴⁸⁰ Badness (or at least some of its aspects) could easily come to be explained to consist in Seeds. Such a view is in fact unambiguously expressed in the Manobhūmi of the *Basic Section*⁴⁸¹ where the term 'Badness' (*dauṣṭhulya*) is said to denote both the Seeds of Defilements⁴⁸² (*kleśapakṣyāṇi bījāni*, representing latent wickedness involving uneasiness) as also the Seeds of [what is the result of karmic] Maturation (*vipākapakṣyāṇi bījāni*, representing unwieldiness and lack of controllability involving uneasiness) and the Seeds of other neutral factors, all these Seeds, sticking in the basis-of-personal-existence, being responsible for the latter being unsatisfactory in the sense of *saṃskāra-duḥkhatā*.⁴⁸³

4.1.4 Once conceived of as Seeds, Badness sticking in the basis-of-personal-existence, or in body and mind, was - at least as far as it was the Seed of mental factors like Defile-

ments or of Suffering in the sense of unsatisfactory sensations - bound to be incorporated, sooner or later, in ālayavijñāna, in analogy to the (other) Seeds of mind and mental factors (§ 3.13) sticking in corporeal matter (§ 2.5) and mind (§ 3.4.2-3). This means that ālayavijñāna, by incorporating Badness, became a hypostasis not only of Seeds but also of the subliminal essential unsatisfactoriness (*saṃskāra-duḥkhatā*) which is constituted by this Badness. This stage of development is documented in the prose commentary on the Paramārthagāthās⁴⁸⁴ which forms part of the (Cintāmayī Bhūmiḥ of the) *Basic Section*.⁴⁸⁵ It would also appear to be presupposed when the *Nivṛtti Portion*⁴⁸⁶ of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* states that ālayavijñāna, on account of containing or comprising all Seeds, is (*-svabhāva) the Truth of Suffering (*duḥkha-satya*);⁴⁸⁷ for this would seem to mean that ālayavijñāna, by comprising Badness, is Suffering (*duḥkha*) in the sense of *saṃskāra-duḥkhatā* (of which only the Noble Ones (*ārya*) are aware),⁴⁸⁸ both by way of being itself unsatisfactory because of consisting of or being a hypostasis of Badness taken as uneasiness, as also by way of being a kind of principle of unsatisfactoriness constituting the uneasiness of the whole personality in which it sticks. Later on, this affiliation of ālayavijñāna to *saṃskāra-duḥkhatā* was reinforced by ālayavijñāna's becoming associated with neither-painful-nor-pleasant sensation (*aduḥkhāsukhā vedanā*: see § 5.9),⁴⁸⁹ for *saṃskāra-duḥkhatā* was not only taken to be generally inherent to all mundane dharmas, but had also been specifically attributed to neither-painful-nor-pleasant sensation and whatever is associated with or akin to it.⁴⁹⁰

4.2 By incorporating Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*) and becoming a kind of principle of essential unsatisfactoriness (*saṃskāra-duḥkhatā*), ālayavijñāna assumed an ontologically or existentially negative character due to which it became something primarily to be got rid of.⁴⁹¹ This negative character was, moreover, enlarged by a

s p i r i t u a l aspect; for in so far as ālayavijñāna is, already in the *Basic Section*, understood to comprise the Seeds of all kinds of mental dharmas including morally e v i l (*akuṣāla*) ones,⁴⁹² it was bound to incorporate Badness not only under its aspect of subliminal uneasiness but a l s o in the sense of latent w i c k e d n e s s , of Badness affiliated to Defilements (*kleśapakṣyaṃ dauṣṭhulyam*),⁴⁹³ because this aspect, too, had, in the Manobhūmi of the *Basic Section*,⁴⁹⁴ come to be explained as the S e e d s (*bīja*) of the Defilements. Since Badness, especially in the sense of latent wickedness or Seeds of Defilements, is often regarded to be constitutive of the state of being under the sway, or of being favourable to the arising, of Cankers (*sāsrava*),⁴⁹⁵ ālayavijñāna, by incorporating Badness in the sense of latent wickedness, came to acquire, or reveal, even an aspect of s p i r i t u a l negativity which, if stressed, was liable to entail its developing to a kind of p r i n c i p l e or source of P o l l u t i o n (see § 4.7), which, sticking in, and permeating, the constituents of personality, constitutes their spiritual impurity.

4.3 Such a development would seem to have been favoured by the fact that, since "being under the sway of, or favourable to, C a n k e r s " (*sāsrava*) is almost equivalent to, and often predicated side by side with, "being under the sway of, or favourable to, C l i n g i n g " (*sopādāna*),⁴⁹⁶ ālayavijñāna, by incorporating Badness in the sense of latent wickedness, came close to the notion of s o p ā d ā n a - v i j ñ ā n a .

4.3.1 The term '*sopādāna-vijñāna*' occurs already in the canonical texts of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivādins⁴⁹⁷ and seems to mean something like *vijñāna* still clinging (emotionally and intellectually) to the other constituents of personal existence and thus tending to being reborn. In this sense, it is c o m - p a r e d with a (fertile) s e e d (*bīja*).⁴⁹⁸ In the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi, however, it is interpreted as c o n t a i n i n g the S e e d s of Defilements (*kleśa-bīja*)

and thereby fostering future rebirth.⁴⁹⁹ Thus, an identification of *sopādāna-vijñāna*, defined in this way, with *ālayavijñāna* comprising all Seeds including Badness in the sense of Seeds of Defilements, was natural.

4.3.2 However, it may have been additionally reinforced in a concrete way by an interpretation of *vijñāna* as Nourishment (*āhāra*) as documented by another passage of the *Vastu-saṃgrahaṇī*.⁵⁰⁰ In this passage, *vijñāna* is, on the one hand, a Nourishment securing the subsistence of living beings already reborn (*bhūtānāṃ sattvānāṃ sthitaye*)⁵⁰¹ by appropriating (i.e. *upādāna* in the biological sense) the gross elements of the sense-faculties (**indriyamahābhūtopādātṛ*) and thus securing the subsistence of corporeal matter and the continuance of life, which is, according to the *Sūtra* (see § 2.3 + n. 149), characterized by the fact that *vijñāna* does not withdraw from the body.⁵⁰² On the other hand, *vijñāna*, in so far as it is *sopādāna* by being under the sway of karman and Defilements, is also a Nourishment helping living beings craving for rebirth (*sambhava-iṣṇāṃ anugrahāya*)⁵⁰³ to take possession of another existence in the future.⁵⁰⁴ In the light of the passage referred to in § 4.3.1,⁵⁰⁵ the *sopādānatva* of *sopādāna-vijñāna* could easily be taken to be due to the fact that the respective *vijñāna* contains the Seeds (*bīja*) of Defilements (*kleśa*) and, by analogy, the Impressions or residues (*vāsanā*) of karman.⁵⁰⁶ Now, as was shown in § 4.2, the Seeds of Defilements came, sooner or later, to be understood as being comprised in *ālayavijñāna*. Similarly, *ālayavijñāna* also incorporated the Impressions of karman, perhaps by taking the place of Mind-containing-all-Seeds (*sarvabījakam vijñānam*), provided that I am right in assuming that the latter is the successor to the *vijñāna* of the *Pratītyasamutpāda Analysis*, the main function of which was to receive and pass on the Impressions of good and bad *saṃskāras* (see § 7.3.6.3). It would therefore appear natural that *ālayavijñāna* came to be regarded as fulfilling not only the first function of *vijñāna* as Nourishment, viz. biological appropriation of corporeal matter (which it had taken

over more or less from the outset (see § 2.13.4)), but also its second function, viz. that of *sopādāna-vijñāna*; the more so since the traditional Buddhist meaning of 'ālaya' was practically synonymous with 'upādāna' in the sense of Clinging.

4.4.1 There is not yet any clue even to an approximation of ālayavijñāna to *sopādāna-vijñāna* in the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Here as well as in the *Proof Portion*⁵⁰⁷ of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*, 'upādāna' is, in connection with ālayavijñāna, used only in the sense of "biological appropriation" (see §§ 3.5 and 3.6), i.e. of functioning as a principle of life. The earliest source showing traces of a connection of the newly introduced subliminal *vijñāna* with *sopādāna-vijñāna* is the Vth chapter of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*. To be sure, in this text, too, the subliminal *vijñāna* has also the function of appropriating corporeal matter (§ 3.9.2.5). But as the new name 'ādānavijñāna' suggests, what is emphasized is, apart from its function as a substratum of perceptive and cognitive processes, its rôle as the principle undergoing rebirth, or taking (and maintaining) possession (*(upa-)ādāna*) of a new existence (see § 3.9.2.4-6).

4.4.2 According to *Samdh V.2*,⁵⁰⁸ the "reincarnation" (i.e. the taking possession of a new existence) and the subsequent thriving of Mind-containing-all-Seeds (*sarvabījakaṃ cittam*) - expressly identified, at *Samdh V.3*, with *ādānavijñāna* and ālayavijñāna - is based on a t w o f o l d u p ā d ā n a : 1) *upādāna* of (or: consisting in) the [subtle] material sense-faculties together with their [gross] bases⁵⁰⁹ (**sādhiṣṭhāna-rūpīndriya*) and 2) *upādāna* of (or: consisting in) the Impression of the diversity of (/proliferous involvement in)⁵¹⁰ the everyday usage of phenomena⁵¹¹, names, and conceptions (**nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā*).⁵¹²

4.4.2.1 It is obvious that the first type of *upādāna* refers to biological appropriation, of which the material sense-faculties and their bases are the o b j e c t , it making no

difference whether '*upādāna*' is taken as an action noun (and the compound as a tatpuruṣa), or in the passive/objective sense of "that which is appropriated"⁵¹³ (and the whole expression as a rūpaka compound).

4.4.2.2 The *second* type of *upādāna*, on the other hand, would seem to represent, in the form of an Impression (or residue, habit energy), the spiritually negative *upādāna*⁵¹⁴ leading to rebirth, i.e. Clinging to mundane existence, concretized, in this passage, not so much in the sense of Clinging to a new (basis of) personal existence or to objects of sensuality⁵¹⁵ but rather in the Mahāyāna sense of Clinging to the diversified world as such, by taking it to be real.

If the second type of *upādāna* is understood in this way, the Impression can not be the object of *upādāna* but would rather be identical with it, and one will have to explain °*prapañca-vāsanôpādāna* either as "[the Impression of] Clinging"⁵¹⁶ which consists in the Impression of °*prapañca*", or as "the Impression of °*prapañca* which is that on account of which [a new existence] is taken possession of"⁵¹⁷.

4.4.3 Starting from this interpretation,⁵¹⁸ one might think that the residue of spiritually negative *upādāna* is responsible for taking possession of the new existence,⁵¹⁹ whereas biological appropriation (at least also) secures its continuance. Such a distinction would imply that when one is reborn in the *ārūpyadhātu* an *upādāna* securing continuance is not required since in this case there are, as the text states, not two kinds of *upādāna*⁵²⁰ but - so one will have to understand⁵²¹ - only the second type, viz. *vāsanopādāna*, because corporeal matter does not exist in that world-sphere.

Yet, one may consider the possibility that in the case of the second *upādāna* the term '*upādāna*' includes still another shade of meaning, for it may also allude to the fact that the °*prapañca-vāsanā* not only causes Mind-containing-all-Seeds (i.e. *ādānavijñā-*

na = ālayavijñāna) to take possession (*upādāna*) of a new existence but is also, throughout the new existence, itself contained (*sanniviṣṭa*)⁵²² in this Mind. Now this function of containing Seeds or receiving and retaining Impressions (as also the function of being infested with karmic Impressions) is often expressed by the term '*parigraha*',⁵²³ which in its turn alternates with '*upādāna*' (and '*ādāna*') in the sense of "taking possession [of a new existence]".⁵²⁴ It would thus not seem unreasonable to argue that in the present passage the expression '*prapañca-vāsanôpādāna*' is also intended to evoke the idea that Mind-containing-all-Seeds is infested by, or contains, the *prapañcavāsanā* before and at the moment of rebirth as well as throughout the new existence. In the latter case, i.e. if '*upādāna*' (also) means "containing" or "retaining", the *prapañca-vāsanā* would, just as in the case of the first *upādāna* (see § 4.4.2.1), be the object of *upādāna*.⁵²⁵ Such a use of *upādāna* in the sense of containing or retaining Seeds or Impressions (or in the sense of Seeds or Impressions as that which is contained in (ālaya)vijñāna)⁵²⁶ is in fact documented in later sources,⁵²⁷ but unambiguous occurrences in reliable early texts⁵²⁸ seem to be missing; it may hence be questionable to assume such a connotation of '*upādāna*' in the case of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, the more so in view of the fact that it is not corroborated by the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra-vyākhyāna* nor by the *Triṃśikā-bhāṣya*.⁵²⁹

4.5.1 In the *Pravṛtti Portion*⁵³⁰ of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*, which has taken over the twofold *upādāna* of *Samdh V.2*,⁵³¹ the connection of the **nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* with spiritually negative Clinging is supported by the fact that it is renamed into '*parikalpitasvabhāvābhīniveśa-vāsanā*'.⁵³² Actually, Sticking to the Imagined Character [of reality] (*parikalpitasvabhāvābhīniveśa*), or its Impression, is, in other parts of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*⁵³³ and the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*⁵³⁴, expressly stated to be the decisive cause of Pollution (*saṃkleśa*) or rebirth, and would therefore seem

to be equivalent to spiritually negative *upādāna* in its actual and latent form, respectively.⁵³⁵

4.5.2 On the other hand, *upādāna* (hence also the *parikalpita-svabhāvābhiniṣeṣa-vāsanā* included in it) is, in the *Pravṛtti Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*, expressly taught to be the o b j e c t (*ālambana*) of *ālayavijñāna* (see § 5.6.3.2), and this would seem to imply that this *vāsanā* is viewed as continuing to exist throughout the new existence. Thus, here too it would not seem impossible that this *vāsanā* may be called '*upādāna*' not only in the sense of that on account of which this existence was taken possession of but also in the sense of something which is contained or incorporated (*parigrhīta*) in *ālayavijñāna*. This ambiguity would seem to be confirmed by the Hsien-yang-shêng-chiao-lun⁵³⁶ which expressly states that the beginningless (**anādikālika*) Impression of diversity/diversification (**prapañcavāsanā*) is both the homogeneous cause (*hetupratyaya*)⁵³⁷ of the *ālayavijñāna* of a given existence a n d - together with the material sense faculties and their bases - the o b j e c t of *ālayavijñāna*'s function of appropriating/containing (*u p ā d ā n a*).⁵³⁸

4.6 Apart from this connection with spiritually evil Clinging in the form of Impression (*vāsanā*), *ālayavijñāna* has, in the *Pravṛtti Portion*, come to be associated with Clinging for yet another reason as well: viz. because it is, in this text, expressly conceived of as the o b j e c t i v e b a s i s of the n o t i o n of 'I'. In the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, only the f e a r had been voiced that immature people m i g h t i m a - g i n e *ādānavijñāna* to be Self (*ātman*) if it had been taught to them (§ 3.11.6); in the *Pravṛtti Portion*, however, *ālayavijñāna* is conceived of as the object of a continuous, spontaneous notion of 'I' (*aḥaṃkāra*) and feeling of identity (*asmimāna*) (§ 3.11.7), and though the text does not yet make this explicit, it may thus be interpreted, in the sense of the typically Buddhist meaning of '*ālaya*', as "mind which is clung to [as Self]" (§ 3.11.8).

Now, one might think that being the object of the wrong notion of 'I' is merely accidental or extraneous to the entity concerned. But both in Abhidharma⁵³⁹ as well as in early Yogācāra texts⁵⁴⁰ we find the idea - not implausible at least as far as the constituents of one's own personality are concerned - that being the objective basis of a Defilement, and especially of the notions of 'I' and 'mine', impinges on the nature of the entity concerned; in other words: to be the object of the notions of 'I' and 'mine' implies being *sāsrava*⁵⁴¹ and *sopādāna*, i.e. being, if not of the nature of Cankers⁵⁴² (*āsrava*, i.e. Defilements) and Clinging (*upādāna*), then at least connected with them,⁵⁴³ or under their sway,⁵⁴⁴ or permeated by Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*) affiliated to them⁵⁴⁵ and thus, normally,⁵⁴⁶ favourable to their arising.⁵⁴⁷ Thus, by being the object of the notion of 'I', ālayavijñāna itself would become, or turn out to be, under the sway of or favourable to Cankers (*sāsrava*) and Clinging (*sopādāna*), i.e. spiritually evil.

This is, however, not expressly stated in the *Pravṛtti Portion*, where the spiritually negative aspect of ālayavijñāna remains entirely marginal.

4.7.1 The situation is altogether different in the *Nivṛtti Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*. In this text, the spiritually negative aspect of ālayavijñāna has become predominant. Ālayavijñāna is expressly⁵⁴⁸ taught to be a) the Truth of Suffering (*duḥkha-satya*) of the present life, i.e. the container or hypostasis of Badness in the sense of uneasiness constituting *saṃskāra-duḥkhata* (see § 4.1.4), b) the cause of the Truth of Suffering in the next life, i.e. the cause, by way of receiving and passing on karmic Impressions, of a new ālayavijñāna which is the result of karmic Maturation (see § 3.12.5), and c) the cause of the Truth of the Origin [of Suffering] (*samudaya-satya*) in the present life, i.e. the cause of Defilements (*kleśa*) (and karman) on account of its comprising Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*) in the sense of latent wickedness.

4.7.2 What is more, at least in the second half of the *Nivṛtti*

Portion it becomes clear that this its functioning as a principle of Pollution (*sarva-saṃkleśa-mūla)⁵⁴⁹ is clearly regarded to be e s s e n t i a l to ālayavijñāna.⁵⁵⁰ Ālayavijñāna is conceived to be e s s e n t i a l l y permeated (*-anugata) by Badness (dauṣṭhulya),⁵⁵¹ nay, even by Badness in the sense of latent w i c k e d n e s s , for it is expressly stated to be - by nature - the cause of the arising-and-continuance (pravṛtti) of Defilements (kleśa).⁵⁵² Or, as another passage of the first chapter of the Vinīścayasamgrahaṇī puts it, a l l Seeds incorporated in ālayavijñāna are included in the Impression(s) of Sticking to the Imagined Character [of reality] (parikalpitasvabhāvābhīniveśa-vāsanā), which, in its turn, is called 'Omnipresent B a d - n e s s ' (sarvatraḡa-dauṣṭhulya).⁵⁵³ Accordingly, ālayavijñāna is, in the *Nivṛtti Portion*, regarded to be e s s e n t i a l l y under the sway of, or favourable to, Clinging (sopādāna),⁵⁵⁴ both in the sense of clinging (upādāna) to the present basis-of-personal-existence [as to one's Ego or Mine] and in the sense of taking possession (upādāna) of further existence.⁵⁵⁵ It is not therefore unexpected that the slightly later but closely related Hsien-yang-shêng-chiao-lun⁵⁵⁶ expressly identifies ālayavijñāna with the canonical sopādāna-vijñāna.

4.7.3 Such an exposition of the nature and function of ālayavijñāna strongly suggests that the term 'ālayavijñāna' is now p r i m a r i l y understood in the sense of the typically Buddhist use of 'ālaya' as Clinging, viz. as "vijñāna to which one clings [as one's Self]". Since in the *Nivṛtti Portion* itself there is no reference to ālayavijñāna as the object of the notion of 'I',⁵⁵⁷ and in view of its equation with sopādāna-vijñāna, one may even envisage interpreting the term by recurring to the s u b j e c t i v e meaning of 'ālaya', i.e. as "vijñāna which is [under the sway of] Clinging" or "vijñāna which [contains, or consists of, the Seeds of] Clinging", although there is no explicit confirmation of such an interpretation of the term 'ālayavijñāna', neither in the *Nivṛtti Portion* nor, as far as I know,

in any other Yogācāra source. Nevertheless, it would seem that the frequency of the subjective meaning "[spiritually negative] Clinging" in the Buddhist use of the word 'ālaya' may have even been one of the reasons, if not the main reason, for the considerable change the concept of ālayavijñāna has undergone in the *Nivṛtti Portion*.

4.8.1 One would not expect ālayavijñāna, conceived in this way, to contain the Seeds of supramundane (*lokottara*), pure (*anāsrava*) dharmas, in contrast to the *sarvabījakam vijñānam* of the *Basic Section* which is said to include, if a person is destined for Nirvāṇa, the Seeds of (one of) the three kinds of Enlightenment (*bodhi*).⁵⁵⁸ Even the *Proof Section* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*, when it demonstrates the existence of ālayavijñāna by pointing out that, as far as the ordinary six *vijñānas* are concerned, a state of mind which follows upon a heterogeneous state of mind cannot have the latter for its Seed (*bīja*), adduces, as one instance of such a heterogeneous sequence, the case that a pure (*anāsrava*) or supramundane (*lokottara*) state of mind follows upon an impure (*sāsrava*) or mundane (*laukika*) one,⁵⁵⁹ and thus obviously presupposes the view that ālayavijñāna is or contains the Seed(s) of pure or supramundane dharmas, too. It would, however, appear questionable to uphold such a position for a text like the *Nivṛtti Portion* where ālayavijñāna is regarded to be, essentially, a kind of principle of Pollution.

4.8.2 In fact, it appears that in the basic material of the *Nivṛtti Portion* (see §§ 10.1 and 11) no such purificatory function of ālayavijñāna was assumed. In this material, it is only stated that ālayavijñāna, the root of Pollution, is brought to an end by means of the cultivation of wholesome factors (**kuśala-dharma-bhāvanā*), in the sense that the cultivation of a preparatory contemplation leads to the supramundane insight into (the four Noble) Truth(s) or True Reality,⁵⁶⁰ the repeated cultivation of which entails, in its turn, the cessation of ālayavijñāna.⁵⁶¹ It seems that the text did not, originally, treat the question of

the S e e d s of the wholesome factors leading up to supramundane insight.

4.8.3 It is only in an intercalated⁵⁶² paragraph of the *Nivṛtti Portion* that this problem is treated. According to this paragraph, ālayavijñāna, in spite of being the root of all Pollution, nevertheless also incorporates the Seeds of the basic wholesome dharmas (*kuṣālamūla*) [indirectly] conducive to liberation (*mokṣabhāgīya*) and of those [directly] leading up to penetration [into Truth] (*nirvedhabhāgīya*).⁵⁶³ To be sure, these preparatory wholesome dharmas t h e m s e l v e s are hardly pure or supramundane.⁵⁶⁴ But since their continuous cultivation (*bhāvanā*) eventually leads to supramundane insight,⁵⁶⁵ they o p p o s e the continuation of saṃsāra, and in so far as ālayavijñāna contains t h e i r Seeds, it is at any rate n o t the cause of dharmas that are p o l l u t i v e in the sense of entangling a person in Suffering.⁵⁶⁶

4.8.4 But, as was stated above (§ 4.8.1), such a wholesome function or aspect of ālayavijñāna is not easily reconciled with its general character, in the *Nivṛtti Portion*, as a principle of Pollution⁵⁶⁷ which is expressly taught to be the cause of the origination-and-continuance (*pravṛtti*) of Defilements (*kleśa*) and of the non-origination (*apravṛtti*) of the Path (*mārga*, i.e. of supramundane insight).⁵⁶⁸ Accordingly, in the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī passage to which a l l Seeds contained in ālayavijñāna are included in Omnipresent Badness (*sarvatragaṃ dauṣṭhulyam*),⁵⁶⁹ the supramundane dharmas are said to arise not from a Seed (*bīja*) in the sense of, or deriving from, an Impression (*vāsanā*) stored up in ālayavijñāna and thus comprised in *dauṣṭhulya*, but from a "Seed" consisting in True Reality ["working" as] the objective condition [of supramundane insight] (**tathatālanbanapratyaya-bīja*).⁵⁷⁰

Thus, in contrast to the extant form of the *Nivṛtti Portion* (including the intercalated paragraph [see § 4.8.3]), according to which the preparatory wholesome dharmas originate from Seeds contained in ālayavijñāna and lead in the end to supramundane insight

(though there is no express statement to the effect that they or their Seeds become the Seed of this insight), the last-mentioned passage is unambiguous in stating that supramundane dharmas can not have a mundane principle as their homogeneous cause, but can only be directly derived from the supramundane reality which reveals itself in supramundane liberating insight and is, by way of a metaphor of the metaphor, expressly called the "Seed" of (the latter and hence of all) supramundane dharmas.

Yet, if the "Seed" of supramundane insight is True Reality (*tathatā*), one might ask why, since *tathatā* is always present, supramundane insight does not arise at any and every moment in all living beings. The answer of the text is that there are obstructions (*āvaraṇa*) which prevent *tathatā* from becoming the object (and thus the "Seed") of insight.⁵⁷¹ And it may be for dispelling these obstructions that preparatory practice is required. But the text does not say anything of the sort, and this silence - deliberate or not - is significant; for, even if the mundane factors dispelling obstructions are not the direct cause of supramundane insight, they would still pave the way for its arising. Their function would thus, in any case, be contrary to the pollutive effect of *ālayavijñāna*, and it would be difficult to derive them from Seeds incorporated in the latter and, accordingly, forming part of Badness.

4.8.5 It may be under the impression of this difficulty that in the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, as is well-known,⁵⁷² another solution is propounded. This text, on the one hand, presupposes that supramundane insight, like any other mental factor, has to arise from a Seed (*bīja*) in the ordinary psychological sense, i.e. from a Seed deriving from an Impression (*vāsanā*).⁵⁷³ On the other hand, it is expressly admitted that, in view of the essentially pollutive character of *ālayavijñāna*, supramundane insight can not emerge from a Seed in *ālaya-vijñāna*,⁵⁷⁴ and the same is also taken for granted in the case of the mundane factors leading up to supramundane insight. It

is thus only from the Supramundane Sphere itself that supramundane insight and the wholesome factors leading up to it can, for the first time, enter the mental series of a living being, though, in contrast to the theory described in § 4.8.4, they cannot be engendered by the Supramundane Sphere directly but only by mediation of a Seed deriving from an Impression (*vāsanā*) left by an actual occurrence of supramundane insight. Yet so far no such supramundane insight has ever arisen in the mental series of an ordinary living being.⁵⁷⁵ It has only arisen in the mental series of the Noble Ones (*ārya*), especially the Buddhas. The Impression which will afterwards become the Seed of the first supramundane insight of a living being must thus go back to the supramundane insight or gnosis (*bodhi*) of the Buddhas,⁵⁷⁶ which for this purpose has to be, somehow, transferred by them to the mental series of ordinary living beings. This is done by means of the proclamation of the Buddhist (especially the Mahāyāna) Doctrine (*deśanā*). This Doctrine is nothing else but a verbalization of supramundane insight into True Reality⁵⁷⁷ and creates, in the mental series of the listener, an Impression - the Impression of Listening (*śrutavāsanā*) - which, like the Doctrine itself,⁵⁷⁸ is termed an "outflow of True Reality completely freed from [accidental] Impurities" (*suviśuddha-dharmadhātu-niṣyanda*).⁵⁷⁹ This Impression, though occurring side by side with ālayavijñāna, or even commixed with it like milk with water,⁵⁸⁰ yet does not form part of it, but is rather a heterogeneous element opposed to ālayavijñāna.⁵⁸¹ Though still mundane in itself, this Impression is nevertheless, on account of its supramundane origin, capable of becoming the Seed or cause of the factors leading up to supramundane insight and finally of supramundane insight itself.⁵⁸²

4.8.6 In later texts, this relation of being based on ālayavijñāna without forming part of it is even used to establish the existence of a primordial Seed of supramundane dharmas in the mental series of living beings.⁵⁸³ In the Laṅkāvatārasūtra,⁵⁸⁴ as is well-known, even ālayavijñāna itself,

being identified with *tathāgatagarbha*, is, or comprises, the cause of supramundane purification - a position which is, to be sure, irreconcilable with that of the *Nivṛtti Portion* but is not entirely inexplicable if we start from the concept of ālayavijñāna we found in the *Basic Section* or in the *Proof Portion* (§ 4.8.1).⁵⁸⁵

4.9 As was shown in § 4.7, in the *Nivṛtti Portion* and related materials ālayavijñāna is essentially connected with Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*), especially in the sense of latent wickedness (= Seeds of Defilements), and with spiritually evil Clinging (*upādāna*). This fact, however, inevitably entails, as the text expressly states, the consequence that persons who have abandoned all Clinging and have become free from all Badness (in the sense of latent wickedness), i.e. Arhats, Pratyekabuddhas, Bodhisattvas no longer liable to turning back (*avaivartika* or *avivartanīya*), and Tathāgatas, have to be regarded, when still alive, to be nevertheless devoid of ālayavijñāna⁵⁸⁶ (just as they are considered to be devoid of *sopādāna-vijñāna*)⁵⁸⁷. Thus, in *nirodhasamāpatti*, such persons are, just as in *nirupadhiṣeṣa-nirvāṇa*, devoid of both pravṛttivijñānas and ālayavijñāna⁵⁸⁸ and this obviously means: of every kind of *vijñāna*.⁵⁸⁹ For although according to one passage⁵⁹⁰ the Transmuted Basis[-of-existence] (**āśrayaparivṛtti*) - which has, in the Arhat, etc., come to entirely replace ālayavijñāna and the Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*) with which it is bound up or of which it consists - is characterized by free control (**vaśin?*) over good and neutral dharmas,⁵⁹¹ this free control is, in contrast to its evil counterpart, viz. Badness, not hypostatized in the text into a form of mind on its own.

The fact, however, that, in the case of the *nirodhasamāpatti* of Arhats, etc., no kind of *vijñāna* appears to be left implies that the *Nivṛtti Portion* altogether overlooks, in this case, the statement of the Dharmadinnāsūtra that in *nirodhasamāpatti* mind has not withdrawn from the body. At any rate, one is justified in stating that in this text, at least in the case of

the Arhat, etc., ālayavijñāna has lost its function of guaranteeing in *nirodhasamāpatti* the presence of mind and thus the biological appropriation of corporeal matter and the continuation of life. But if ālayavijñāna is not required for this purpose in the case of the Arhat, etc., it would appear to be dispensable in other cases, too. Since the text does not offer or indicate any other solution of the problem, it would seem that its author simply was not conscious of this consequence. In other words: By interpreting ālayavijñāna in terms of the typically Buddhist meaning of 'ālaya', viz. spiritually evil Clinging, and by consistently bringing the concept of ālayavijñāna as close as possible to the notion of *sopādāna-vijñāna*, the author of the *Nivṛtti Portion* came - obviously with - out noticing it - to seriously jeopardize the very purpose of ālayavijñāna for the sake of which it had been introduced in the first place, i.e. to be present, and to guarantee the biological appropriation of corporeal matter, even in *nirodhasamāpatti*. In order to fulfil this purpose, ālayavijñāna had to be regarded as continuing to exist even in Arhats, etc., and as being absent in *nirupa d h i ś e ṣ a -nirvāṇa* only, i.e. in the state after the death of an Arhat, etc., as is in fact expressly stated in the *Sacittikā/Acittikā Bhūmiḥ* of the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*.⁵⁹²

4.10 It appears that the difficulty involved in the concept of ālayavijñāna as set forth in the *Nivṛtti Portion* did not remain hidden to the *Yogācāras* themselves. At any rate, in other chapters of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, two theories can be found which create the impression of being attempts at solving the problem, or at least *de facto* succeed in doing so.

4.10.1 One of these theories is presented in the *Sacittikā Bhūmiḥ* of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*. In this chapter - which in structure and detail has many points in common with the *Pravṛtti Portion* and the *Nivṛtti Portion* -, the decisive role in establishing or maintaining Pollution (*saṃkleśa*) is no longer

attributed to ālayavijñāna but has been entirely transferred to the new *manas*⁵⁹³ which, as a subtle notion of 'I' and 'mine',⁵⁹⁴ is essentially defiled and altogether eliminated in the Arhat.⁵⁹⁵ Ālayavijñāna is thus no longer required as the principle of Pollution, and would be free to resume its old function of biological appropriation even in Arhats. But the text does not expressly say so. It merely stresses, in this context, that ālayavijñāna is not directly associated (*-saṃpratyukta*) with any Defilements (*kleśa*),⁵⁹⁶ but it does not offer a revised theory of ālayavijñāna's relation to Badness (*daṣṭhūlya*) or to the Seeds of Defilements the essential connection with which had implied its absence in Arhats, etc. It may be on account of this inexplicitness with regard to the nature and function of ālayavijñāna that the solution of the Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya does not seem to have succeeded in superseding the *Nivṛtti Portion*, the influence of which, clearly present in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*⁵⁹⁷ and the *Hsien-yang-shêng-chiaolun*⁵⁹⁸, is still palpable in Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā*.⁵⁹⁹

4.10.2 The reconsideration of the crucial problem of ālayavijñāna's relation to Badness which one misses in the Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya is, however, presupposed in the *Sopadhikā/Nirupadhikā Bhūmiḥ* of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*. This text states that, when an Arhat enters *nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa*, he first stops "forthcoming" mind (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*) by becoming absorbed in *nīrodhasamāpatti*, and that thereupon ālayavijñāna abandons the [corporeal] basis(-of-existence) [and, in its turn, also ceases to exist].⁶⁰⁰ This means that according to this text the Arhat is still furnished with an ālayavijñāna, which keeps his body alive even in *nīrodhasamāpatti*, and the withdrawal or cessation of which means entering into *nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa*, i.e. death. The reason why this passage can accept the continuance of ālayavijñāna even in Arhats seems to be that it presupposes a concept of Badness (*daṣṭhūlya*) which differs from that of the *Nivṛtti Portion* in an important respect. In the *Nivṛtti Portion* the notion of Badness appears to be co-extensive with latent wicked-

n e s s , i.e. Seeds of D e f i l e m e n t s .⁶⁰¹ In fact, in a few passages of the Yogācārabhūmi, the aspect of uneasiness appears to be a kind of by-effect of, or at least closely connected with, Badness in the sense of latent wickedness.⁶⁰² On the other hand, the Sopadhika-nirupadhika-bhūmi-viniścaya recurs to a distinction, already made in the Manobhūmi of the Basic Section,⁶⁰³ between two kinds of B a d n e s s , viz. Badness affiliated to Defilements (*kleśapakṣyaṃ dauṣṭhulyam*) involving latent wickedness, and Badness affiliated to [what is Result-of-]Maturation (*vipākapakṣyaṃ dauṣṭhulyam*) not involving wickedness but only uneasiness, and considers, in accordance with some other passages,⁶⁰⁴ the latter kind, viz. *vipāka-dauṣṭhulya*, to continue to exist even in the Arhat.⁶⁰⁵ Thus, it is only a part or special aspect of ālayavijñāna that is, in a latent form, characterized by *upādāna* or *ālaya* in the spiritually evil sense and thus responsible for Pollution and is therefore by necessity entirely eliminated when Arhatship is attained, whereas another part or aspect of ālayavijñāna is spiritually neutral and fit for functioning as the principle of biological appropriation even in an Arhat.⁶⁰⁶ This latter aspect, as is well-known,⁶⁰⁷ later Yogācāras like Hsüan-tsang⁶⁰⁸ prefer to call '*vipāka-vijñāna*' only, reserving the term '*ālayavijñāna*', in accordance with the *Nivṛtti Portion*, to the "pollutive" aspect which ceases with the attainment of Arhatship.

5. Ālayavijñāna as a veritable vijñāna

5.1 My *Initial Passage* started from the canonical statement that in *nīrodhasamāpatti* mind (*vijñāna*) has not withdrawn from the body (§ 2.1), and from this it drew the conclusion that, in view of the absence of the ordinary, conscious forms of mind, there must be, in *nīrodhasamāpatti*, some other - by necessity subliminal - kind of *vijñāna* (§ 2.3). The *Initial Passage* seems to have tried to establish such a *vijñāna* by hypostatizing the Seeds (*bīja*) of mind sticking in the material sense-faculties to a kind of mind (*vijñāna*) on its own, called 'ālayavijñāna' (§ 2.5). It is thus obvious that already in the context of the very first introduction of ālayavijñāna - provided that I have spotted it correctly - the *v i j ñ ā n a* nature of ā l a y a - v i j ñ ā n a , i.e. the fact that it is some genuine kind of mind (*vijñāna*), is of fundamental importance.

However, this *vijñāna* nature of ālayavijñāna turns out to be by no means unproblematic as soon as one tries to justify it in a more concrete way.

5.2 In view of the close connection of the pertinent parts of the Yogācārabhūmi with the Abhidharmic tradition, it is not surprising that ālayavijñāna, in order to deserve being qualified as a genuine *vijñāna*, came to be expected to satisfy the Abhidharmic definition of a *vijñāna*.

This definition, which in substance can be traced back to the canonical texts, takes *vijñāna* as that which performs the act of *vi-jñā-*,⁶⁰⁹ or, more explicitly, as that which makes known (*vijñapti*), i.e. perceives or cognizes (*upalabdhi*), an object (*viṣaya*, *ālambana*).⁶¹⁰

Besides, every kind or state of mind (*citta* = *vijñāna*) is, in Abhidharmic theory, considered to be associated with (*saṃprayukta*) mind-like or mental factors (*caittāḥ* or *caitasikā dharmāḥ*).⁶¹¹ Some of these mental factors (especially

the good and evil ones) occur only more or less sporadically, but others are regarded as o m n i p r e s e n t (*sarvatraga*), i.e. as accompanying every state of mind without exception. In the *Yogācārabhūmi*,⁶¹² five mental factors are accepted as omnipresent: 1) [focussing of] attention (*manaskāra*), 2) contact (*sparśa*),⁶¹³ 3) sensation or feeling (*vedanā*), 4) ideation (*saṃjñā*),⁶¹⁴ and 5) volitional impulse or drive (*cetanā*).

5.3 It is obvious that both the above-mentioned definition of *viññāna* and the view that every *viññāna* is by necessity accompanied by at least five mental factors including attention and volitional impulse are based on a purely actualistic concept of *viññāna*. Thus, if the *viññāna* nature of ālayaviññāna is vindicated by the assumption that it, too, must satisfy these criteria – viz. cognize an object and be associated with at least the omnipresent mental factors⁶¹⁵ –, this would seem to be hardly compatible with its presence in an unconscious state like *nirodhasamāpatti*, in essential connection with which, however, the concept of ālayaviññāna appears to have been introduced for the first time. For the state of *nirodhasamāpatti* is traditionally taken to be characterized by the a b s e n c e of all mental activity⁶¹⁶ and is – under its full name '*saṃjñā-vedayita-nirodha(-samāpatti)*' – expressly stated to be w i t h o u t ideation (*saṃjñā*) and sensation (*vedanā*).⁶¹⁷ But precisely these two are among the omnipresent mental factors on the presence of which the *viññāna* nature of ālayaviññāna would, from the Abhidharmic point of view, be dependent. If, on the other hand, the consequence that ālayaviññāna must cognize an object and be associated with mental factors is rejected, it would seem difficult, at least from the Abhidharmic point of view, to establish it as a veritable *viññāna*, as it, however, would have to be if the Sūtra referred to in the *Initial Passage* is to be taken seriously.

5.4 In the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, there is no indication that the afore-mentioned implications of the *vi-jñāna* nature of *ālayavijñāna* had already become a conscious issue, and the same is true of the Vth chapter of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* and of the layer A (see § 9) of the *Proof Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*. Yet, there are a couple of passages which may be taken to anticipate certain aspects of this development:

5.4.1 On the one hand, there is a passage in the *Basic Section*⁶¹⁸ which may be taken to imply that *ālayavijñāna* is associated with neither-painful-nor-pleasant (*aduḥkhāsukha*) sensation (cp. § 6.5.2). Since in this passage *ālayavijñāna* figures as (the primary?) result of karmic Maturation (cp. § 6.5.4), it would seem that it had come to be connected with such a sensation because it had taken the position of mind in the embryonic state (probably identical with Mind-containing-all-Seeds (*sarvabījakaṃ vijñānam*)⁶¹⁹), which is, in pre-*ālayavijñānic* materials of the *Basic Section*, stated to be "established" (*pratiṣṭhita*)⁶²⁰, as a rule (*prakṛtyā*), in neither-painful-nor-pleasant sensation.⁶²¹

5.4.2 On the other hand, the *Proof Portion* refers to a corporeal experience (*kāyiko 'nubhavaḥ*), or experiences of the body arising in the body⁶²² (*kāye kāyānubhavāḥ*), both in and outside meditative absorption, which have to be ascribed to *ālayavijñāna* (cp. § 3.7.1). This would seem to mean that *ālayavijñāna*, somehow, p e r c e i v e s o r s e n s e s t h e b o d y i n which it sticks, or causes it to be sensed along with its own becoming sensible.

5.4.2.1 Perhaps this idea is somehow connected with the fact that *ālayavijñāna* came to incorporate Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*: see § 4.1.4) - especially, of course, Badness sticking in the body - and, occasionally, also its counterpart Ease (*praśrabdhi*: see n. 47). Now, Badness in the sense of subliminal uneasiness constitutes a kind of Suffering (*duḥkha*: see § 4.1.2), and this Suffering is, in spite of its subtleness, somehow f e l t ,⁶²³ especially in connection with neither-painful-nor-pleasant sensa-

tion (*aduhkhāsukhā vedanā*) where it is not overlain with acute pleasure or pain.⁶²⁴

5.4.2.2 Thus, it may be that, by assuming that *ālayavijñāna* experiences the *B a d n e s s* (= uneasiness *s t i c k i n g i n t h e b o d y*) - this Badness being something of which *ālayavijñāna* itself is constitutive -, the passage anticipates, in an indistinct fashion, the idea that *ālayavijñāna* *p e r c e i v e s t h e b o d y* and is, at the same time, associated with neither-painful-nor-pleasant *s e n s a t i o n*.

5.4.2.3 A passage of the Hsien-yang-shêng-chiao-lun (see § 3.7.2) seems to suggest that in states of meditative absorption, when bodily uneasiness is replaced by corporeal ease, *ālayavijñāna* is associated with, or at least responsible for, *p l e a s a n t s e n s a t i o n*. But due to the negative development of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* delineated in § 4, this idea does not appear to have struck roots.

5.5.1 Though somehow vaguely related to the problem of the *vijñāna* nature of *ālayavijñāna*, the statements discussed in the preceding paragraph (5.4) do not yet seem to proceed from a clear-cut awareness of this problem. Such an awareness appears to be documented for the first time in the VIIIth chapter of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, where the new subliminal kind of *vijñāna* is explicitly understood as a veritable *vijñāna* in the sense of *c o g n i t i o n o f a n o b j e c t* (see § 5.6.1). It is worth noting in this connection that *Samdh VIII* appears to have made use of the definition of *vijñāna* as (mere) making known (i.e. perception/cognition) of an object (**ālabhāna-vijñapti(-mātra)*) also in the context of the question of whether the images visualized in meditative concentration (*Samdh VIII.7*) - and analogously also the contents of everyday experiences (*Samdh VIII.8*) - are different from mind or not.⁶²⁵ Since the theory of *vijñaptimātratā* is also alluded to in the subsequent part of the paragraph of *Samdh VIII* which presents the subliminal form of mind as an actual perception (or "representation") of an object (see n. 628a), it

may even be that the first attempt to conceive of the subliminal *viññāna* as a perception (or "representation") of an object was motivated not so much by the ordinary Abhidharma definition of *viññāna* as *viññapti*, i.e. cognition of an object, but rather by its specifically Yogācāra idealist reinterpretation, i.e. by the doctrine of *viññaptimātratā* (which is, by the way, quite obviously the motive of conceiving of ālayaviññāna as a cognition of an object also at MSg II.13 (see § 5.12.1 + n. 698)).

5.5.2 This assumption would also explain the fact that the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra does not yet touch upon the problem whether ālayaviññāna is or is not associated with mental factors. This question is, however, explicitly raised and discussed (see § 5.9) in the *Pravṛtti Portion* (of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*. This text does not seem to advocate the standpoint of *viññaptimātratā* (see § 10.3.1) and may hence be regarded rather as an attempt to revise and systematize the theory of ālayaviññāna, or the theory of mind (*citta*, *manas*, *viññāna*)⁶²⁶ with ālayaviññāna as its central concept, by establishing ālayaviññāna as the fundamental layer of personality and by consistently taking it as a veritable *viññāna* in the Abhidharma sense,^{626a} though perhaps it may have been additionally encouraged to this step by the VIIIth chapter of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra.⁶²⁷

5.6.1 As was stated in § 5.5, the first text to document an awareness of the issue that in order to be a veritable *viññāna* the new, subliminal kind of mind must cognize or perceive an object is the VIIIth chapter of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, where *ādānaviññāna* (i.e. ālayaviññāna: see § 3.9.2.3) is characterized as an "unconscious (or: not fully conscious?) steady⁶²⁸ perception (or "representation")^{628a} of the Receptacle (i.e. of the surrounding world) (*asaṃvidita-sthira-bhājana-viññapti)"⁶²⁹.

5.6.2 In one paragraph of the *Proof Portion* (viz. layer B.2: see § 9), ordinary perceptions and cognitions are stated to be inevitably accompanied not only by a perception of the surrounding world (*bhājana-vijñapti*) but also (apart from a notion of 'I' to be ascribed to *manas*: see § 9) by a perception of the basis (*āśraya-vijñapti*)⁶³⁰ which will, in this connection, refer to a continuous perception of one's own corporeal basis-of-existence⁶³¹ and doubtless indicate another cognitive function of ālayavijñāna.^{631a}

5.6.3 In the *Pravṛtti Portion*, the cognitive function of ālayavijñāna is described in a way which is close to that of the *Proof Portion* but not identical with it and at any rate more elaborate.⁶³²

According to the *Pravṛtti Portion*, too, ālayavijñāna perceives two objects, one "outside" (*bahirdhā*) and one "inwardly" (*adhyātman*):⁶³³

5.6.3.1 On the one hand, ālayavijñāna is, on the lines of Saṃdh VIII, stated to perceive, in an uninterrupted (and indistinct, or not clearly delimited?) form,⁶³⁴ the Receptacle (i.e. the surrounding world) (*aparicchinākāra-bhājana-vijñapti*).⁶³⁵

5.6.3.2 On the other hand, ālayavijñāna perceives, as in the *Proof Portion*, also the corporeal basis-of-personal-existence, but this perception is, in the *Pravṛtti Portion*, only a part of a more complex perception derived from Saṃdh V.2 where Mind-containing-all-Seeds (= ālayavijñāna) was stated to reincarnate on the basis of a twofold *upādāna* (see § 4.4.2). In the *Pravṛtti Portion*, this twofold *upādāna* is made into an object of ālayavijñāna's cognitive function, which means that ālayavijñāna is taken to perceive or cognize both the [subtle] matter of the [material] sense-faculties along with its [gross] basis as also the Impression (*vāsanā*) of emotionally involved conceptual proliferation, specified, in this text, as Sticking to the Imagined Character [of reality] (*parikalpita-svabhāvābhiniveśa*: see § 4.5.1).⁶³⁶

5.6.3.3 The perception of the surrounding world is, moreover, stated to be based on (i.e. to be, so to speak, a secondary or by-effect of) ālayavijñāna in so far as it has the "upādāna inwardly"⁶³⁷ (i.e. primarily, in this connection, the corporeal basis of personal existence) for its object, and this is illustrated by the flame of a lamp which, though functioning "inwardly" on the basis of (*upādāya!) wick and fat,⁶³⁸ automatically emits light "outside",⁶³⁹ i.e. illumines the surrounding space.

5.6.3.4 The object perceived by ālayavijñāna is always present and does not change.⁶⁴⁰ Thus, ālayavijñāna, though not eternal but a continuous series of moments,⁶⁴¹ continues as a homogeneous perception⁶⁴² (*ekarasa-vijñaptitaḥ) throughout life.⁶⁴³

5.6.3.5 On the other hand, the object of ālayavijñāna differs according to the world sphere where one is reborn.

a) One passage (based on Saṃdh V.2)⁶⁴⁴ states that in the immaterial world-sphere (ārūpyadhātu) the upādāna perceived by ālayavijñāna is confined to the Impression (vāsanā);⁶⁴⁵ in the ārūpyadhātu a perception of the corporeal basis-of-existence is, of course, impossible since who is reborn in this sphere is devoid of material constituents.

b) In another paragraph,⁶⁴⁶ the *Pravṛtti Portion* declares that the upādāna⁶⁴⁷ which is the object (ālambana) of ālayavijñāna is limited (*parīṭṭa) in the kāmādhātu, large (*mahādgata) in the rūpadhātu, infinite (*apramāṇa) in the ākāśa- and vijñānānantyāyatana, subtle (*sūkṣma) in the ākīñcanyāyatana, and extremely subtle (*ati-sūkṣma) in the naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana. This makes good sense in the first two cases since it can be referred to the fact that the bodies of living beings are comparatively small in the kāmādhātu⁶⁴⁸ but large in the rūpadhātu.⁶⁴⁹ But it is not so easy to understand what the author had in mind in the case of the stages of the ārūpyadhātu, since there is, in this sphere, no body at all.⁶⁵⁰ Thus - provided that the passage does not presuppose a divergent view on corporeal matter in the ārūpya-

*dhātu*⁶⁵¹ - the *upādāna* in this sphere can only be the I m - p r e s s i o n (*vāsanā*). Yet, in this case, too, the use of the attribute "infinite" (*apramāṇa*) and the distinction between "subtle" and "extremely subtle" do not make sense unless they are taken to refer, indirectly, to a dissimilarity of the a c t u a l (immaterial) dharmas which arise from the Impression in the various stages of the *ārūpyadhātu*.⁶⁵²

5.6.4.1 More or less the same view on the twofold cognitive function of *ālayavijñāna* as in the *Pravṛtti Portion* is indicated in the S a c i t t i k ā B h ū m i ḥ of the *Viniś-cayasamgrahaṇī*; according to this text, *ālayavijñāna* "always [perceives], as its object, on the one hand the *upādāna*, and on the other the surrounding world - one and the same (or: uniform) [throughout life] - without clearly discerning (or delimiting?) it"⁶⁵³.

5.6.4.2 Similarly, in the beginning of the H s i e n - y a n g - s h ê n g - c h i a o - l u n ,⁶⁵⁴ *ālayavijñāna* is stated to appropriate a n d p e r c e i v e , on the one hand, the [subtle] material sense-faculties and their [gross] bases as well as the Impression(s) of [saṃsāric] diversity/diversification (*prapañca-vāsanā*), and to support and perceive, on the other hand, the Receptacle (= surrounding world) outside.⁶⁵⁵

5.7 As was indicated above (§ 5.3), the admission that as a *vijñāna* *ālayavijñāna*, too, had to be conceived of as actually c o g n i z i n g a n o b j e c t does not appear to be easily compatible with its presence in u n c o n s c i o u s states like *nirodhasamāpatti*. This seems to hold good particularly in the case of the pertinent paragraph of the *Proof Portion*; for in this paragraph, what must be the cognitive functions of *ālayavijñāna* (viz. a continuous perception of the surrounding world and of the [corporeal] basis [of personal existence]: see § 5.6.2) is presented as a matter-of-fact e x p e r i e n c e (*upalabhyante!*).⁶⁵⁶ Since such an experience can hardly be imagin-

ed not to contradict the unconscious character of *nirodhasamāpatti*, it would seem that in this passage the specific connection of ālayavijñāna with *nirodhasamāpatti* had, probably, been lost sight of, as appears to be the case in some other texts, too.⁶⁵⁷ Yet, most of these texts, or at any rate the majority of the sources concerned, have remained conscious of the s u b l i m i n a l or f a i n t nature of ālayavijñāna, and try to harmonize the cognitive function of ālayavijñāna with its faintness by expressly specifying either this cognitive function⁶⁵⁸ or the object cognized⁶⁵⁹ as un- or not fully conscious (*asaṃvidita*)⁶⁶⁰, indistinct or not clearly delimited or difficult to cognize or determine (*aparicchinna*, etc.;⁶⁶¹ *duṣpariccheda*, etc.⁶⁶²), or subtle (*sūkṣma*)⁶⁶³.

A particularly illuminating illustration of the matter is given by *Pṛthivībandhu:⁶⁶⁴

"As a glow-worm flying by day, though not [totally] lacking luminosity, yet does not shine as brightly as the light of the sun, etc., so ālayavijñāna, when perceiving inwardly that which is appropriated (*upādāna*) ..., perceives it [but] in an indistinct or subtle or faint way, and when perceiving the surrounding world (*bhājana-loka*) outside, perceives it in an indistinct or subtle or faint way ...".

5.8. While it is comparatively easy to account for the mere fact that ālayavijñāna came to be conceived of as a cognition of an object (see § 5.2-3), I am so far unable to give a definitive answer to the question why the object of ālayavijñāna was concretized precisely in the way described in § 5.6, viz. as the surrounding world, corporeal matter, and the Impression(s) of saṃsāric diversity/diversification or of Sticking to the Imagined Character [of reality]. All I can do is to offer some rather unsatisfactory hypothetical remarks.⁶⁶⁵

5.8.1 One possibility one may be tempted to take into consideration is that the object of ālayavijñāna was derived from a reinterpretation of the term 'ālayavijñāna', by way of taking it

as a genitive tatpuruṣa, with 'ālaya' indicating the object of 'vijñāna'. Since 'ālaya' may also mean "receptacle", 'ālaya-vijñāna' might have been taken to mean "cognition of the Receptacle", i.e. of the surrounding world (*bhājana(-loka)*).⁶⁶⁶ Likewise, if 'ālaya' was understood in the sense of "what one clings to", i.e. the *āśraya* or *ātmabhāva* (containing all Seeds),⁶⁶⁷ this might have supplied the *āśraya* (and the Seeds) as another object of *ālayavijñāna*, as would also have resulted, even more specifically, if the term '*ādāna-vijñāna*' had, in a similar way, been interpreted as "cognition of the *ādāna* (in the sense of the twofold *upādāna* of Saṃdh V.2)". But as far as I can see there is not the slightest hint in the sources that such an interpretation of the term(s) was ever thought of.⁶⁶⁸ Moreover, oddly enough, the Saṃdhi-nirmocanasūtra, which prefers '*ādāna-vijñāna*', presents, as the object of the subliminal *vijñāna*, only the surrounding world, which could be derived only from '*ālaya-vijñāna*', whereas the corporeal basis and the Impression(s), which would more easily be derived from '*ādāna-vijñāna*', figure as the object of the subliminal *vijñāna* only in the Yogācārabhūmi, which prefers '*ālaya-vijñāna*'.

5.8.2 Another possibility is that the object of *ālayavijñāna* was, as may be indicated by the *Proof Portion* (see § 5.7), derived from a matter-of-fact experience - i.e. a kind of steady background awareness of one's body (cp. also § 5.4.2!) and of the surrounding world (cp. also § 7.4) -, which was found suitable for attribution to *ālayavijñāna*. While not altogether excluding such a possibility as a contributory factor, I should still find it strange that the occurrence of such experiences should have been entirely overlooked or deliberately ignored before the introduction of *ālayavijñāna*. Besides, it may be difficult to explain, on the basis of a matter-of-fact experience, the idea that *ālayavijñāna* also cognizes the Impression(s) (*vāsanā*) of saṃsāric diversity/diversification or of Sticking to the Imagined Character [of reality].

5.8.3 A third possibility of explanation is to start from theoretical considerations: If ālayavijñāna, being a *viññāna*, had to operate as a perception or cognition of some object, it would not seem unnatural if this function was considered to be directed towards the very object ālayavijñāna was already acknowledged to appropriate, i.e. towards the body and the material sense-faculties. This principle could be extended to the Impression (*vāsanā*) if this too was regarded, in line with Saṃdh V.2, as *upādāna*.⁶⁶⁹ Such an extension will seem more plausible if attention is paid to the special case of the world-sphere of immateriality (*ārūpyadhātu*) where the corporeal basis of one's existence is lacking,⁶⁷⁰ which would mean that, the *vāsanā* apart, ālayavijñāna is without *upādāna* and object.⁶⁷¹ As for the perception of the surrounding world, it may have been found difficult to conceive of the perception of the corporeal basis in isolation: since the corporeal basis always exists, and is appropriated, within a certain surrounding, its perception, too, is naturally conceived of as automatically involving a perception of that surrounding, too,⁶⁷² just as the flame of a lamp, though arising "inwardly" on the basis (*upādāya*) of wick and fat, automatically illumines the surrounding space.⁶⁷³

5.8.4 It should however be noted that, so far as the cognitive function of the subliminal *viññāna* is concerned, the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, which has obviously been made use of by the *Pravṛtti Portion*,⁶⁷⁴ mentions only a perception of the surrounding world (*bhājana-viññapti*) but is tacit on a perception of the corporeal basis or of the twofold *upādāna*, the latter being merely characterized as that on the basis of which (**upādāya*: see n. 508) the reincarnation, etc., of the (subliminal) Mind containing all Seeds (*sarvabījakam cittam*) takes place.⁶⁷⁵ Unless the characterization of ālayavijñāna's cognitive function in Saṃdh VIII is, for whatever reason, incomplete, this would mean that in explaining why the object of ālayavijñāna/*ādāna-viññāna* was concretized as it was we have to start not from the perception of the corporeal basis or of the twofold *upādāna* but

from the perception of the surrounding world. In this case, the cognitive function of ālayavijñāna may have been conceived of on the analogy of the ordinary, i.e. extroverted, sense-faculties or perceptions: As, e.g., eyesight, hidden in the eye, generates a perception of visible things outside but not of the eye itself, or as visual perception, being based on the sense-faculty of sight, perceives things outside but not its basis, so ālayavijñāna/āḍānavijñāna, hidden in the body it appropriates, perceives its surrounding but not the body. Yet, if one thinks of the sense of touch and tactile perception, which apprehend touch all over and even within the body, one can easily see why the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī has added, to the perception of the surrounding world, a perception of ālayavijñāna's own corporeal basis - an addition which may, however, also have been motivated or reinforced by the (possibly earlier) idea of bodily experiences to be ascribed to ālayavijñāna (see § 5.4.2).⁶⁷⁶

In this connection it may be worth stating that the wording of the simile by which the *Pravṛtti Portion* illustrates ālayavijñāna's perception of the surrounding world would seem to fit the (presumable) initial situation (documented by Saṃdh VIII.37) when it says that the flame of a lamp, arising "inwardly", produces light "outside".⁶⁷⁷ Yet, the simile may just as well be interpreted in the sense of the view of the *Pravṛtti Portion*, if one presupposes that the flame of a lamp or candle in fact illumines not only the surroundings but also its own basis, viz. wick and fat.⁶⁷⁸

5.8.5 However, it may well be that even this latter hypothesis

(§ 5.8.4) at best helps to explain how the statement of Saṃdh VIII may have been understood and adapted by the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī. In view of the *vi j ñ a p t i m ā t r a t ā* background of Saṃdh VIII (see § 5.5.1), one has to consider the possibility that in establishing āḍānavijñāna as *bhājana-vijñapti* Saṃdh VIII did not at all start from the traditional, realist view of perception but from some other idea, e.g. from the idea that āḍānavijñāna in the epistemological context, viz. āḍānavijñā-

na viewed as a *vi j ñ a p t i*, i.e. as a representation or image, must be as *f u n d a m e n t a l* as it is in the context of psychological analysis (Samdh V.4-5: see § 3.9.3), and it may have been for this reason that *āḍānavijñāna* was taken to be a "steady representation of bhājana[loka]", i.e. of the "surrounding world" as the receptacle and footing or support (*pada*, *pratiṣṭhā*)^{678a} of living beings. This explanation would, by the way, also be applicable if *vi j ñ a p t i m ā t r a t ā* is left out of account.

5.9 As was indicated in § 5.5, it is only in the *Pravṛtti* Portion of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* that the *vi j ñ ā n a* nature of *ālayavi j ñ ā n a* is systematically developed also in the sense that it is realized to involve association (*saṃprayoga*) with mental factors. The text accepts this consequence without restriction, and accordingly ascribes to *ālayavi j ñ ā n a* all the five mental factors which are said to be omnipresent (*sarvatraga*), i.e. associated with every state of mind without exception: viz. contact (*sparśa*), sensation (*vedanā*, expressly specified, in the case of *ālayavi j ñ ā n a*, as neither-painful-nor-pleasant)⁶⁷⁹, ideation (*saṃjñā*), volitional impulse (*cetanā*), and (focussing of) attention (*manaskāra*).⁶⁸⁰ Though the assumption of these factors does not seem unreasonable if the cognitive function of *ālayavi j ñ ā n a* - viz. "making known" (*vi j ñ a p t i*), i.e. cognizing or perceiving, an object - is taken seriously, at least some of them do not easily fit its subliminal character. And they would seem almost incompatible with the presence of *ālayavi j ñ ā n a* in *nīrodhasamāpatti* where all mental activities (occasionally defined as *saṃjñā* and *vedanā*)⁶⁸¹ or, in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda tradition, as *saṃjñā* and *cetanā*⁶⁸² but certainly also including *manaskāra*) are said to have ceased.⁶⁸³ The *Pravṛtti* Portion, though not mentioning *nīrodhasamāpatti* and perhaps no longer concerned with its special problems, is nevertheless aware of the subliminal character of *ālayavi j ñ ā n a* and tries to do justice to it by declaring the mental factors associated with *ālayavi j ñ ā n a* to be *s u b t l e* (*sūkṣma*) on account of being hard to observe even for sagacious worldly

people.⁶⁸⁴ But although this solution may be acceptable as far as neither-painful-nor-pleasant sensation is concerned (the more so since there are antecedents in the older materials (see § 5.4)), it may seem problematic in the case of essentially actualistic factors like ideation (*saṃjñā*), volitional impulse (*cetanā*) or (focussing of) attention (*manaskāra*). Accordingly, even closely related texts like the *Sacittikā Bhūmiḥ* of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*⁶⁸⁵ and the beginning of the *Hsien-yang-shêng-chiao-lun*⁶⁸⁶ confine themselves to letting *ālayavijñāna* be associated with neither-painful-nor-pleasant sensation but do not mention its association with the other omnipresent factors.

5.10 In contrast to the *Pravṛtti Portion* and its bold acceptance of the consequences ensuing, in the Abhidharmic perspective, from taking *ālayavijñāna* as a veritable *vijñāna*, the majority of the older post-Yogācārabhūmi sources⁶⁸⁷ appear, for whatever reasons, to have had considerable reserves in the matter. A detailed account would by far exceed the limits of the present study, but even a tentative sketch, incomplete and preliminary though it is, will not perhaps be found entirely superfluous.

5.11.1 In the Yogācāra works ascribed to "Maitreya-
(nātha)" (viz. *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, *Madhyānta-vibhāga* and *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*), the term '*ālayavijñāna*' is, as is well-known,⁶⁸⁸ never used. This cannot be accounted for by the assumption that the context did not offer any opportunity to mention it; for the "Maitreya texts" occasionally make use of more or less equivalent concepts⁶⁸⁹ some of which are expressly identified with *ālayavijñāna* already by the earliest commentator.⁶⁹⁰ In fact, some of these concepts make it difficult to believe that the author did not yet know of *ālayavijñāna*, but create rather the impression that he deliberately avoided it.

5.11.2 An especially illuminating example is found in the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*:⁶⁹¹

"Due to beginningless ignorance of *tathatā* [there is] false

imagination (*abhūtaparikalpa*) that contains all Seeds (*sarvabījaka*) and is the cause of the appearance of the dichotomy [of *grāhya* and *grāhaka*] which does not really exist (*asad-dvaya-prakhyāna-kāraṇa*), and there is another [series of false imagination] (cp. DhDhVV *rgyud g'zan*) based on that [first kind of false imagination] ..."

This passage explicitly distinguishes between two layers of *abhūtaparikalpa*, one of them being conceived of as the support of the other and as containing all Seeds (*sarvabījaka*). This looks like a deliberate attempt to introduce a subliminal form of mind without calling it 'ālayavijñāna' (with which it is, however, expressly identified in Vasubandhu's commentary)^{692.693}

5.11.3 The motives for such a reserve can only be surmised. One might consider the possibility that the author of the "Maitreya texts" did not like the Abhidharmic consequences ensuing from the *vijñāna* nature of ālayavijñāna. But in this case he should not have used, probably in a similar sense, the notion of *pratyayavijñāna* (MAV I.9a)⁶⁹⁴ either. Therefore, it is more probable that, in view of his decidedly Mahāyāna (and non-Abhidharma) attitude, such implications meant little to him, and that his reserves against the concept of ālayavijñāna have some other reason: e.g. the fact that it did not occur in the professedly Mahāyāna chapters of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (viz. *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and *Bodhisattvabhūmiviniścaya*, of which he appears to have made ample use)⁶⁹⁵, but only in more traditional parts. Or the author of the "Maitreya texts" may still have been aware of the specific connection of ālayavijñāna with *nirodhasamāpatti* (which appears to be almost entirely ignored in these texts!)⁶⁹⁶ or with biological appropriation (which hardly suits the spiritualist orientation of the ontology of the "Maitreya texts" according to which all phenomena, especially all material phenomena, are nothing but illusory manifestations of mind (*vijñāna*) or false imagination (*abhūtaparikalpa*))⁶⁹⁷.

5.12.1 In contrast to this, the Abhidharma element is much stronger in what is generally regarded as the main works of A s a ṅ g a , viz. the M a h ā y ā n a s a ṃ g r a h a (which claims to be based on the (Mahāyāna-)Abhidharmasūtra) and, of course, the A b h i d h a r m a s a m u c c a y a . In the latter text, ālayavijñāna, though not occurring very often, yet figures as a well-established element of the Yogācāra tradition. In the Mahāyānaśaṃgraha, it is more central and even constitutes the subject-matter of one of the two largest chapters of the text (viz. MSg I). All the more striking is it that throughout this lengthy treatment of ālayavijñāna there is no attempt to interpret it, on the lines of the actualist Abhidharma notion of *viññāna*, as a perception or cognition of an o b j e c t and as associated with m e n t a l f a c t o r s . It is only in a passage of another chapter that ālayavijñāna is - in the context of *viññāp t i m ā t r a t ā* (see § 5.5.1)! - described as a cognition or representation of an object or of objects (**arthavijñapti*),⁶⁹⁸ but even here this idea is presented as a kind of s u p p o s i t i o n which the author himself need not have shared.⁶⁹⁹ There is no reference at all, in the Mahāyānaśaṃgraha, to ālayavijñāna being associated with mental factors. In the Abhidharmasamuccaya, to be sure, the latter aspect is once hinted at,⁷⁰⁰ but without any further specification. On the other hand, the Abhidharmasamuccaya does not contain, as far as I can see, any reference at all to ālayavijñāna as actually cognizing an object.

5.12.2 In the Mahāyānaśaṃgraha⁷⁰¹ and also - though, due to fewer occurrences, less conspicuously - in the Abhidharmasamuccaya,⁷⁰² ālayavijñāna is primarily conceived of as a c o n t a i n e r or even h y p o s t a s i s⁷⁰³ of S e e d s (*bīja*). This function of ālayavijñāna is, of course, extremely important in a mind-only system in which even the content of perceptions and cognitions cannot be derived from an external world but only from a mental source. On the other hand, in spite of the systematical development of mind-only ontology and spiritual practice in chapters II and III of the Mahāyānaśaṃgraha,

ālayavijñāna still has, in the 1st chapter which is specifically dedicated to it, also preserved its function of biological appropriation,⁷⁰⁴ of keeping the corporeal basis-of-personal-existence alive.

5.12.3 Since both Mahāyānasamgraha and Abhidharmasamuccaya contain several references to *nīrodhasamāpatti*⁷⁰⁵ and to the presence of ālayavijñāna in this state,⁷⁰⁶ one may surmise that at least one reason for the striking reserve, in these texts, against an actualist explication of ālayavijñāna was the feeling that an actual cognitive function of ālayavijñāna, as well as its being associated with mental factors like ideation (*saṃjñā*) or volitional impulse (*cetanā*), is hardly compatible with the unconscious, inactive character of this state. Actually, one passage of the Mahāyānasamgraha⁷⁰⁷ - though probably forming part of a later addition⁷⁰⁸ - expressly states that in *nīrodhasamāpatti* no object (*ālambana*) or mode [of its apprehension] (*ākāra*) is experienced, and that this fact excludes the presence, in this state, of *manovijñāna* but not of ālayavijñāna, the latter being, as the Mahāyānasamgraha-bhāṣya⁷⁰⁹ explains, essentially characterized by [the function of merely] appropriating the corporeal basis (*āśraya*) of one's existence [but not by the function of actually perceiving or cognizing anything in any manner].

5.12.4 On the other hand, the occurrences of *nīrodhasamāpatti* in the ālayavijñāna chapter of the Mahāyānasamgraha are, or belong to, text portions which appear, from the compositional point of view,⁷¹⁰ to be intrusive and thus may not have formed part of the original draft of this chapter but may have been added - probably by the author himself⁷¹¹ - under the increasing impact of the Yogācārabhūmi ambience. If this is true,⁷¹² the tendency to concentrate on the Seed aspect of ālayavijñāna and the conspicuous reserve against taking ālayavijñāna as an actual cognition should not, in the Mahāyānasamgraha (and thus perhaps also in the Abhidharmasamuccaya)⁷¹³, be due, at least not primarily, to an awareness of the incompatibility of such a concept of ālayavijñāna with

its presence in *nirodhasamāpatti*. It will, in this case, more likely have to be explained otherwise: e.g. as being rooted in the pertinent features of the specific Mahāyāna background of the Mahāyānaśaṃgraha, viz. the ālayavijñāna concept of the Abhidharma-sūtra (which seems to stress the causal or Seed function of ālayavijñāna)⁷¹⁴ and the tendency of the "Maitreya texts" to conceive, though without using the term 'ālayavijñāna' (see § 5.11), Seeds⁷¹⁵ or the causal aspect of mind as a layer on its own.⁷¹⁶

5.13.1 A similar picture as from the Mahāyānaśaṃgraha and the Abhidharmasamuccaya is, as far as I can see, also gained from Vasubandhu's commentaries on the early Yogācāra Śāstras as well as from the Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa. I have not systematically perused the Mahāyānaśaṃgraha-bhāṣya,⁷¹⁷ but at least in the other works of this group⁷¹⁸ ālayavijñāna is usually referred to only as supporting or containing, or consisting of, Seeds (*bīja*) or Impressions (*vāśanā*).⁷¹⁹ As far as I can see, there is no mention of ālayavijñāna as being associated with mental factors, and it is only in one passage of the Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya⁷²⁰ that ālayavijñāna seems⁷²¹ to be stated to consist not only of Seeds but also of [a representation or image of] objects, viz. the Foundation or Receptacle (*pratiṣṭhā*, i.e. the surrounding world), the body (*deha*), and the [objects-of-]enjoyment (*bhoga*).

5.13.2 It would seem that the view expressed in the latter passage is significantly different from that of the *Pravṛtti Portion* (§ 5.6.3):

Firstly, it does not include [a cognition of] Impressions or Seeds but adds *bhoga*, which appears to mean the sense-objects.⁷²²

Secondly, in contrast to the *Pravṛtti Portion* according to which ālayavijñāna is a cognition (*viññapti*) which has the surrounding world, etc., for its object (*ālam-bana*),⁷²³ the Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya passage would seem to imply that ālayavijñāna is the surrounding world, etc. I.e.: taken as

a veritable *viññāna*, *ālayaviññāna* is, according to this passage, not a cognition of an object but a *viññāna* appearing as an object, viz. the surrounding world, etc., without involving any real dichotomy of an apprehending *viññāna* and an object that is apprehended.⁷²⁴

This view is, in contrast to that of the *Pravṛtti Portion* (see § 10.3.1.4), essentially "idealist" or "spiritualist". It seems to start from an (initially non-*ālayaviññānic*) pattern of parallel sets of objective or "material" appearances on the one hand, and subjective or "immaterial" ones on the other.⁷²⁵ The precise character and mutual relation of these two sets appears to have been somewhat vague at first. Later on, the objective set is sometimes taken to be comprised in the *pravṛttiviññānas*,⁷²⁶ sometimes (as in the above-mentioned *Madhyāntavibhāga* passage)⁷²⁷ understood to be included in *ālayaviññāna*, and finally split up into two sets,⁷²⁸ viz. an objective image in the *pravṛttiviññānas* and a prototype of this image in *ālayaviññāna* (see § 5.17 + n. 769).⁷²⁹ A detailed treatment of this development is, however, beyond the limits of the present study.

5.14.1 A markedly different position is met with in the pertinent works of *Vasubandhu* the *Kośakāra*⁷³⁰. In contrast to the texts discussed in §§ 5.11-13, the author of these works is fully aware of, and consistently accepts, the Abhidharmic requirement of ascribing, even to *ālayaviññāna*, a cognitive function: in order to be a *viññāna* at all, *ālayaviññāna*, like any other *viññāna*, must have an object (*ālambana*) and a [specific] mode [of apprehending this object] (*ākāra*).⁷³¹ But in those of his works which advocate *ālayaviññāna* but not mind-only (viz. *Karmasiddhi*, *Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā* and *Pañcaskandhaka*), *Vasubandhu* refrains, in the case of *ālayaviññāna*, from going into details: *ālayaviññāna*, to be sure, does have an object and a mode of apprehending it, but its object and mode-of-apprehension are not, or cannot be,⁷³² distinctly ascertained or de-

f i n e d (*aparicchinnā lambanākāra*).⁷³³ To the objection that this does not solve the problem because one cannot understand "how something can be a *viññāna* and yet be thus", i.e. not have a clearly determined object and mode-of-apprehension, Vasubandhu answers by merely referring to the fact that "the other theoreticians who admit the existence of [some form of] mind (*viññāna*) in states like *nirodhasamāpatti* will have the same difficulty".⁷³⁴

Vasubandhu does not, in the afore-mentioned works, mention, or even raise the problem of, an association of *ālayaviññāna* with mental factors, probably because this would have provoked his own arguments (with which he had charged the opponent's view of the presence of a *manoviññāna* in *nirodhasamāpatti*)⁷³⁵ to be turned against himself.

5.14.2 It is only in the *Triṃśikā*⁷³⁶ (which in all essential issues follows the *Yogācāra* standpoint) that Vasubandhu abandons his reserves and whole-heartedly adopts, with regard to both the object of *ālayaviññāna* and its association with mental factors, the position of the *Pravṛtti Portion*, taking *ālayaviññāna* to cognize, in an unconscious or not fully conscious way, the Abode (i.e. the surrounding world) and the *upādi* (= *upādāna*: see § 5.6.3.2),⁷³⁷ and to be associated with the five omnipresent mental factors (see § 5.9).⁷³⁸

5.15.1 It may be interesting to note that *Sthiramati* in his commentary on the *Triṃśikā* interprets the line on the cognitive function of *ālayaviññāna* (see § 5.14.2) in a different way.⁷³⁹ To be sure, he introduces the line by [virtually] quoting the wording of the pertinent sentence of the *Pravṛtti Portion*⁷⁴⁰ according to which both the surrounding world and the *upādāna*, viz. corporeal matter and the Impression of Sticking to the Imagined Character [of reality], are cognized (*-viññapti*) by⁷⁴¹ *ālayaviññāna*. But in his own explanation of the line *Sthiramati* construes '*viññapti*' only with '*sthāna*', not with '*upādi*'.⁷⁴² This means that he takes the cognitive function of *ālayaviññāna* to be confined

to an - indistinct⁷⁴³ - perception of the arrangement (*sanniveśa*) of the surrounding world.⁷⁴⁴ The *upādāna*, on the other hand, is, according to Sthiramati's interpretation, not perceived: corporeal matter is merely appropriated by *ālayavijñāna*,⁷⁴⁵ and Impressions (*vāsanā*) are merely contained in it;⁷⁴⁶ there is no direct and concrete awareness of the act of appropriation⁷⁴⁷ nor of Impressions.⁷⁴⁸

This explanation would seem to correspond, in substance, to the situation met with in the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*.⁷⁴⁹ Besides, it should be noted that Sthiramati's explanation of Tr 3ab does not, at least as far as the body and the sense-faculties are concerned, show any trace of mind-only (i.e. "idealism" or spiritualism) but rather, as a matter of course, makes use of a pre-idealist concept (viz. biological appropriation).⁷⁵⁰

5.15.2 Another remarkable feature of Sthiramati's commentary on

Tr 3ab is that he includes, into what is appropriated, not only corporeal matter but also the mental constituents of personality (*nāman*),⁷⁵¹ which would seem to include the *pravṛttivijñānas*. The reason may be that, since Impressions (*vāsanā*) are, in Sthiramati's own explanation, not taken to be an object of (the function of) *upādāna*,⁷⁵² it is only by including the mental constituents that *ālayavijñāna*'s function of appropriation is furnished with an object even in the world-sphere of immateriality (*ārūpya-dhātu*).⁷⁵³ At the same time, by including *nāman* in the object of appropriation, Sthiramati restores the original comprehensiveness of the pattern of appropriating factors and appropriated ones. For originally mind and mental factors as a whole had been taken to appropriate corporeal matter. But when the function of appropriation came to be taken over by *ālayavijñāna*, the ordinary forms of mind and mental factors dropped out of the pattern, so to speak. By including *nāman*, i.e. the ordinary forms of mind and mental factors, in the object of appropriation, Sthiramati reintegrates them into the pattern. But it should be noted that this

procedure involves an *e x t e n s i o n* of the notion of *upādāna* beyond the sense of *b i o l o g i c a l* appropriation to a kind of "*e x i s t e n t i a l*" appropriation which comes close to the notion of taking - or, in the present context, maintaining - possession of *a l l* constituents of personal existence (i.e. to *upādāna* in the sense of *parigraha*)⁷⁵⁴.

5.15.3 It would be interesting to check systematically what Sthiramati has to say on the object of *ālayavijñāna* in his other works,⁷⁵⁵ but I have to confine myself to a few observations based on an entirely preliminary collection of materials.

5.15.3.1 On the one hand, in his *c o m m e n t a r y* on the *P a ñ c a s k a n d h a k a* (which seems to be earlier than the *Triṃśikā-bhāṣya*)⁷⁵⁶ Sthiramati, pointing out that *ālayavijñāna* has both the surrounding world and the *t w o f o l d u p ā d ā n a* (viz. corporeal matter and the Impression of Sticking to the Imagined Character [of reality] but *n o t nāman!*) for its object,⁷⁵⁷ closely follows the *Pravṛtti Portion* (§ 5.6.3.1-3).

5.15.3.2 On the other hand, in the *c o m m e n t a r y* on the *M a h ā y ā n a s ū t r ā l a ṃ k ā r a*, Sthiramati's position appears to be close to that of his own explanation of Tr 3ab; for there are, in this work, several passages which mention *o n l y o n e* object to be cognized by *ālayavijñāna*, viz. the *s u r r o u n d i n g w o r l d*.⁷⁵⁸ This seems to hold good also for * *A s v a b h ā v a*'s *Sūtralaṃkāraṭīkā*.⁷⁵⁹ Both texts, moreover, not only adduce *Triṃśikā* 3ab in support of their view that *ālayavijñāna* cognizes the surrounding world⁷⁶⁰ but also quote *Viṃśatikā* 9⁷⁶¹ in order to prove that the so-called material sense-faculties are in reality nothing but the *S e e d s* of the respective perceptions.⁷⁶² This may suggest that also the intention to harmonize the statements of *Triṃśikā* and *Viṃśatikā* should be taken into consideration as a possible motive for confining the cognitive function of *ālayavijñāna* to (manifesting an image of) the surrounding world.

5.15.3.3 Again, in the *Madhyāntivibhāga-ṭīkā*, Sthiramati seems to be fairly consistent in having *ālayavijñāna* cognize both the surrounding world (or objects) and the "living being" (*sattva*) or the body along with the [material] sense-faculties.⁷⁶³ At the same time, he explicitly specifies that making known or cognizing something has to be understood in the idealist sense of appearing as something (*-prati-*, *-nir-* or *-ā-bhāsa-(tā)*).⁷⁶⁴ Seeds or Impressions do not, in the *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā*, form part of the objects or contents of *ālayavijñāna*.⁷⁶⁵

5.16 In contrast to Sthiramati's view on the object of *ālayavijñāna*, which seems to vary in accordance with the (exegetical traditions of the) texts commented upon, Hsüan-tsang's *Siddhi* (成唯識論) is fairly^{765a} consistent in including, among the objects cognized by *ālayavijñāna* and forming its "image part" (相分), not only the surrounding world and corporeal matter but also the Seeds (of the impure dharmas).⁷⁶⁶ But in connection with the problem of *sahabhū-āśraya* Hsüan-tsang⁷⁶⁷ quotes an opinion⁷⁶⁸ according to which the material sense-faculties are, in line with the *Viṃśatikā*, nothing but Seeds, and which may therefore imply a similar view of the object of *ālayavijñāna* as Sthiramati's and *Asvabhāva's commentaries on the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* (§ 5.15.3.2), though such a view does not seem to be expressly mentioned in the *Siddhi*.

5.17 It thus seems that in the late phase of the development of the *Yogācāra* school proper in India, due to Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā*, the idea of the cognitive function of *ālayavijñāna* had, by and large, asserted itself, and that interest switched over to more specific problems connected with this issue: e.g. the question of what precisely is the relation between the objective image in *ālayavijñāna* and the objective image in the ordinary perceptions and cognitions;⁷⁶⁹ of how to interpret, in an idealist sense, biological appropriation of corporeal matter by *ālayavijñā-*

na;⁷⁷⁰ to which degree the images of the surrounding world in the ālayavijñānas of different (classes of) living beings are similar;⁷⁷¹ whether the ālayavijñāna of one living being contains also an image of the (invisible) material sense-faculties of o t h e r living beings;⁷⁷² or whether there is a causal relation between the images in the ālayavijñānas of different living beings, analogous to that between the image in the ālayavijñāna and the images in the pravṛttivijñānas of one and the same living being.⁷⁷³ A detailed discussion of these issues is, however, quite beyond the scope of the present study.

6. Evaluation of the other occurrences of ālayavijñāna in the Basic Section of the Yogācārabhūmi

6.0 In the preceding chapters, I have tried to describe the origin of ālayavijñāna (in the limited sense of § 1.4) and some of the developments it underwent, especially in the earliest sources, by starting from what I have called my *Initial Passage* (see § 2.1), since this passage fully satisfies the criteria stipulated in § 1.7. As has already been stated (§ 1.9), the latter fact does not *a priori* exclude that there may be other pertinent passages or contexts which also satisfy these criteria, only that a comprehensive investigation would by far exceed the limits of this study. All that I can do, for the time being, is to present a preliminary investigation into the pertinent passages of the oldest source (see §§ 1.5 and 1.6), i.e. those passages of the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* where the term 'ālayavijñāna' is met with. In examining these passages with a view to the applicability of the criteria of § 1.7, I shall not entirely ignore the question whether a certain systematic context may prove, on closer inspection, to pose problems which may have favoured or even required the introduction of something like ālayavijñāna, or are in fact regarded to have done so by later sources; but my main aim will be to find out whether the passage itself contains any unequivocal indication in this direction. Besides, I shall, if possible, add observations on compositional history and relative chronology.

Apart from the *Initial Passage* (§ 2.1), the occurrences of 'ālayavijñāna' in the *Basic Section* known to me are the following:

- ① Y 4,7;
- ①A Y 6,5f. = 7,6f. = 7,22f. = 8,14f.
- ①B Y 11,9f.
- ② Y 11,4f.
- ③ Y 24,4f.

- ④ Y 109,13-15
- ⑤ Y 192,8
- ⑥ Sacittikā/Acittikā Bhūmiḥ (see App. I), § 5
- ⑦ { ⑦A Comm. ad PG 33-34 (see App. II; ŚrBh_W 177,14f.)
- ⑦B Comm. ad PG 37 (see App. II; ŚrBh_W 177,22)

6.1.1 Y 4,5ff. runs as follows:

- ① a) *cakṣurvijñānaṃ katamat / yā cakṣurāśrayā rūpaprativijñap-
tiḥ*⁷⁷⁴ /
- ① b) *cakṣurvijñānasyāśrayaḥ katamaḥ /*
 - α) *cakṣuḥ sahaḥbūr āśrayaḥ /*
 - β) *manaḥ samanantara āśrayaḥ /*
- ① { γ) *sarvabījakam āśrayopādātṛ vipākasamgrhītam ālaya-
vijñānaṃ bījāśrayaḥ /*
- ① c) ...
- ① d) α) *cakṣuḥ katamat / ...*
- β) *manaḥ katamat / ...*
- γ) *sarvabījakam vijñānaṃ katamat / pūrvakam prapañcarati-
hetum upādāya yaḥ sarvabījako vipāko nirvṛttaḥ /*

In the case of the other sense-perceptions (Y 6,5f., etc.), ①b appears in a shorter form:

- ①A *bījāśrayas tad eva sarvabījakam ālayavijñānam.*

The same wording is found, with an insignificant variant, also in the case of *mano(vijñāna)* (Y 11,9f.):

- ①B *bījāśrayaḥ pūrvavad eva sarvabījakam ālayavijñānam.*

①d β + γ is, in the case of the other sense-perceptions, represented merely by the reference

mano-bījayaḥ pūrvavad vibhāgaḥ (Y 6,8, etc.),

and not represented at all in the case of *mano(vijñāna)*.

6.1.2 1. In these passages, ālayavijñāna is unequivocally introduced in the context of the question of what is the *bījāśraya*, i.e. the basis in the sense of Seed,⁷⁷⁵ of visual perception (①), the other sense-perceptions (①A), and *mano(vijñāna)* (①B). Ālayavijñāna is able to perform this function because it is qualified as "containing all Seeds" (*sarvabījaka*).

Yet, I do not find that the passage satisfies the criteria of § 1.7.

As for the criterion of the plausibility of the term, 'ālaya-' can, to be sure, be understood as "receptacle [of Seeds]" or as "that where [the Seeds] stick or lie hidden", provided that we concede that the idea that ālayavijñāna is the Seed(s) and the notion that it contains Seeds (which is anyway suggested by its being qualified as *sarvabīja k a*)⁷⁷⁶ are not mutually exclusive.⁷⁷⁷ But it would be less easy to explain why it was precisely the term 'ālaya' (and not rather the key-term 'bīja') that was chosen to express this function, and why this meaning is so scantily⁷⁷⁸ documented before Vasubandhu.⁷⁷⁹

Even if these difficulties are disregarded, one would still be faced with the fact that the text does not disclose any reason why the function of storing Seeds made the introduction of an entirely new kind of *vijñāna* inevitable. This cannot be accounted for by the assumption that such inevitability might have been regarded as self-evident; for in many other passages the Yogācārabhūmi does not find any difficulty in having Seeds be contained either in the psycho-physical basis of personal existence (*ātmabhāva*) as a whole (i.e. in corporeal matter or the material sense-faculties and in mind, at least as far as they are *vipāka*)⁷⁸⁰ or in the mind series (*citta-* or *vijñāna-santati*).⁷⁸¹

To be sure, arguments for restricting the function of acting as a Seed, or of containing Seeds, to ālayavijñāna are presented not only in the Mahāyānasamgraha⁷⁸² but already in the *Proof Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* when it proves the existence of ālayavijñāna by pointing out that the ordinary *vijñānas* cannot be the Seeds of each other (i.e. that the preceding moment cannot be the Seed of the following one) because of the frequent inhomogeneity of subsequent moments of mind, and because their series is sometimes interrupted for a long time.⁷⁸³ Yet, the present passage does not indicate such arguments⁷⁸⁴ which may, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, as well have been excogitated only after ālayavijñāna had, for some other reason,

already been introduced, the more so since at least for the second problem (interruption of the mental series) a different solution was available (see § 2.5).⁷⁸⁵

2.a) Besides '*sarvabījaka*', the qualification also that *ālaya-vijñāna* is "subsumed under [the category of] *vipāka*" appears to be closely connected with the context of (1) since in the explanatory part ((d)γ) too mind containing all Seeds is defined as the [result of] M a t u r a t i o n (*vipāka*) containing all Seeds. Now, this would seem to presuppose that the *sarvabījo vipākaḥ* of the Paramārthagāthāḥ,⁷⁸⁶ which appears to be more or less identical with the "basis-of-personal-existence (*ātmabhāva*) containing all Seeds" of the Manobhūmi,⁷⁸⁷ had come to be identified with Mind-containing-all-Seeds (*sarvabījakaṃ vijñānam*), taught, in the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī,⁷⁸⁸ to "approach" or "follow", or "be under the sway of" (*-upaga*),⁷⁸⁹ [the Impressions of] *karman* and *kleśas* and to settle down, at the moment of conception or Linking up (*pratisandhi*), in *nāmarūpa*. This identification may, however, have led to a quandary. To be sure, as long as *ātmabhāva* qualified as *vipāka* is regarded as containing all Seeds, there will be no gap; for *vipāka* elements will be available throughout life since *ātmabhāva* includes corporeal elements that are *vipāka* (especially the material sense-faculties). Likewise, as long as the mind series as a whole is taken to contain all Seeds and as long as *sarvabījakaṃ vijñānam* is nothing but this mind series as a whole under this specific aspect,⁷⁹⁰ there would - provided that we disregard special cases like *nirodhasamāpatti* - again be no gap, since receiving and passing on Impressions or Seeds would not necessarily be restricted to such states of mind as are *vipāka*. As soon, however, as the result of Maturation (*vipāka*) containing all Seeds is c o n f i n e d t o m i n d - or as soon as Mind-containing-all-Seeds is (expressly) conceived of as being *vipāka* o n l y , the situation becomes difficult because the mind series, though *vipāka* at the moment of conception, does not remain so throughout life but is rather interspersed with good, bad and other non-*vipāka* phases. It would therefore not appear impossible that a restric-

tive "combination", as found in (d)_γ, of the two main views on what contains Seeds involved a situation that made the introduction of a new kind of *viññāna* necessary or at least helpful.

b) Even the choice of the name 'ālayaviññāna' would, in this case, not be inexplicable. For, since the result-of-Maturation (*vipāka*) or basis-of-personal-existence (*ātmabhāva*) containing all Seeds is expressly stated to be the object of the notion of Ego⁷⁹¹ and is besides equated with *ālaya* in the sense of "what is clung to",⁷⁹² it would not seem impossible that the new kind of mind which took its place was called 'ālaya-viññāna' in the sense of "mind which is clung to [as Ego]".

c) Yet, if this had been the original meaning of the term 'ālayaviññāna', one would - since it is fully in accordance with the predominant Buddhist use of 'ālaya' and not at all in conflict with later doctrinal developments - expect it to have been unanimously retained by the Yogācāra tradition, and it would be very difficult to explain the fact that it is not documented in the oldest sources (like Saṃdh V.3) but only in the Mahāyānasamgraha and later texts drawing upon the latter (and only as an alternative meaning at that).⁷⁹³

d) And as regards the systematical problem sketched in a, it has to be stressed once more that the text itself does not contain any statement to the effect that such a problem was realized at all,⁷⁹⁴ or even felt to render the introduction of a new kind of *viññāna* inevitable. But surely such a lack of any explicit statement of, or clear hint at, a reason why a new kind of *viññāna*, called 'ālayaviññāna', had to be introduced at all, is best explained if we assume that ālayaviññāna was not newly invented in the present passage but was rather made use of after it had already been established before,⁷⁹⁵ because it was felt convenient or because it had already come to be associated with the issue of containing or comprising Seeds and/or with the issue of being the result of karmic Maturation.

3. Such an assumption would seem to be supported by the qualification of ālayavijñāna as appropriating the body or corporeal⁷⁹⁶ basis [of personal existence] (*āśrayopādātṛ*). This attribute does not supply an explanation for the choice of the term 'ālayavijñāna',⁷⁹⁷ nor does it indicate a cogent motive for the introduction of a new kind of *vijñāna* at least as far as the present passage is concerned; for the function of biological appropriation has, in contrast to containing all Seeds, hardly any direct connection with the systematic context of the present passage, viz. the determination of the *bījāśraya* of visual perception, etc. The attribute '*āśrayopādātṛ*' would therefore seem to presuppose that ālayavijñāna had already come to play a rôle in a different systematic context, and it may even signalize that (1), or at least a part of it, was taken over from that context. This presumption is supported by the fact that the same characterization of ālayavijñāna as in (1) is also found in (3) where all attributes fit the context (see §§ 6.3.2 and 6.3.4).

6.1.3 The impression that ālayavijñāna was introduced into the present passage only later - and, in view of the preceding considerations,⁷⁹⁸ probably as an already established concept - is corroborated by closer textual analysis, which shows that the term 'ālaya-vijñāna', as well as the attributes '*āśrayopādātṛ*' and '*vipākasaṃgrhīta*', originally did not form part of the material compiled in this portion of the Yogācārabhūmi. My argument runs as follows:

1. Paragraph (b) of the text quoted in § 6.1.1 identifies the three *āśrayas* of *cakṣurvijñāna* as *cakṣus* (α), *manas* (β), and *sarvabījakam āśrayopādātṛ vipākasaṃgrhītam ālayavijñānam* (γ), respectively. In (d), these notions are defined, in their turn, but in the case of the last item (γ) the concept to be defined does not occur in the same form as in (b) but only as *sarvabījakam vijñānam*. Even if it were conceded that, in view of the length of this item, it would be understandable enough that it is repeated, in (d), in an abridged form, one would still expect this abridgment to consist in the bare use of the terminus

technicus 'ālaya-vijñāna', without attributes. And even if, in the abridged version too, one or the other of the attributes may well have been repeated, the terminus technicus 'ālayavijñāna' ought to have been maintained at any rate, and ought not to have been mutilated into the unspecific 'vijñāna' as is, however, the case in (d)_γ.

2. The fact that the third definiendum is given in (d) as 'sarvabījakam vijñānam' would, however, be unobjectionable if it was this notion, and nothing more, that the *bījāśraya* had in (b)_γ (= (1)) originally been identified as; in other words: if the words 'āśrayopādātṛ vipākasamgrhītam ālaya-' in (1) - and 'ālaya-' in (1A) and (1B) - are later additions.

3. 'Sarvabījakam vijñānam' does in fact occur as a kind of terminus technicus in a few other passages, both of the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*⁷⁹⁹ and of the *Basic Section*.⁸⁰⁰ As for its occurrence at Y 24,4f. (= (3)), see § 6.3.3.

4. By assuming that in (1) the *bījāśraya* of visual perception was, originally, identified as the *sarvabījakam vijñānam* only, yet another incongruence of the present text would vanish: viz. the strange fact that what is to be defined by (d)_γ, viz. (b)_γ = (1), already enumerates even more characteristic features of *ālayavijñāna* than the definition presented in (d)_γ; for in the latter not only 'sarvabījaka', but also 'vipāka' would be tautological, and the only additional information (d)_γ would supply does not refer to the nature or function of *ālayavijñāna* itself but only to its cause, whereas the extant version of (b)_γ = (1) contains, in 'āśrayopādātṛ', additional information about *ālayavijñāna* itself.

Thus the assumption appears justified that an earlier version of the material on which the present portion of the *Yogācārabhūmi* is based did not contain 'ālaya-jñāna' but only 'sarvabījakam vijñānam', and that the words 'āśrayopādātṛ vipākasamgrhītam ālaya-' in (1), as well as 'ālaya-' in (1A) and (1B), were added later.

To be sure, argument 4 will be valid only for the attributes '*āśrayopādātṛ*' and '*vipākaśaṃgrhīta*', but the other arguments hold good for '*ālaya-*', too. It may well be that at first only '*ālaya-*' was added and that the addition of '*āśrayopādātṛ*' and '*vipākaśaṃgrhīta*' took place only thereafter,⁸⁰¹ regarded as necessary because, perhaps, *ālayavijñāna* was still a fairly new concept which could not be presupposed to be well-known and was felt, by the (or: a) compiler or by a redactor, to require, at its first occurrence in the text, some explication, supplied by him not by an explanation of its literal meaning but by a kind of definition of its principal functions and aspects,⁸⁰² presumably taken over from (3) (see § 6.1.2.3).

6.1.4 It is not easy to decide whether the reference to *ālayavijñāna* and its attributes was added before, at, or after the compilation of (this part of) the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. At any rate, the addition of '*ālaya-*', at least, must precede the compilation of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, in the very beginning of which the *sarvabījakam ālayavijñānam* of (1) is expressly referred to.⁸⁰³ What is more, it is almost certain that the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* into the present material is also presupposed by the Vth chapter of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* (see § 3.9.1 + n. 324). On the other hand, we have no such clue with regard to the attributes '*āśrayopādātṛ*' and '*vipākaśaṃgrhīta*' which are not quoted in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* and do not figure in the pertinent paragraphs of the *Samdhinirmocana* (viz. V.4-5). This may (but of course need not) be taken as supporting the possibility (see § 6.1.3) that these attributes were added only later on. Even so, their addition cannot have been a particularly late event since it seems to be motivated by the fact that *ālayavijñāna* could not yet be presupposed to be well-known (see § 6.1.3). Besides, neither biological appropriation nor being comprised in the category of *vipāka* would, from my point of view, involve markedly later developments of the *ālayavijñāna* concept.⁸⁰⁴ At any rate, both attributes must have been added before (2) (see § 6.2.1) received its present form, since in view of the sequence

of the attributes '*āśrayopādātṛ*' and '*vipākasaṃgrhīta*' it is (1) and not (3) on which (2) is based (see § 6.2.2). But if I am right in presuming that these attributes were first introduced in (3) (see § 6.3.4) and only afterwards made use of also in (1) because such a characterization of ālayavijñāna was regarded to be required at what is, from the point of view of the final arrangement of the compilation, the very first occurrence of this term in the *Yogācārabhūmi* (see § 6.1.3 [end]), it would seem fairly im- probable that they formed part of (1) before the compilation of this part of the *Basic Section*, and they ought rather to have been introduced only somewhat later.

6.2.1 Y 11,3-8:

- svabhāvaḥ katamaḥ / yac cittam mano vijñānam /*
- (1) { (a) *c i t t a ṃ katamat / yat sarvabīj o p a g a t a m*
āśraya b h ā v o p a g a t a m ā ś r a y a b h ā v a s a -
*n n i < v i > ṣ ṭ a m*⁸⁰⁵ *upādātṛ vipākasaṃgrhītam ālaya-*
vijñānam /
- (b) *m a n a ḥ katamat /*
- α) *yat śaṇṇām api vijñānakāyānām anantaniruddham,*
 β) *kliṣṭam ca mano yan nityam avidyātmadrṣṭy-asmimāna-*
trṣṇā-lakṣaṇaiḥ caturbhiḥ kleśaiḥ samprayuktam /
- (c) *v i j ñ ā n a ṃ katamat / yad ālambanavijñaptau pratyup-*
asthitam /

6.2.2 The close relation between (2) and (1) is obvious, and it is undoubtedly a genetic one. The question is whether (1) is an abridgement of (2), or rather (2) a remodeling and expansion of (1). I for one do not perceive any good reason for, but do perceive evidence against, choosing the former possibility.

a) '*Āśrayopādātṛ*' in (1) can hardly be an abridged equivalent of '*āśrayabhāvopagatam āśrayabhāvasanniviṣṭam upādātṛ*' in (2) because it imparts substantially less information. For in (2) '*upādātṛ*' alone will have to convey the same idea as '*āśrayopādātṛ*' in (1), viz. that ālayavijñāna fulfills the function of

biological appropriation of the body or corporeal matter.⁸⁰⁶ In contrast to this, the expressions '*āśrayabhāvopagata*' and '*āśrayabhāvasanniviṣṭa*' can hardly be taken in this or a similar sense, i.e. as "what has approached (*-upagata*, i.e. appropriated), and has entered into, or sticks in (*-sanniviṣṭa*), the thing consisting in the [corporeal] basis(-of-existence)", for in this case '*bhāva*' would, to say the least, be redundant.⁸⁰⁷ One will rather have to take '*bhāva*' in the function of an abstract suffix, and this is what the Tib. and the Chin. translation actually do. According to Tib.,⁸⁰⁸ '*āśrayabhāvopagata*' means "what has changed into the state of (i.e.: has become, or even simply: is) the basis" (*gnas kyi dños por g y u r p a*), according to Chin.,⁸⁰⁹ "what is followed or accompanied by (i.e. furnished with) the nature of basis" (依止性所隨), while '*āśrayabhāvasanniviṣṭa*' is interpreted in Tib. as "remaining in, or adhering to, the state of (or: continuing to exist as) the basis" (*gnas kyi dños por gnas pa*), in Chin. as "sticking to the nature of basis" (依附依止性). If these interpretations are substantially correct, one will have to understand the two attributes as stressing the fact that *ālayavijñāna* is the basis-of-personal-existence, the use of two attributes being perhaps intended to distinguish between the aspect that it has, at the moment of Linking up (*pratisandhi*), become⁸¹⁰ the basis of a given existence, and the aspect that it sticks to this function throughout life.⁸¹¹ It is hard to imagine that such an important idea should have been entirely dropped in the hypothetical abridgement of (2). On the other hand, the matter becomes fully plausible if we regard (2) as a later remodeling and extension of (1), motivated by the fact that it was no longer (as at the time when (1) was composed) the body but rather *ālayavijñāna* that was considered to be the fundamental basis of personal existence (see § 3.10). From this point of view, the expression '*āśrayopādātṛ*', presupposing the older view, turned out to be unsatisfactory. Therefore, in (2) the two elements of this compound were separated, and the former element, viz. '*āśra-*

ya-', was supplemented by a new piece of text, to the effect of divesting the body of the rôle of basis-of-existence and emphatically attributing it to ālayavijñāna. The desire to stress the new view may also sufficiently account for the fact that it is expressed by two attributes. Perhaps it also favoured the replacement of 'sarvabījakam' by 'sarvabījopagatam' ("resorted to by, i.e. furnished with, all Seeds"),⁸¹² which may - but I am not quite sure about this - be taken as more clearly expressing the idea that ālayavijñāna is a full-fledged entity on its own containing or supporting Seeds, and not merely a vague hypostasis of Seeds sticking in the body or in the material sense-faculties.

b) Yet, this is hardly the whole truth. On reconsidering the matter, one might not feel fully convinced by the motive suggested, in a, for the replacement of 'sarvabījakam' by 'sarvabījopagatam', since at least formally already 'sarvabījakam' would, as a bahuvrīhi, suggest a difference between the Seeds and ālayavijñāna as their owner (see § 6.1.2 and n. 428). Besides, one might ask why the author of (2) found it so important to coin two expressions for the āśraya function of ālayavijñāna (or even to distinguish between two aspects of it) since even if he had wished to emphasize this function, an expression like '*āśrayabhūtam',⁸¹³ would have been sufficient.

c) One might consider the possibility of solving the latter problem by understanding at least one of the two expressions as a tatpuruṣa with its prior member in the instrumental (i.e. 'āśrayabhāvena', in the predicative sense of 'āśrayataḥ'). In this case, one would have to render 'āśrayabhāvopagata' by "which is taken [by people] as the basis [of their personal existence]", or 'āśrayabhāvasanniviṣṭa' as "what is stuck to [by people] as the basis [of their personal existence]". Actually, to one of the explanations of the Yogācārabhūmivākhyā 'āśrayabhāvopagata' refers to ālayavijñāna being taken as ātman.⁸¹⁴ But it is hardly justifiable to understand 'āśraya' in the sense of ātman. Besides, I doubt that such an analysis of the compounds 'āśrayabhā-

vopagata and '*āśrayabhāvasanniviṣṭa*' is grammatically (or at least idiomatically) admissible. At least, I could not find any example for such a use, whereas the use at least of '*upagata*' and related forms with the accusative of an abstract, both separately⁸¹⁵ and in compounds,⁸¹⁶ is well documented. Thus, it is probably not possible to differentiate the two attributes by taking one of them to mean "taken, or stuck to, as the basis", and we are rather left with the fact that both expressions are more or less synonymous.

d) Actually, not only the use of the two quasi-synonymous expressions but also the substitution of '*sarvabījopagata*' for '*sarvabījaka*' becomes fully intelligible if we consider another central feature of the passage, viz. the fact that the modifications introduced by (2) also, and perhaps mainly, serve the purpose of supplementing the characterization of ālayavijñāna by "etymological" elements, i.e. by including, into the characterization of ālayavijñāna in (1), an indication of the literal meaning of the term. This is not only confirmed by one of the explanations of the Yogācārabhūmivyākhyā⁸¹⁷ but also strongly suggested by the fact that '*upagata*' occurs as a quasi-synonym of '*allīna*' already at MN I 65 or I 233, and also in the Mahāniddeśa (p. 38) where it is found in a list of closely related expressions which also include '*nivīṭṭha*'. Thus, the main reason for replacing '*sarvabījaka*' by '*sarvabījopagata*', as well as for the somewhat repetitive and unusual expressions '*āśrayabhāvopagata*' and '*āśrayabhāvasanniviṣṭa*', is to indicate etymologies of the term 'ālayavijñāna', which would, according to this passage, have to be understood as "mind where all Seeds stick",⁸¹⁸ or "mind which sticks (i.e. has come to stick and keeps sticking?) to the state of being the basis [of a given existence]".⁸¹⁹ Though '*-upagata*' was good for bringing out both the passive and the active meaning of '*ālaya*', in the case of the active meaning the nuance of "sticking" was additionally and perhaps more aptly expressed by the quasi-synonym

'sanniviṣṭa' which, on the other hand, does not seem to be applicable in a passive sense.

6.2.3 Apart from the fact, that (2) is, as I have just tried to demonstrate, a remodeling of (1) and therefore later to it, and apart from the fact that this remodeling involves an advanced stage in the theory of ālayavijñāna and in that of the basis-of-personal-existence, there are also more or less independent reasons for denying its claim to be representative of the original context of the introduction of ālayavijñāna:

a) As for the explanations of the literal meaning of the term 'ālayavijñāna' indicated in (2) (see § 6.2.2.d), they do not give the impression of representing the original meaning. For apart from the fact that two (or even three) different interpretations are indicated, these explanations do not, to my mind, really render plausible why ālayavijñāna was just called 'ālaya vijñāna', as I have already pointed out (§ 6.1.2.1) with regard to the aspect of being furnished with Seeds. The second (and third) explanation(s) are anyhow too artificial to represent the original meaning. And even if they too are taken into account, one may still ask why the new *vijñāna* was not rather called '*āśraya-vijñāna' or the like. Thus it appears that the explanations of the literal meaning of the term 'ālayavijñāna' indicated by (2) hardly represent the original meaning. Rather they are secondary attempts to (re-)interpret a given term the original meaning of which had either been forgotten or - more probably - was felt inappropriate in view of the change the concept had undergone in the meantime, viz. because it had developed, from a somewhat vague hypostasis of Seeds, sticking or lying hidden in corporeal matter, to an entity on its own which could actually be conceived of to contain Seeds and which had, to a certain extent, disengaged itself from the body and even superseded it in its function as the basis of personal existence.

b) The fact that biological appropriation is, in (2), expressed only by the word 'upādātṛ', without an ob-

j e c t of this function being pointed out, can be explained, according to § 6.2.2.a, as due to a development of the concept of "basis of personal existence" which led the author of (2) to split the compound '*āśrayôpādātṛ*' (in (1)), and to refer '*āśraya*', by means of inserting a new piece of text, to *ālayavijñāna*. This procedure left '*upādātṛ*' without its objective complement, and the author of (2) either forgot, or regarded it as unnecessary, to make good the loss, the result being a certain incompleteness and lack of precision, which would be rather unsatisfactory e x - c e p t if we suppose that the object of the appropriative function of *ālayavijñāna*, and thus, of course, *ālayavijñāna* itself, too, could, when (2) was composed, be presupposed to be so w e l l - k n o w n as to need no express mention. This argument would, of course, also work if the dependence of (2) on (1) is left out of account.

c) The systematical context of (2) is a differentiating interpretation of the terms '*citta*', '*manas*' and '*viññāna*' (see § 6.2.1). This set of concepts is often understood in the sense of quasi-synonyms,⁸²⁰ but occasionally the need of a differentiating interpretation - typical of Abhidharmic and commentatorial exegesis - is felt, and the terms are then referred to different aspects, states or functions of (the traditional kinds of) mind, e.g. '*citta*' to future, '*manas*' to past, and '*viññāna*' to present moments of mind.⁸²¹ Of course, a differentiating explanation of *citta*, *manas* and *viññāna* would have acquired a more binding character if it could have been referred to substantially different entities. But it is highly improbable that this was a sufficient motive for such a revolutionary step as was the introduction of a new kind of mind like *ālayavijñāna*, nor would it explain the peculiar character and functions of *ālayavijñāna* or the choice of the name '*ālayavijñāna*'. Things would seem to have developed rather the other way round: a f t e r *ālayavijñāna* had been introduced, it was quite naturally made use of in the context of a differentiating interpretation of the terms '*citta*', '*manas*' and '*viññāna*'.

An isolated identification of *citta* - in the sense of "what is piled up of ..., or filled or overspread with ..." ((*ā-, upa-)cīta)⁸²² - with ālayavijñāna or ādānavijñāna is documented in the Vth chapter of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra⁸²³ (which treats of proficiency in the secret points of *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna*!). A full-fledged differentiating explanation, referring '*citta*' to ālayavijñāna, '*manas*' to the new *manas*, i.e. the conception of Ego as another new kind of mind, and '*vijñāna*' to the traditional kinds of mind, is found in the Sacittikā Bhūmiḥ of the Vinīścaya-saṃgrahaṇī.⁸²⁴ The present passage, viz. Y 11,3ff., would, in its extant form, seem to be even later since its presentation of the Defilements of the new *manas* shows features of post-Yogācārabhūmi developments (see n. 943). And even if this particular part of the definition of *manas* is regarded as a later interpolation (see ib.), the mere fact that the passage would even then still refer to the new, continuous *manas* - and in a form at that which hardly makes sense except if the concept is presupposed to be already known (see ib.) - renders it improbable that it is significantly earlier than the compilation of the Vinīścaya-saṃgrahaṇī. At any rate, it will be later than Saṃdh V. This would well fit in with the rather advanced concept of ālayavijñāna involved in (2).

One may, however, consider the possibility that any kind of reference to the new *manas*, and perhaps also the remodeling of the characterization of ālayavijñāna, are due to a later hand (or later hands), and that originally the text had identified *vijñāna* with the present moments of (the traditional kinds of) mind, in so far as they are actually engaged (*pratyupasthita*!) in cognizing an object, *manas* - in the traditional way - with the immediately preceding past moments (i.e. (b)α), and *citta* with ālayavijñāna since it is an accumulation of, or filled/overspread with, the Seeds which virtually embody the future forms of these same forms of mind. Such a pattern, entirely hypothetical though it is, would agree, at least in structure,⁸²⁵ with what is implicit in Saṃdh V and may even be older (but of

course need not be so, especially if it was already combined with the remodeling of the characterization of ālayavijñāna, and in view of what will be pointed out in § 6.2.4), and it would be closely connected with the Abhidharma pattern of differentiating *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna* by referring them to different temporal states.⁸²⁶ Later on, the new *manas* would have been added because a later redactor or compiler may have felt the need to harmonize this pattern with the different one of the Sacittikabhūmiviniścaya.⁸²⁷

6.2.4 However the textual history of Y 11,4-8 (i.e. the differentiating definition of *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna*) is construed, it would seem that the whole passage is heterogeneous to the context it is actually found in and may thus well be a comparatively late addition.

a) The surrounding context, understood in an unbiased way, clearly refers to the traditional *mano vijñāna* only, dealing with it in a pattern closely parallel to that of the preceding treatment of the five sense-perceptions. The objects (*ālambana*, viz. all dharmas, particularly imperceptible dharmas), associated mental factors (*sahāya*) and functions (*karman*) enumerated at Y 11,11ff., are in their overwhelming majority typical of, or in any case compatible with,⁸²⁸ *mano-vijñāna*. The same is true of the way in which the item "basis" (*āśraya*) is treated (Y 11,9f.): it only lists *manas* as *samanantarāśraya* and ālayavijñāna as *bījāśraya* because these two are required not only for sense-perception but also for *manovijñāna*. On the other hand, a *sahabhū-āśraya* is not indicated in the present passage because in traditional Abhidharma *manovijñāna* has none.⁸²⁹ The later Yogācāra view that *manas* (in the sense of a new kind of *vijñāna*) is the *sahabhū-āśraya* of *manovijñāna*⁸³⁰ is obviously still unknown to the present passage.

b) If, on the other hand, Y 11,4-8 were an integral part of the text, the specifications of basis (*āśraya*), object (*ālambana*), etc., ought to suit not only *manovijñāna* but all the three kinds of mind in which, according to Y 11,4-8, (the stage of)

manas itself (*svabhāva*) consists. Yet, specifications fitting ālayavijñāna and (*kliṣṭa*-)*manas* would at best be hidden among those fitting *manovijñāna*. In the case of "basis" (*āśraya*), the specification of the "immediately preceding basis" as *manas* would hardly be applicable to *manas* as a kind of mind on its own nor to ālayavijñāna if the definition of Y 11,6 (b)_α in § 6.2.1) is presupposed according to which *manas* is the moment, of the six [traditional] kinds of mind, that has ceased immediately before. And I for one would hesitate to presuppose, for the Yogācārabhūmi, the idea that ālayavijñāna as the basis-in-the-sense-of-Seed is also regarded as its own *bījāśraya*.⁸³¹ Finally, if the *manas* to be specified in terms of *āśraya*, etc., had actually included, from the outset, all the different kinds of mind contained in Y 11,4-8, it would also have included the traditional *manas*, i.e. the immediately preceding moment of any of the six traditional forms of mind (viz. *manovijñāna* and sense-perceptions), and this would imply that under the heading of *āśraya* the text would have to mention also the bases of the sense-perceptions, including the sense-faculties as their simultaneous bases, but this is not the case.

c) Thus, the incoherence of the text as it stands can hardly be denied: The specification, at Y 11,4-8, of *svabhāva*, i.e. of what *manas* itself is, does not fit in with the specification of its *āśraya*, etc., and appears to have supplanted the original text which must have consisted in a definition of (the *svabhāva* of) *manovijñāna* on the lines of the definitions of *cakṣurvijñāna*, etc., at Y 4,5, etc.:

**manovijñānaṃ katamat / yā mana-āśrayā dharma-prativijñaptiḥ* /⁸³²

d) Such will at least have been the wording of the source material used by the compiler of (this part of) the *Basic Section* of the Yogācārabhūmi. The question is whether it was retained in the original wording of the Yogācārabhūmi - perhaps with a sentence like '*svabhāvaḥ katamaḥ* (or **manaḥ katamat*) / **yan manovijñā-*

nam /' placed in front of it -, or whether already the compiler of the Manobhūmi remodelled the treatment of the *svabhāva* of *manas/manovijñāna* into a differentiating explanation of the terms '*citta*', '*manas*' and '*viññāna*' (perhaps motivated by the desire of properly integrating ālayavijñāna into the *viññāna* theory by having it figure not only as the *bījāśraya* of the *viññānas* but also as one of them, i.e. under the heading of *svabhāva*). The latter alternative would seem to presuppose that ālayavijñāna as the *bījāśraya* had already been introduced before the compilation, and at least in this case, one would suppose Y 11,4-8 to have had the form suggested at the end of § 6.2.3.c; at any rate, except if, as is very unlikely (see § 6.1.4), the whole of (1) (on which (2) is based) is taken to precede the compilation of this part of the Yogācārabhūmi, the recast of the characterization of ālayavijñāna in (2) will have to be regarded as a later addition, as holds certainly good for the insertion of the new *manas* at Y 11,6f. (viz. (b)β in § 6.2.1). But it is equally well possible that the entire remodelling of the treatment of the *svabhāva* of *manas/manovijñāna* into a differentiating interpretation of '*citta*', '*manas*' and '*viññāna*' was carried out only later, perhaps even after the compilation of the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī and under its influence. Actually, this latter possibility seems to be supported by the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī itself; for in discussing the question why the *Basic Section*, even though all "internal" and "external" dharmas are entities on their own, establishes solely the *viññānas* to be such (**svabhāvataḥ*), i.e. makes them predominant and the other elements subordinate to them, the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī refers to the *viññānas* by the expression "the six *dhātus* which are *viññāna*" (**ṣaḍ viññānadhātavaḥ*),⁸³³ and this can only mean the five sense-perceptions and *mano-viññāna* (not *manas*). This would seem to presuppose that at the time of the compilation of (this part of) the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī what was defined in the beginning of the Manobhūmi was still the *svabhāva* of *manovijñāna*, and not yet *citta*, *manas* and *viññāna*. At any rate, this Viniścayasamgrahaṇī passage con-

firms that the topic of the initial portion of the Manobhūmi of the *Basic Section* as a whole was clearly felt to be *mano vi - jñāna*, not *citta*, *manas* and *viññāna* in a sense including *ālayaviññāna* and the new *manas*.

6.3.1 Y 24,1-10:⁸³⁴

1. Text:

- (a) *tatra saṃraktayor mātāpitros tivrāvasthāgate rāge sarvapaścād ghaṇaṃ⁸³⁵ śukraṃ mucyate / tadante⁸³⁶ cāvaśyam ubhayoḥ <śukra-⁸³⁷ > ṣoṇitabinduḥ prādurbhavati / dvayor api ca tau śukraṣoṇitabindū mātur eva yonau miśrībhūtau śaraṃ ba<d>dhvā tiṣṭhataḥ ekapiṇḍībhūtau <,> tadyathā pakvaṃ payaḥ śītībhāvam āpadyamānaṃ <,>*
- (3) { *yatra tat sarvabījakaṃ vipākasamgr̥hitaṃ⁸³⁸ āśrayopādātr⁸³⁹ ālayaviññānaṃ saṃmūrcchati /*
- (b) *kathaṃ punaḥ saṃmūrcchati </> tena saṃjātaśareṇa śukraṣoṇitapiṇḍena saha tadviparyastālambano⁸⁴⁰ <'>ntarābhavo nirudhyate, tannirodhasamakālaṃ ca tasyaiva sarvabījasya viññānasya sāmāthyāt⁸⁴¹ tadanyasūkṣmendriyamahābhūtavyatimiśro <'>nyas tatsabhāgaḥ śukraṣoṇitapiṇḍo jāyate sendriyaḥ /⁸⁴² tasyāṃ cāvasthāyāṃ pratiṣṭhitaṃ viññānaṃ baddhaḥ⁸⁴³ pratisandhir ity ucyate / sā cāsau kalalāvasthā /*

2. Translation:

- (a) "When in the parents who [have become more and more] impassioned [while making love] sexual passion reaches the [most] vehement state, finally viscid semen is discharged, and in the end [of this process] inevitably [a drop of fluid] comes forth in both of them, [viz.] a drop of semen [in the father] and [a drop of] blood [in the mother]. These two drops of both of them, [viz. the drop] of semen and [the drop] of blood, get mixed in the mother's womb and form a film, having become one single lump, just like boiled milk when cooling down [forms a film].

③ { Into this [congealing mixture of blood and semen] merges that ālaya-vijñāna containing all Seeds, comprised in [the category of 'Result-of-]Maturation' and appropriating the basis [of personal existence].

④ (b) How does it merge? Together with that lump of semen and blood which has formed a film, the [being of the] intermediate state, which has that [blood-andsemen] for its object [though] in a wrong way,⁸⁴⁴ ceases to exist. Simultaneously with its⁸⁴⁵ cessation, there arises, by virtue of that same mind containing all Seeds, another lump of semen and blood, which is similar to the [preceding one but] is mixed with the gross elements of the subtle sense-faculties - which are different from the [gross elements that constitute blood-and-semen as such]⁸⁴⁶ - and is [already] furnished with [one] sense-faculty⁸⁴⁷ (and is thus a living body). At this stage one speaks of mind being [re-]established [in a new basis-of-existence], and of Linking up having taken place. This is the state of *kalala*."

6.3.2 The characterization of ālayavijñāna in ③ is substantially⁸⁴⁸ identical with that in ①, but the context is different since the present passage deals with reincarnation, more precisely with Linking up (*pratisandhi*) a new existence as a living being born from a womb (*jarāyuja*),⁸⁴⁹ this reincarnation being initiated, according to ③, by ālaya-vijñāna merging into (*samūrcch-*) protoembryonic matter at the moment of conception. It is in the context of this passage that Ui seems to see the origin of ālayavijñāna.⁸⁵⁰

To be sure, the term 'ālayavijñāna' in the sense of "mind [characterized by coming to] stick to or in, or hide in, [protoembryonic matter]" (see § 3.3.1.2-3) would suit the situation of reincarnation perfectly well and thus meet the second requirement

of § 1.7 (though even in this case the choice of precisely this term would perhaps not be as plausible as in the *Initial Passage* where it c o n t r a s t s with the term '*pravṛtti-vijñāna*').

But the present passage does not seem to offer anything in terms of the first criterion, viz. that in the systematic context concerned the introduction of a new kind of *vijñāna* should have become inevitable; for it neither supplies nor even does it indicate any r e a s o n why, in the context of reincarnation, the traditional kinds of mind were not sufficient but rather an entirely new kind of mind was required. All that the present passage does is to qualify, in (3), ālayavijñāna by precisely the same attributes which had been ascribed to it in (1). To be sure, in the present case, in contrast to (1),⁸⁵¹ a l l of them are closely related to the systematic context, viz. reincarnation; for mind at reincarnation not only contains the Seeds of the further development of the present existence⁸⁵² (and even of future existences)⁸⁵³ and is, as the result of previous karman (and delight in wordly existence)⁸⁵⁴, qualified as *vipākā*,⁸⁵⁵ but is also essentially bound up with taking possession of the new existence and especially with a p p r o p r i a t i n g proto-embryonic matter in order to constitute and preserve it as animate, i.e. as a l i v i n g o r g a n i s m .⁸⁵⁶ Yet, the present passage does n o t indicate for what r e a s o n any of these functions made the introduction of ālayavijñāna inevitable.

Even the (hypothetical) problem arising from a restrictive combination of the two main views on what contains Seeds (viz. [a] the psycho-physical basis-of-personal-existence as a whole in so far as it is *vipākā*, and [b] the m i n d series) - a problem which may be conceived to have rendered the introduction of a new kind of *vijñāna* necessary in the context of the *bījāśraya* of perceptions and cognitions i n g e n e r a l (see § 6.1.2.2.a) - can hardly be imagined to have led to difficulties in the case of the s p e c i f i c situation of reincarnation; for mind at the moment of conception had been specified as Result-of-Maturation (*vipākā*) already in earlier Yogācāra materials,⁸⁵⁷ and

I for one do not see why it had, by necessity, to be conceived of as an entirely new form of mind and not, e.g., as a faint variety of *manovijñāna*.

To be sure, pertinent arguments are expressly presented in later sources like the *Mahāyānasamgraha*⁸⁵⁸ and already indicated in the *Proof Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*. According to the latter text, the *viññāna* which appropriates the (corporeal) basis of existence [at the moment of reincarnation, and keeps it appropriated throughout life,] cannot be any of the traditional kinds of mind, because it is taught to result from previous karmic forces, whereas the ordinary *viññānas* arise from present conditions, viz. sense-faculty, object, and attention;⁸⁵⁹ moreover, it must be morally neutral and [Result-of-]Maturation, but no such kind of *viññāna* is found among the traditional ones.⁸⁶⁰ One wonders, however, why these difficulties had not been felt, for such a long time, by the *Vaibhāṣikas* and *Sautrāntikas* who, after all, do not, in this case (in contrast to the problem of mind in *nirodhasamāpatti*), seem to have denied the presuppositions from which they are derived. Therefore, these arguments may well have been excogitated only afterwards, i.e. when *ālayaviññāna* had already been introduced for some other reason.

The more so since the early *Yogācāras* themselves do not, in the beginning, appear to have felt any need to introduce, in the context of reincarnation, an entirely new kind of *viññāna*, as is documented by the very *Manobhūmi* (to which (3) belongs), in the beginning of which dying (*cyavate*) and being reborn (*upapadyate*: Y_m) are listed among what both unbiased reading and textual history vindicate as exclusive functions of *manovijñāna*⁸⁶¹; cp. also the detailed treatment of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* of the *Basic Section*⁸⁶² where the *viññāna* which arises, at the moment of conception, in the mother's womb, is not called '*ālayaviññāna*' but only '*pratisandhi(pha-la)-*' or '*vipāka-viññāna*', and not distinguished from the six traditional kinds of mind.⁸⁶³

As a context in which ālayavijñāna may have been introduced for the first time, reincarnation would stand on a par with *nirodhasamāpatti* only if one could produce convincing evidence for the inevitability of the introduction of a new kind of *vijñāna* in this context too, and such evidence would have to come from a passage from the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. But (3) does not satisfy this condition. Rather, (3) too appears, like (1), to presuppose ālayavijñāna as an already established concept, albeit, in view of the qualifications added, perhaps a not yet well-known one.

6.3.3 This evaluation of (3) tallies with the fact that, in it too, the reference to ālayavijñāna is probably, as in (1), intrusive to the material which forms its surroundings. On the one hand, the *sarvabījakam ... ālayavijñānam* of (3) is, like the corresponding term in (1), resumed, a few lines later (see (b) in § 6.3.1), by the expression '*tasyaiva sarvabījasya vijñānasya*',⁸⁶⁴ and not, as one would expect, by '*tasyaiv ālaya-vijñānasya*' - a fact which would, however, be quite natural if (3), like (1), had originally only contained the words '*yatra tat sarvabījakam vijñānam saṃmurechati*' and if '*vipākasamgrhītam āśrayopādātr ālaya-*', or at least '*ālaya-*',^{864a} is, here too, taken as a later addition (see § 6.1.3). This is further corroborated not only by the fact that the occurrence of ālayavijñāna is in conflict with rebirth being, in the introductory outline, enumerated among what otherwise constitutes specific functions of *manovijñāna*,⁸⁶⁵ but also by the fact that in the wider context of (3) there is no further occurrence of the term 'ālayavijñāna', instead of which we find traditional or at any rate less precise terms like '*ātmabhāva*',⁸⁶⁶ '*vijñāna*',⁸⁶⁷ and also '*sarvabījakam vijñānam*',⁸⁶⁸ ⁸⁶⁹

6.3.4 As for the age of the presumable addition of '*vipākasamgrhītam āśrayopādātr ālaya-*' or at least '*ālaya-*' in (3), it would seem to precede the Vth chapter of the *Samdhinirmocana* (see § 3.9.1 + ns. 324 and 327) in the pertinent part of which

in this case also the aspects of biological appropriation⁸⁷⁰ and being the result of [karmic] Maturation⁸⁷¹ are referred to. Since in the case of (3) all the qualifications of ālayavijñāna fit the context, it will not perhaps be unreasonable to suppose that 'vipākaśaṃgrhīta' and 'āśrayopādātṛ', if not even belonging to the older layer, were at any rate introduced here for the first time, and only afterwards extended to (1) because it was felt that ālayavijñāna, as a concept which had not yet struck firm roots, needed a kind of definition at its first occurrence in the text (see § 6.1.3-4). This does not, however, mean that if not in (1) then at any rate in (3) their possible insertion, or the introduction of ālayavijñāna itself, must necessarily have preceded the compilation of (this part of) the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

6.4.1 Y 109,13-15:⁸⁷²

- (4) *evam avyākṛtā dharmā<ḥ> kuśalākuśālāvyākṛtān dharmān āvahanti, tadyathā kuśalākuśālāvyākṛtabījakam ālayavijñānam /*

"In the same way, neutral factors [may] entail good, bad and neutral factors: viz. (/ as e.g.) ālayavijñāna, which contains the Seeds of good, bad and neutral factors, [entails these factors]."

6.4.2 (4), on the one hand, starts from the assumption that ālayavijñāna is morally neutral (*avyākṛta*), which does not necessarily imply - but is, in its turn, implied by - ālayavijñāna's being (comprised in the category of) '[Result-of-]Maturation' (*vipāka*). On the other hand, (4) expressly characterizes ālayavijñāna as containing the Seeds of good, bad and neutral dharmas, which is a kind of differentiated equivalent to "containing all Seeds" (*sarvabījaka*) in (1) and (3).

As for a justification for the choice of the term 'ālayavijñāna', the situation in (4) is similar to that in (1) (see § 6.1.2, especially 1). But, in contrast to (1), (4) may be taken

to indicate a reason why a new kind of *viññāna* had to be introduced in the systematic context of Seeds; for the statement that neutral *ālayaviññāna* entails good, bad and neutral factors because it contains their Seeds may in fact presuppose the argument - similar to that of the *Proof Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*⁸⁷³ - that crassly contradictory dharmas (like good and bad states of mind) cannot be the Seed of each other and that therefore an additional, neutral state of mind is required as the Seed of, e.g., a good state of mind immediately following upon a bad one.

Yet, (4) does not express such an argument but at best presupposes it. But even this much is by no means certain, for (4) may, on the contrary, have been the starting point from which this argument was developed only later. In fact, (4) could just as well be explained as an attempt to apply, to the present context of *āvāhakahetu* (i.e. of good, bad or neutral dharmas entailing or favouring (*ānukūlya*: Y 109,1) the arising of similar, homogeneous factors), the concept of *ālayaviññāna* after it had already been established, because *ālayaviññāna*, being comprised in what is Result-of-Maturation and thus morally neutral, was compatible with all kinds of dharmas and thus suited to contain their Seeds and to act, in a sense, as a homogeneous cause of all of them.

6.4.3 As in (1) - (3), in (4) too the impression that *ālayaviññāna* is an extraneous element is supported by textual evidence. Two facts arouse suspicion with regard to its forming an integral part of its surroundings:

a) The other instances of *āvāhaka-hetu* consist in good, bad and neutral factors entailing similar factors of a higher intensity or quality. In the case of (4), however, we are not concerned with intensification but with actualization. To be sure, it is not unreasonable to combine both kinds of causality under the common aspect of "being favourable" (*ānukūlya*), but nevertheless the difference is conspicuous.

b) After having dealt with good factors entailing other good factors of higher intensity or quality, the text introduces the treatment of bad factors by the particle *t a t h ā* ("likewise"), whereas *e v a m* is used within the treatment of good or bad factors, mostly but not always⁸⁷⁴ in correspondence with *yathā* (*yathā ... , evam ...*). Now, one would expect the treatment of neutral dharmas to be introduced by another *t a t h ā*, but what is used in the beginning of (4) is *e v a m*. Yet, the expected *t a t h ā* follows after (4) as an introductory particle to the treatment of neutral dharmas as entailing other neutral dharmas of a higher intensity or quality, i.e. to a treatment which is, from the point of view of the type of causality it deals with, closely parallel to the treatment of the good and the bad factors. Thus, the paragraph on *āvāhaka-hetu* would present, not only from the point of view of content but also from the point of view of style, a perfectly harmonious structure if (4) were omitted (i.e. regarded as an insertion):

*kāmapratīsaṃyuktāḥ kuśalā dharmāḥ kāmapratīsaṃyuktān kuśalān
vaiśeṣikān dharmān āvahanti /*

evam ...

yathā ... , evam ...

...

*t a t h ā akuśalā (Y_m) dharmā akuśalān vaiśeṣikān dharmān
āvahanti / ...*

[*evam avyākṛtā dharmāḥ* etc. (= (4))]

*t a t h ā avyākṛtā dharmā avyākṛtān vaiśeṣikān dharman āva-
hanti / ...*

6.5.1 Y 192,6-9:

(a) *sukhavedanīyaṃ karma*

yat a) *puṇyam*,

b) *tridhyānavedanīyaṃ cāniñjyam /*

(b) *duḥkhavedanīyaṃ karma yad apuṇyam /*

(c) *aduḥkhāsukhavedanīyaṃ karma*

(5) { yat a) *sarvatrālayaviññānavaipākyam karma*,

b) *caturthāc ca dhyānād ūrdhvam āniñjyam /*

"(a) 'Karman entailing pleasant experience' is α) meritorious karman, as well as β) immovable karman to be experienced in the three [lower] dhyānas.

(b) 'Karman entailing painful experience' is demeritorious karman.

(c) 'Karman entailing neither pleasant nor painful experience' is α) the karman which matures to [a new] ālayavijñāna, in every [kind of] existence, and β) immovable karman [to be experienced in existences] from the fourth dhyāna onward."

6.5.2 In (5), ālayavijñāna is unambiguously qualified as [Result-of-]Maturation (*vipāka*) of karman. Moreover, in the context of (c), (5) would seem to imply that ālayavijñāna is associated with neither-pleasant-nor-painful sensation - or at any rate not associated with pleasant or painful sensation -, since it is the result of karman conducive - or not conducive - to such sensation. But I for one cannot detect, in this passage, any indication of the literal meaning of the term 'ālayavijñāna' nor of a reason why the introduction of a new kind of *vijñāna* should have become inevitable in the context of the problem of karman and its Maturation (*vipāka*). I thus do not see any alternative to the assumption that, in (5) too, ālayavijñāna is not introduced as an entirely new concept but rather a ready one merely made use of.

6.5.3 The present passage does not seem to contain any formal indication that the reference to ālayavijñāna is an addition. Yet, at the risk of straining the forbearance of my readers, I have to assert that it is a later element, at least from the point of view of the history of ideas. Actually the text itself would seem to be, from a systematical point of view, slightly unsatisfactory when it defines karman entailing pleasant or painful experience as that which is meritorious or demeritorious; for if one lists, as the present passage does, karman resulting in a new ālayavijñāna separately, one would, strictly speaking, have to qualify meritorious and demeritorious karman in (a) and

(b) since, as the preceding paragraph of the text⁸⁷⁵ confirms, some meritorious and demeritorious karman does not entail pleasant or painful experience but a new (basis-of-personal-)existence, which means (or at least includes) ālayavijñāna. One might consider explaining the absence of such a qualification in (a) and (b) as due to laxness or brevity. Yet, in the present case, the original, "pre-ālayavijñānic" explanation of the pattern has actually been preserved in the Abhidharmasamuccaya⁸⁷⁶ as well as in Vaibhāṣika sources⁸⁷⁷ (provided that we disregard the use of *kuśala/akuśala* instead of *puṇya/apuṇya/ānīñjya*)⁸⁷⁸:

sukhavedanīyaṃ karma = good karman [to be experienced in] the *kāmadhātu* and the first three dhyānas;

duḥkhavedanīyaṃ karma = *akuśalaṃ karma*;

aduḥkḥāsukhavedanīyaṃ karma = good karman [to be experienced] beyond the third dhyāna.

This does not, of course, mean that the Abhidharmasamuccaya as a whole is earlier than the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (see § 1.6.1 + n. 100), but it corroborates the suspicion that (5), too, has - though, from the formal point of view, in a more skilful way than (1)-(4) - been added to earlier materials which did not yet contain ālayavijñāna.

6.5.4 From the doctrinal point of view, it would seem that the introduction of the additional category of karman maturing in ālayavijñāna into an older pattern distributing the different moral species of karman according to the different experiences they are conducive to, signalizes that the present passage stresses the distinction between two kinds of karman: one kind has the function of entailing (*ā-kṣip-*), in a corresponding world-sphere (*dhātu*) or way-of-existence (*gati*), a new (basis-of-personal-)existence (*janman*,⁸⁷⁹ *ātmabhāva*⁸⁸⁰); the other kind of karman supplements (*paripūrayati*) this existence by special pleasant or unpleasant features.⁸⁸¹ Sometimes, only the effect of the first kind of karman, i.e. the new (basis-of-personal-)existence as such, is qualified to be *vipākā*.⁸⁸² This appears to be the case also in the paragraph immediately preceding the passage under

discussion, viz. Y 192,4-6,⁸⁸³ where meritorious, demeritorious and immovable karman are - once again in contrast to an older pattern⁸⁸⁴ - distinguished in terms of whether they mature to (- *v a i p ā k y a*) a new existence (*sugati*, etc.) or are merely conducive to [corresponding] experiences (-*vedanīya*) supplementing these existences.

In the present passage, however, the effect of the first function of karman, viz. of entailing (*ā-kṣip-*), as its *vipāka* in the stricter sense, a new (basis-of-personal-)existence (*ātmabhāva*), is specified as *ā l a y a v i j ñ ā n a*. This would seem to mean that in this passage *ālayavijñāna* has, at least as far as the initial phase of an existence is concerned, come to take the position of *ātmabhāva* as the primary result of karmic Maturation - an impression which is supported by the presumable association, in (5), of *ālayavijñāna* with neither-painful-nor-pleasant sensation which had, in the *Manobhūmi*, been stated to be characteristic of primary *vipāka* (in contrast to what only secondarily arises from it (*vipākaja*)).⁸⁸⁵ If this conclusion is correct, the impulse contained in the identification, in (1) and (3), of *ālayavijñāna* with *sarvabījakaṃ vijñānam* - which had come to be defined as *vipāka* in a similar sense⁸⁸⁶ - would, in (5), have begun to operate, initiating the process by which *ālayavijñāna* became, in analogy to *sarvabījakaṃ vijñānam*,⁸⁸⁷ a more independent entity on its own and even the fundamental constituent of a living being (§ 3.10). This would mean that (5) is, at any rate, later, at least slightly later, than (1) and (3).

6.6.1 (6) = SacAcBh § 5 (see App. I).

6.6.2 This passage represents, in a generalized form (see § 3.2.2), the same systematic context as my *Initial Passage* (§ 2.1). In contrast to the latter, it does not, however, indicate the exegetical (or any other) problem that led to the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* in the case of *nirodhasamāpatti*. (6), too, would thus have to be regarded as making use, and expressly

extending the application, of ālayavijñāna as an already established concept.

6.6.3 Though, from the point of view of the history of ideas, (6) represents a later layer than the rest of the Sacittikā/Acittikā Bhūmiḥ which presupposes the traditional vijñānas only, I can see no incoherence in it from the compositional point of view. I therefore prefer to consider the Sacittikā/Acittikā Bhūmiḥ to have been conceived as it stands from the outset, at a time when the concept of ālayavijñāna had already been introduced but had not yet fully asserted itself. The Sacittikā/Acittikā Bhūmiḥ may even be regarded to have been written with the very intention of making, with the help of the pattern of conventional and ultimate truth, the ālayavijñāna theory prevail over the traditional view without jeopardizing the latter.

6.7.1 Commentary on Paramārthagāthās 33-34 (= (7A)) and 37 (= (7B)):

(7A) α) *dvitīyatṛtīyābhyām* (sc. *gāthābhyām*) *duḥkhaṃ saṃskāraduḥkhata-saṃgrhītam ālayavijñānamayaṃ* (sc. *darśayati*)
</>

β) *tad dhi* (less probably: *tad(-) vi(-) niveśanam kṛtvā tenopaiti prapañcitam bhaviṣyāmi na bhaviṣyāmi evamādi* /

γ) *niveśanam ity ātmabhāvaparigrahaṃ* / ...

(underlined parts from PG).

(7B) *tasyedānīm ālayavijñānasamgrhītasya duḥkhasya saraḥsārūpyaṃ darśayitvā viśoṣaṇaṃ darśayati .../*

For text-critical notes, translation and interpretation see App. II.

6.7.2 1.a) Both passages are unambiguous in declaring Suffering in the sense of *saṃskāraduḥkhata*, i.e. of the ontological or subliminal unsatisfactoriness essentially characterizing or continuously permeating all worldly existence (see § 4.1.1-2), to consist of (-*maya*), or be comprised in (-*saṃgrhīta*), ālayavijñāna (see § 4.1.4).

b) Furthermore, (7A) connects ālayavijñāna with *niveśana*, which is, in its turn, explained as "taking possession of a [new] (basis of) personal existence" (*ātmabhāvapari-graha*); but I for one find it difficult to decide precisely how this connection is conceived by the text, i.e. whether (at the moment of Linking up (*pratisandhi*)) ālayavijñāna is caused to take possession of a new basis of existence (i.e. body, etc.) or whether - perhaps more probably - a new ālayavijñāna is taken possession of as the (primary element of ?) a new basis of existence (for details see ns. 1474 and 1477(I); cp. also § 7.1B.2.2.1).

c) Finally, a synthesizing interpretation of PG 28-36 in the light of the commentary would suggest that Suffering, i.e., according to the comm.: ālayavijñāna, which is the cause of the notion of Ego (*ahamkāra*: PG 35), is identical with [the Result-of-]Maturation containing all Seeds (*sarvabījo vipākaḥ*: PG 28-29) which is not only the cause of the wrong view of Self (PG 31: *svabījāt ... jāyate ātma-darśanam*) but also its object (PG 29ab). From this, one may conclude that, from the point of view of the commentary, ālayavijñāna may not only be the cause but also the object of the wrong view of Self. Yet, it has to be stressed that the commentary does not seem to contain an explicit statement to this effect and does not explain the *sarvabījo vipākaḥ* of PG 28-29 as ālayavijñāna (cp. also §§ 3.11.4.1 and 3.11.5).

2.a) As for the literal meaning of the term 'ālayavijñāna', it can hardly become plausible on the basis of the qualification of ālayavijñāna as Suffering in the sense of *saṃskāraduḥkhatā* (see 1.a). The use of the term would, however, be reasonable if one were ready to accept the idea that ālayavijñāna is the object of the notion of Ego (see 1.c) to be deliberately implied by the text; for in this case the term would fit the situation very well if taken in the sense of "mind clung to [as Self]".⁸⁸⁸ But even if we disregard the general difficulties to be faced if this were taken to be the original meaning of the term 'ālayavijñāna' (see § 6.1.2.2.c), it can hardly be in the present

passage that it was introduced for the first time, for it is not used here with reference to nor in direct connection with the idea of Clinging to Self.

b) On the other hand, the fact that the term 'ālayavijñāna' occurs, in (7A), in the immediate vicinity of the explanation of the semantically related word 'niveśana' in PG 33-34, might be taken to suggest that its formation was stimulated, precisely in this context, by the gāthā expression 'niveśana', and thus may, in view of the explanation, in (7A)γ, of *niveśana* as *ātmabhāvaparigraha*, originally have meant something like "*viññāna* that enters upon or comes to stick to [a new (basis of) personal existence]" or, more probably, "*viññāna* which has become one's abode" or "which is stuck to [as the (primary element of?) one's basis-of-personal-existence]" (see also § 7.1B.2.2.1). Even the question why, in this case, it was just the term 'ālayavijñāna' (and not, e.g., rather 'niveśana-' or 'parigraha-viññāna') that was chosen, may perhaps be answered by referring to a canonical passage like MN I 233, where what is the object of *niveśana* in PG 33-34, viz. Suffering, is the object of *ā-lī-* (see n. 1444(A)). But even so what the occurrence of 'niveśana' stimulated under the influence of canonical phraseology may equally well have been not the first coining of the term 'ālayavijñāna' but rather the employment, in the present context, of 'ālayavijñāna' as an already established term, and in a modified sense at that.⁸⁸⁹

c) That the latter possibility is much more probable would seem to be corroborated by the fact that the present passage does not express or at least indicate any motive which may have rendered the introduction of a new kind of *viññāna* inevitable, neither in the context of taking possession of a new (basis-of-personal-)existence nor in the context of *saṃskāra-duḥkhatā*, let alone the context of the objective basis of the notion of Ego with which *ālayavijñāna* is, in the present passage, connected, at best, only implicitly. As for the two latter contexts, even later sources do not seem to make use of them for proving the necessity of the existence of *ālayavijñāna*.

6.7.3 From the point of view of textual composition, I for one cannot, in (7A) and (7B), detect any incoherence or formal indication of their being later additions, though I do not exclude the possibility that the explanation of 'niveśana' as 'ātmabhāva-parigraha' ((7A)γ) and the replacement, in the interpretation of *duḥkha* ((7A)α), of the older concept of *ātmabhāva* (cp. Y 25,15f.) by ālayavijñāna may in fact represent two successive steps in the exegesis of the Paramārthagāthās.

6.7.4 As for relative chronology, some of the Paramārthagāthās express ideas closely related to some of the "pre-ālayavijñānic" materials compiled in the first two Bhūmis of the *Basic Section*.⁸⁹⁰ The commentary, introducing ālayavijñāna, would thus be comparable to the intrusive references to ālayavijñāna in passages like (1), (3), (4) and (5). Actually, even if we disregard the idea, at best implied by the text, that ālayavijñāna is the ultimate objective basis of the notion of Ego (which seems to presuppose a certain modification of the original concept of ālayavijñāna: see § 3.11), the doctrinal positions involved in (7A)/(7B) would (at least from my starting-point [§§ 2.1 and 2.13]) assign these passages to a comparatively late stage of development:

1. The equation of ālayavijñāna with *saṃskāraduḥkhatā* - which is hardly self-evident - appears to be a secondary development presupposing certain reflections on the original concept of ālayavijñāna and even a certain shift of emphasis (see § 4.1). It may even be based on a reinterpretation of the materials of Y 26,11-19⁸⁹¹ in the light of the ālayavijñāna concept (and from such a reinterpretation of Y 26,11ff. the idea also of ālayavijñāna as the objective basis of the notion of 'I' would, sooner or later, have followed almost automatically).

2. If 'niveśana' in (7A)β has, as is perhaps more probable, to be understood in a non-causative sense, (7A)β would seem to imply that ālayavijñāna is stuck to as the *ātmabhāva* (see n. 1474(C) and § 6.7.2.1.b and 2.b). This, however, would mean that ālayavijñāna has - at least as far as the moment of conception is

concerned, but probably for the whole of a given existence - become the fundamental constituent of a living being (cp. also ns. 1483 and 1484). This would bring (7A) close to the demonstrably (see § 6.2.4) comparatively late passage (2) which explicitly states ālayavijñāna to be the basis [of personal existence] (*āśraya*) and even uses, in this connection, the expression *-san n i v i ṣ ṭ a* in order to indicate the literal meaning of the term 'ā l a y a vijñāna' (see § 6.2.2.d).⁸⁹² In view of this affinity, one may even consider the possibility that it was precisely (7A) which provoked the remodeling of (1) into (2) (see § 6.2.2.a). (7A) would, in its turn, appear to presuppose a similar development as (5) (see § 6.5.4).

In view of the preceding considerations, I tend to take (7A)/(7B) to represent, apart from (2), the latest stratum of the ālayavijñāna theory to be found in the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

6.8.1 Summing up the result of my - admittedly preliminary - investigation into the other occurrences of ālayavijñāna in the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, it would seem that none of them satisfies, unambiguously, the criteria stipulated in § 1.7. Thus, it is improbable that any of them can claim to have preserved the original situation and context of the first introduction of ālayavijñāna; at any rate, if one would attribute, to any of them, an evidential value superior to that of my *Initial Passage* (§ 2.1), one would have to adduce very strong arguments.

6.8.2 It is also worth noting that all occurrences of ālayavijñāna which precede my *Initial Passage* in the present arrangement of the *Yogācārabhūmi* appear to have been inserted into - doubtless older - materials where they were originally missing, and that their character of being insertions is recognizable, in four out of five cases, also from the compositional point of view. This fact would seem to suggest that these passages were added only after the *Initial Passage* had been incorporated. This does not, of course, necessarily mean that they were added by

a n o t h e r person; it may (but of course need not) have been the compiler himself (if there was actually only one) who added (at least some of) them by way of revising the earlier parts.

6.8.3 This presumption that my *Initial Passage* is not only representative of the original context in which the idea of ālayavijñāna was introduced for the first time, but probably also the first place where this concept had emerged in the process of the compilation of the Yogācārabhūmi, will receive additional support if it can be shown that the occurrences of the term 'p r a v ṛ t t i v i j ñ ā n a', too, fit into the picture.

According to my hypothesis which takes the *Initial Passage* as its starting-point, the terms 'ālayavijñāna' and 'pravṛttivijñāna' are the antonymic elements of a coherent conceptual structure, and thus intrinsically and originally connected with each other. Consequently, one expects the term 'pravṛttivijñāna' - as a designation of the traditional forms of mind - to occur only in explicit or at least implicit antithesis to 'ālayavijñāna'; and - if the *Initial Passage* was in fact the first passage where ālayavijñāna emerged in the process of the compilation of the Yogācārabhūmi - one expects 'pravṛttivijñāna', too, n o t to occur at all in the chapters which precede this passage in terms of literary arrangement, except, at best, in later additions.

And in fact, as far as I can see, the term 'pravṛttivijñāna' does not, in the Yogācārabhūmi, occur but in association with ālayavijñāna.⁸⁹³ Nor does there seem to be any occurrence at all of 'pravṛttivijñāna' in the portions of the Yogācārabhūmi which, in terms of the present arrangement of the text, precede the *Initial Passage*. That the term 'pravṛttivijñāna' is, in contrast to ālayavijñāna, not even introduced, in these portions, by way of later addition is easily explained by the fact that, being merely a new designation of the traditional *vijñānas*, its absence was, contrary to that of the entirely new concept of ālayavijñāna, nowhere felt to be an essential defect.

7. Discussion of divergent theories on the origin of ālayavijñāna

7.0 After having presented my own view of the origin of ālayavijñāna (in the strict sense of § 1.4) and some aspects of its early developments, and after a preliminary evaluation of the other occurrences of ālayavijñāna in the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, I now proceed to a brief discussion of some important attempts, recently published by Japanese scholars, to explain the origin of ālayavijñāna in a way that differs from my own view. I apologize, beforehand, for any misunderstandings that may have crept in due to my insufficient familiarity with Japanese, as also for having - probably - overlooked other attempts of equal importance.

7.1A.1 In a paper discussing the formation of the theory of ālayavijñāna and *manas* (in the sense of the "7th *viññāna*" of the full-fledged Yogācāra system, which is usually called 'Defiled Mind' (*kliṣṭaṃ manas*)), Sh. Suguro (1977) proposed the hypothesis that the original character of ālayavijñāna as well as the original meaning of the term 'ālayavijñāna' differed considerably from how it was understood later. On the basis of the prevailing canonical and Abhidharma use of the term 'ālaya' in the sense of Clinging or even Clinging to Self (我執, i.e. *ātma-grāha*)⁸⁹⁴ and the fact that in later Yogācāra dogmatics the term 'ālayavijñāna' is reserved for the "8th *viññāna*" of spiritually imperfect persons who have not yet (or at least not yet completely) abolished Clinging to Self, but is not applicable to the "8th *viññāna*" of perfect Saints (Arhats, etc.),⁸⁹⁵ Suguro infers that the original meaning of 'ālayavijñāna' must have been close to that of 'ātma-grāha',⁸⁹⁶ i.e. something like "mind [consisting in or functioning as] Clinging [to Self]". Thus, according to Suguro ālayavijñāna had, originally, the same function which afterwards came to be attributed to the "7th *viññāna*" or (*kliṣṭaṃ manas*).⁸⁹⁷ The latter, in its turn - again according to Suguro -

originally had no connection with Defilements like the notion of Self or Clinging to Self but was merely some kind of simultaneous *mana-indriya*.⁸⁹⁸ Since, in Suguro's opinion, at that stage of development (viz. in the *Manobhūmi* of the *Basic Section*) the different *viññānas* were not yet distinguished as different entities but merely regarded as various modes of one and the same mind (just as later on in Paramārtha's system), there was a certain circulation or mutual adaptability of their functions (相互に機能を融通し合うこと).⁸⁹⁹ Thus it could, so Suguro, easily happen that later on *manas* took over the function of *ātmagrāha* from *ālayaviññāna*⁹⁰⁰ when the latter, in its turn, came to be regarded as the "central subject of the individual" (個体の中心主体)⁹⁰¹ - in a more existential or biological sense - as is documented by its qualification, in the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, as [Result-of-]Maturation (*vipāka*), as containing all Seeds (*sarvabījaka*) and, especially, as that which appropriates the [corporeal] basis[-of-personal-existence] (*āśrayopādātṛ*), and by the notion of *ādānaviññāna* of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*.⁹⁰²

7.1A.2 In my opinion, the assumption of such a kind of exchange of rôles is hardly justified.

7.1A.2.1 As for Suguro's express presupposition that in the beginning the various kinds of *viññāna* were not yet conceived of as distinct entities but merely as modes of one and the same mind, it may, perhaps, hold good for the very earliest phase of the *ālayaviññāna* theory, in case in the beginning *ālayaviññāna* was conceived as a kind of latent or subliminal continuation of the mind series in unconscious states; but it would seem arbitrary even in the case of most of the *ālayaviññāna* occurrences in the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, not to mention the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* or the passage in the beginning of the *Manobhūmi*⁹⁰³ with which Suguro starts but which is obviously a later insertion, probably post-*Samdhinirmocana* and perhaps even post-*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* (see § 6.2.3-4). Apart from this, the subsumption, in this passage, of *ālayaviññāna*, *manas* and the

traditional forms of mind⁹⁰⁴ (or at least *manovijñāna*)⁹⁰⁵ under 'manas' - which may, of course, be used for designating mind in general⁹⁰⁶ - does not necessarily imply, as Suguro seems to suggest,⁹⁰⁷ the substantial unity - though one on the point of disintegrating - of the items subsumed, no more than does their subsumption under the category of '*viññāna*', common even in later sources. The characterization of *ālayavijñāna* as "having adopted, and sticking to, the state of basis[-of-personal-existence]" (*āśrayabhāvopagatam āśrayabhāvasanniviṣṭam*: see § 6.2.2) points rather to a stage of development where it had already come to be conceived of as the fundamental layer of personality (see § 3.10). And Suguro's argument⁹⁰⁸ that the substantial identity of the various *viññānas* in the *Manobhūmi* is also proved by the fact that dying and being reborn are first⁹⁰⁹ enumerated among what is obviously a list of functions of *manovijñāna* but afterwards attributed to *ālayavijñāna*, ignores the possibility that this disagreement may just as well be explained as an incoherence deriving from textual history. In fact the only passage in the extensive treatment of death and rebirth where *ālayavijñāna* comes in⁹¹⁰ can, once again, be shown to be, almost certainly, a later addition (see §§ 6.3.3 and 6.8).

7.1A.2.2 a) The problem of the origin of *klīṣṭam manaha* would certainly require a study on its own. In this paper, I therefore refrain from discussing Suguro's arguments in detail but confine myself to the statement that I have serious reserves against his idea of a reinterpretation, in the light of the doctrine of momentariness, of *manas* as *samanantara-pratyaya* into a kind of simultaneous *mana-indriya*;⁹¹¹ for apart from the fact that the passage with which Suguro starts (viz. Y 11,6f.) does not contain the slightest indication of such an idea,⁹¹² I have so far not come across any passage, at least in the older texts, which would unequivocally corroborate it, or at least suggest that the concept of *samanantarapratyaya* somehow came to be felt to involve difficulties in the context of the doctrine of momentariness.

b) As against Suguro, I am convinced that (*kliṣṭam*) *manas* - inspite of the fact that the attribute '*kliṣṭa*' is missing in what appear to be the oldest pertinent passages⁹¹³ - was from the very outset essentially associated with, nay almost consisting of, the notion or feeling of 'I'.

(α) In an earlier, rather preliminary paper, which was published in an abridged Japanese version only,⁹¹⁴ I tried to explain the formation of *kliṣṭam manaḥ* as a consequence of the problem of the occurrence of *a s m i m ā n a* even in Śāikṣas, i.e. as a consequence of the very dynamism of the traditional view, found already in certain (though not the oldest)⁹¹⁵ canonical texts, especially the Kṣemakasūtra,⁹¹⁶ that even in a person who has realized Truth and eliminated the (speculative) false view that the skandhas are Self (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*) but is not yet a perfect Saint (*arhat*), an involuntary conception or feeling of identity [with the skandhas] (*asmimāna*)⁹¹⁷ is not yet fully eradicated.⁹¹⁸ In the context of Abhidharma thought, it was, however, difficult to conceive of an occurrence of *asmimāna* (now mostly understood as a form of conceit)⁹¹⁹ without the existence of some form of the view of Self (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*), for the latter was regarded as being presupposed by all kinds of *māna*, and especially so by *asmimāna*.⁹²⁰

(β) This difficulty seems to have induced some masters to assume that *asmimāna* is, like *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, eradicated by the very first insight into Truth (*darśana-heya*),⁹²¹ which means that the Śāikṣa has entirely got rid of it. But since such a view was in open conflict with canonical evidence, especially the Kṣemakasūtra,⁹²² it was rejected by the Vaibhāṣikas who, instead, advocated the view that some *asmimāna* was, in fact, eradicable only by repeated cultivation (*bhāvanā-heya*)⁹²³ and thus not fully eliminated even in a Śāikṣa. Yet, this does not mean, for the Vaibhāṣikas, that there must be actual occurrence of *asmimāna* in a Śāikṣa: rather this is impossible because, due to the eradication of its basis, viz. *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, so to speak the backbone of *asmimāna* is broken.⁹²⁴ What remains to be cut off is thus not the outburst of *asmimāna* but only its Possession (*prāpti*).

(γ) According to the Sautrāntika Ś r ī l ā t a⁹²⁵, there is no objection even to actual occurrences of *asmimāna* in Śaīkṣas because Śaīkṣas have to be sure eradicated wrong v i e w s or t h e o r i e s (*dr̥ṣṭi-viparyāsa*) but not wrong notions or ideas (*saṃjñā-* and *citta-viparyāsa*) including the wrong notion or idea of 'Self' with reference to what is not Self.⁹²⁶

(δ) In a passage of the V a s t u s a ṃ g r a h a ṇ ī of the Yogācārabhūmi,⁹²⁷ the occasional occurrence, by inadvertence, of *asmimāna* in Śaīkṣas is taught to be due to the fact that, though they have eradicated *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* along with its propensity (*anuśaya*, i.e. its fertile seed, so to speak), there is still left in them a kind of a f t e r - e f f e c t (*vāsanā*) of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*, and this *vāsanā*, though incapable of producing *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* itself, is nevertheless regarded as sufficient to explain the occasional occurrences of *asmimāna*.

(ε) In other passages of the Yogācārabhūmi, we meet with the idea of an i n n a t e , spontaneous view of Self (*sahajā satkāyadr̥ṣṭiḥ*), considered to occur even in animals and to be morally neutral (*avyākṛta*),⁹²⁸ in contrast to the speculative (*pari-* or *vi-kalpita*) one which is unwholesome (*akuśala*).⁹²⁹ In view of its spontaneity, this innate notion of Ego had, in contrast to the speculative one, to be regarded as being eradicable not by the very first insight into Truth but only by its repeated cultivation (*bhāvanā-heya*),⁹³⁰ and therefore as liable to occur even in Śaīkṣas. This assumption is corroborated by a passage from the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya,⁹³¹ which, without making use of the notions of *kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ* and *ālayavijñāna*⁹³² but evoking rather the older idea of an after-effect (*vāsanā*) of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*⁹³³ and thus perhaps preserving an older stage of development, expressly confirms the connection of the innate *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* with the problem of the occurrence of *asmimāna* in Śaīkṣas and with the Kṣemakasūtra.

(ζ) In the Japanese article noted, my idea was that the impracticability of c o n s i s t e n t l y associating this spontaneous notion or feeling of 'I' with the traditional forms of

mind,⁹³⁴ or with the newly introduced ālayavijñāna,⁹³⁵ left no other way open but to establish the spontaneous notion of Ego, on the analogy of ālayavijñāna and perhaps also under the "atmospheric" influence of the hypostasis of the notion of 'I' into an entity on its own (*ahaṅkāra*) in Sāṅkhya (see § 2.12), as a form of mind on its own,⁹³⁶ or, more precisely, a mental factor based on a form of mind on its own.⁹³⁷

(n) This new form of mind was called '*manas*' since this term - which moreover lent itself to being etymologized in the sense of *manyānā* ("conceiving") - occurred in several sets where all the other items had specific meanings, especially in the set of the terms '*citta*', '*manas*' and '*vijñāna*';⁹³⁸ to be sure, these latter terms were originally understood to be synonymous⁹³⁹ or were at best taken to refer to different aspects, etc., of mind in general,⁹⁴⁰ but already the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra had started to fill them with substantially specific meanings by equating *citta* with *ādānavijñāna* = ālayavijñāna.⁹⁴¹

c) To be sure, the problem of the *asmimāna* of the Śaiṅśas came to be solved in a more satisfactory way by the introduction of *kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ*. Yet, I have now some doubts as to whether the decisive impulse for the introduction of *manas* as a new form of mind did in fact come from this quarter. Starting from what has good chances of being the oldest occurrence of the new *manas*⁹⁴² (at least the oldest occurrence that yields any concrete information about its nature)⁹⁴³, I now consider another possibility to be equally, if not more, probable.

(a) In the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*, the statement that ālayavijñāna is always accompanied by *manas* is followed by a kind of "statement of identity" and a definition, or explanation, of the latter - a fact which shows that the concept was quite new and could not be presupposed to be well-known. In the "statement of identity", the *manas* which always (*nityakālam*) accompanies ālayavijñāna is [distinguished from the traditional one by being] characterized, in an etymologizing fashion, as the one which has the form (*-ākāra*) of conceiving (*manyānā*) by way

of the notion of 'I' (*a h a ṅ k ā r a*) and the feeling of identity (*a s m i m ā n a*).⁹⁴⁴ In the definition/explanation, it is taught to have the form of conceiving *ā l a y a v i j ñ ā - n a* , its o b j e c t , in the form of ' I a m [this]' (*asmīti*) and '[This is my] S e l f '.⁹⁴⁵ In the *Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya*,⁹⁴⁶ *manas* is - perhaps because *asmimāna* was felt to be too much of a *caitta* to qualify the nature of *manas* as a *citta* - defined as having the nature of continually conceiving 'I' (*aḥam*) or 'Mine' (*mama*).

(β) To be sure, the qualifications of *manas* as *aḥaṅkāra* and *asmimāna* would well fit in with the explanation proposed above. But in view of the only s p o r a d i c occurrence of *asmimāna* in *Śaikṣas*⁹⁴⁷ it would not be easy to explain, from this context, why the new *manas* consisting in this *asmimāna* (and the subtle notion of 'I' it presupposes) was established as being c o n - t i n u o u s . Indeed, if we take into consideration that, according to the testimony of the definition/explanation of the new *manas* in the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* (see α), the idea that *ālayavijñāna* is its object appears⁹⁴⁸ to have formed part of the concept of this *manas* from the very outset,⁹⁴⁹ we should conclude that it was rather a d i f f e r e n t systematic context that gave rise to the idea of *manas* as a *vijñāna* on its own, or at least significantly contributed to its introduction. Actually, the terms '*aḥaṅkāra*' and '*asmimāna*' may just as well refer to the problem of the o b j e c t of the (innate) notion of 'I' (and 'Mine') and of the feeling of identity i n g e n e r a l , i.e., primarily, in ordinary, w o r d l y people (*prthagjana*), the *asmimāna* and *sahajā satkāyadṛṣṭiḥ* of *Śaikṣas* being, at best, a special case which, to be sure, may have enhanced the urgency of the problem.

(γ) As was stated above (§ 3.11.2), in the "pre-ālaya-vijñānic" materials of the *Basic Section* the object of the notions of 'I' (*aḥam iti*) and 'Mine' (*mamēti*) - i.e. of *satkāyadṛṣṭi* - and of the notion 'I am [this]' (*asmīti*) - i.e. of the feeling of identity (*asmimāna*) - (of o r d i n a r y people)⁹⁵⁰ is the

basis-of-personal-existence (*ātmabhāva*, *āśraya*), or [Result-of-]Maturation (*vipāka*), containing all Seeds.⁹⁵¹ Later on - probably only after having become the fundamental layer of personality and having replaced, in this function, the body or *ṣaḍāyatana* - *ālayavijñāna* was bound to be regarded also as the most fundamental objective basis of the notion of 'I' and of the feeling of identity (see § 3.11.5ff.). But clearly *ālayavijñāna*, being *subliminal*, could not, on closer inspection, be regarded as the object of the *ordinary* notion of Ego⁹⁵² and feeling of identity but only of a similarly *subtle* one. This fact, however, would seem to have rendered an association of this notion of Ego and feeling of identity with the traditional *viññānas* extremely difficult, still more difficult than did the mere ubiquity of the innate notion of Ego (*sahajā satkāya-dṛṣṭiḥ*), as more or less identical with (or at least comprised in) which the notion of 'I' referring to *ālayavijñāna* could easily come to be regarded.⁹⁵³ Therefore, it would seem to me that it was, above all, on account of their having come to refer to *ālayavijñāna* as their object that the (spontaneous) notion(s) of 'I' (and 'Mine') and the feeling of identity (*asmimāna*) (of ordinary people) had to be established as *another* form of mind on their own, to be called '*manas*' for the reasons suggested earlier (b, η); and this is precisely what is documented in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* passages adduced above (c, α).

(δ) As for the *continuity* of the notion of 'I' and the feeling of identity which constitute the new *manas*, the *Sacittikabhūmiviniścaya* suggests that they are continuous because they arise from nothing but their Seed in *ālayavijñāna*,⁹⁵⁴ i.e. flow forth spontaneously, being independent of any external cause. Perhaps it was also the "atmospheric" influence of the *Sāṅkhya ahaṅkāra* (see b, ζ) that favoured not only the establishment of the notion of 'I' as a form of mind on its own but also its continuity. Anyway, rather than the sporadic feeling of identity in *Śaīkṣas*, it is the ubiquitous occurrence of the idea of 'I' and

'Mine' and of the feeling of identity in ordinary people⁹⁵⁵ that is more likely to have been generalized to, or understood as a manifestation of, a continuous subtle *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* and *asmimāna*.

(ε) Yet the newly introduced *manas* was quite soon, viz. in the *Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya*,⁹⁵⁶ explicitly recognized to occur in Śaikṣas, too, except when they are actually practising the Supramundane Path, which means: not merely sporadically. Its largely continuous presence even in Śaikṣas does, of course, furnish a satisfactory basis for the sporadic outbursts of *manas* if *est asmimāna* which these persons are, according to other passages,⁹⁵⁷ still subject to. *Manas* could thus come to be regarded as the basic principle of Pollution (*saṃkleśa*) (see § 4.10.1).

(ζ) At the same time, the *Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya*,⁹⁵⁸ in this treatment of *manas* in a soteriological context, clearly distinguishes *manas* itself (as the *citta*) from *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* and *asmimāna* as Defilements (*kleśa*, i.e. *caittas*) it is associated with. Naturally, it is, in the soteriological context, these Defilements of *manas* that the text is mainly interested in, and it also tries to systematize them by way of a complete enumeration, which for our text means the addition of two more Defilements, viz. self-love (*ātmasneha*) and Ignorance (*avidyā*). The same list of Defilements of *manas* (substantially retained throughout the later Yogācāra tradition) is also given in a paragraph of the *Pravṛtti Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*⁹⁵⁹ - a paragraph which is, by the way, clearly a kind of supplement to the passage referred to above (c,α)⁹⁶⁰ and thus, perhaps, dependent on the *Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya* material. The addition of self-love (*ātmasneha*) may have been stimulated by the fact that in the *Kṣemakasūtra*⁹⁶¹ *asmīti māna* is followed by *asmīti chanda* (something like "inclination to identify o.s. [with the skandhas]"), but it may just as well have been taken from the context of the notion of Ego with reference to the *ātmabhāva* or *vīpākā* containing all Seeds.⁹⁶² The addition of Ignorance (*avidyā*) may be due to systematic reasons⁹⁶³ but could also be explained as stemming, it too, from the context of the notion of Ego.⁹⁶⁴

7.1A.2.3 In this way, the introduction of *manas* as a new kind of mind presupposes, to be sure, the introduction of *ālayavijñāna*, both as a model case and, probably, because *manas* was required as a form of mind performing the act of Clinging to *ālayavijñāna* as Self. This does not at all mean, however, that *manas* has borrowed its function, viz. Clinging to Self, from *ālayavijñāna*. For as far as I can see there is neither need nor textual evidence for, indeed, there is even counter-evidence against, Suguro's assumption that "Mind clinging [to Self]" was the original meaning of '*ālayavijñāna*'.

a) No need, because I hope to have demonstrated that the passage from the *Samāhitā Bhūmiḥ* quoted in § 2.1 furnishes a fully satisfactory explanation, meeting the requirements stipulated in § 1.7, of the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* in the sense of "mind [characterized by] sticking and being hidden in [the material sense-faculties]" (see § 2.7), a sense which moreover has the advantage of substantially agreeing with what is presumably the oldest explicit explanation of the term extant (see § 2.8).

b) No textual evidence, because the passage from the *Cintāmayī Bhūmiḥ* Suguro⁹⁶⁵ adduces (viz. PG 33-34 + comm.)⁹⁶⁶ does not state nor even imply, as he himself appears to have realized in a later paper,⁹⁶⁷ that *ālayavijñāna* has itself the nature or function of Clinging to Self, but can at best be interpreted as implying that *ālayavijñāna* is the object of the notion of Self (see § 6.7). This, however, is a quite different aspect, and one which is, moreover, fully reconcilable with the traditional character of *ālayavijñāna*, at least as soon as it had become the *āśraya* in the sense of a kind of fundamental layer of personality (see § 3.11, especially 3.11.7-8).

Nor do I find that the fact that the characterization of *ālayavijñāna* as "morally neutral and not obstructed [by Defilements]" (*anivṛtāvyākṛta*) is not met with in the oldest sources must signalize a change in its nature;⁹⁶⁸ for since, as Suguro

himself⁹⁶⁹ points out, ālayavijñāna is, already in the *Basic Section* of the Yogācārabhūmi, characterized as "comprised in [the category of Result-of-]Maturation" (*vipākaśaṃgrhīta*)⁹⁷⁰ and since what is *vipāka* is by necessity subsumed under the (wider!) category of *avyākṛta*⁹⁷¹ in the sense of *anivṛtāvyākṛta*,⁹⁷² I for one do not understand how the use of this wider term can indicate a change so long as the more specific term (viz. *vipāka*) is still also used (as it in fact is in texts like the Mahāyānaśaṃgraha)⁹⁷³. In my opinion, it was merely for the sake of clarification, i.e. in order to expressly distinguish the moral indefiniteness (*avyākṛtatva*) of ālayavijñāna from that of (*kliṣṭaṃ*) *manas*, that the indefiniteness of the former was, later on,⁹⁷⁴ explicitly marked as *anivṛta* (though this had always been implicit in its *vipāka* nature), in contradistinction to the moral character of *manas* which had to be determined as *nivṛtāvyākṛta*.⁹⁷⁵

c) As for counter evidence, it should be noted that the restriction of ālayavijñāna to non-saints is, to be sure, expressed in the *Nivṛtti Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* (see § 4.9), but is not found anywhere in the *Basic Section*. On the contrary, the Sacittikā-and-Acittikā Bhūmiḥ expressly states that the only state in which ālayavijñāna has ceased is Extinction where no "possessions" (i.e. skandhas) remain (*nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa*),⁹⁷⁶ i.e. the state of the Saint (*arhat*) after his death. The fact that in this way in the oldest source, in contrast with the later system, ālayavijñāna is not restricted to non-saints but, as a matter of course, taken to exist in Arhats, too, as long as they are still alive, makes it almost certain that ālayavijñāna had, in the beginning, a nature which did not conflict with the state of an Arhat, as Suguro's hypothetical original meaning would, in contrast to mine, certainly do.

7.1B.1 It was only after the decisive parts of the present study had already been written down that I discovered that, in a later paper dealing with the original meaning of the term 'ālayavijñāna',⁹⁷⁷ Suguro had proceeded towards an important modification of his view, essentially anticipating, as far as the original meaning of 'ālayavijñāna' is concerned, the position which I myself had come to adopt in the meantime. For in this article, Suguro distinguishes between the inherited meaning of 'ālaya', viz. "Clinging" (執着, especially in the sense of "Clinging to Self", 我執)⁹⁷⁸ - or "that to which one clings"⁹⁷⁹ -, and a new, specifically Yogācāra meaning which the term 'ālaya' came to adopt in connection with ālayavijñāna, viz. "sticking in" (付着).⁹⁸⁰ Accordingly, he takes 'ālayavijñāna' to mean "the vijñāna which sticks in [the body]" (肉体に付着している識)⁹⁸¹ - a view which is largely (i.e. save that I should lay more stress on the nuance of hiding or being hidden in the body) in agreement with my own one, as is also the fact that Suguro finds this original meaning of 'ālayavijñāna' corroborated by the explanation of this term in Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra V.3⁹⁸² (see § 2.8), though I do not share his opinion that this original meaning of 'ālayavijñāna' is not essentially different from that of the term 'ādānavijñāna'.⁹⁸³

7.1B.2 Yet, in spite of this basic agreement, two points would seem to require discussion. The first point is the fact that even in the above-mentioned paper Suguro still sticks, to a certain extent, to his former view of an initial phase in which ālayavijñāna - still *in statu nascendi* and not yet a clear-cut concept - includes, or is at least nothing but one aspect of an entity which also includes, the aspect of Clinging (to Self). The second point is the interpretation and conclusiveness of the passages from the *Basic Section* of the Yogācārabhūmi on which Suguro bases his new (and, as already stated, substantially acceptable) explanation of the original meaning of the term 'ālayavijñāna'.

7.1B.2.1.1 Suguro seems to be of the opinion that the description of death and rebirth in the Manobhūmi of the *Basic Section*⁹⁸⁴ contains a kind of ālayavijñāna theory *in statu nascendi*. According to him, the purport of this passage is to teach Clinging (to Self) as the cause, and the (arising of a new) body or basis-of-personal-existence (*ātmabhāvavā*)⁹⁸⁵ as the result.⁹⁸⁶ As for the relation of ālayavijñāna to these two aspects, Suguro, declaring that the vagueness of the text does not allow of any decision, finds it reasonable to regard ālayavijñāna as covering both sides,⁹⁸⁷ i.e. to be the *vijñāna* which is clung to as Self (i.e. the result) as well as the *vijñāna* which clings to Self (i.e. the cause),⁹⁸⁸ i.e. both the object and the subject of the function of Clinging (to Self), both aspects being included in the inherited Buddhist meaning of 'ālaya'.⁹⁸⁹

7.1B.2.1.2 Yet, there is, in this piece of text, only one single occurrence of the term 'ālayavijñāna', viz. Y 24, 4f.,⁹⁹⁰ and in this passage ālayavijñāna receives the same somewhat stereotyped characterization as at Y 4,7⁹⁹¹ - a characterization which, according to Suguro himself,⁹⁹² does not give the impression of a concept *in statu nascendi* but rather of a kind of first systematic definition of an already established concept. Besides, ālayavijñāna is, in this passage, unambiguously characterized as [Result-of-]Maturat ion (*vipāka*), i.e. result (of karman and Delight in worldly existence)⁹⁹³, but not as the cause in the sense of [a state of mind directly associated (*samprayukta*) with] the act of Clinging (to Self). Moreover, even this single occurrence of ālayavijñāna is, as I have tried to show above,⁹⁹⁴ palpably heterogeneous to its surroundings and appears to have been inserted - probably by way of revising the earlier parts during the process of the compilation of the *Basic Section*⁹⁹⁵ - into one of the pieces of earlier materials of which the bulk of the text is composed. Since these materials never use the term 'ālayavijñāna' but rather a number of systematically related but less developed (and partly

traditional) terms,⁹⁹⁶ they are obviously "pre-ālayavijñānic". We are thus concerned with two different strata, one of which represents a stage of development in which the theory of ālayavijñāna had already assumed a clear-cut form, and another one which consists of "pre-ālayavijñānic" materials, but none which shows ālayavijñāna *in statu nascendi*. For this reason, the materials of this piece of text have, as far as their original meaning is concerned - and we are, in the present discussion, not interested in what they may have meant for a compiler or redactor who was active a f t e r the concept of ālayavijñāna had already undergone systematical definition -, to be interpreted b y t h e m - s e l v e s , and not on the basis of the tacit presupposition⁹⁹⁷ that the other concepts with similar systematic function these materials contain were, f r o m t h e o u t s e t , conceived of as quasi-synonyms of, or at least as more or less equivalent to, ālayavijñāna.

7.1B.2.1.3 These remarks hold good also for the passage Y 26,18f. (equivalents of 'bīja', including 'satkāya', 'ālaya', 'satkāyadrṣṭy-adhiṣṭhāna' and 'asmimānādhiṣṭhāna')⁹⁹⁸ to which Sūguro refers as evidence for a close connection of the c a u s a l aspect of ālayavijñāna with Clinging to Self,⁹⁹⁹ obviously in the sense that the passage points to ālayavijñāna as directly associated with, i.e. as the s u b j e c t of, the a c t of Clinging to Self.¹⁰⁰⁰

a) Yet, since 'ālaya' is a t r a d i t i o n a l concept, its occurrence does not by any means imply that the passage had, by itself, anything to do with ālaya v i j ñ ā n a . Being equated with 'satkāya', which usually means the five *upādāna-skandhas*,¹⁰⁰¹ 'ālaya', too, will have to be understood rather in the sense of the f i v e u p ā d ā n a - s k a n d h a s as something to which one clings.¹⁰⁰² This interpretation fits in with ālaya being, in our passage, also identified with *upādāna* ("that to which one clings").¹⁰⁰³ It would also be supported by the canonical basis for the quasi-synonymity of 'satkāya', 'prapañca', 'ālaya' and 'upādāna', viz. by the fact that these terms,¹⁰⁰⁴

as well as the five skandhas,¹⁰⁰⁵ are used as the objective complement of expressions meaning "delighting in" (*-abhirata*; *-ārāma*, *-rata*, *-sammudita*).¹⁰⁰⁶ And in view of the preceding sentence it is additionally corroborated by the fact that *ālaya* is, furthermore, identified with Suffering (*duḥkha*); for the preceding sentence had stated that the Tathāgatas have taught that the whole basis-of-existence (*sakala āśrayaḥ*) is Suffering or unsatisfactory in the sense of *saṃskāraduḥkhatā*¹⁰⁰⁷ and had thus alluded to the last sentence of the canonical explanation of the Noble Truth of Suffering, viz. that the five *upādāna-skandhas* are Suffering, thus indicating that in this stratum¹⁰⁰⁸ it is not yet *ālayavijñāna* that represents *duḥkha* in the sense of *saṃskāra-duḥkhatā* but rather the five *upādāna-skandhas*, or the basis(-of-personal-existence) (*āśraya*, a term largely equivalent to '*ātmabhāva*'¹⁰⁰⁹ which had been used before¹⁰¹⁰) constituted by them, or at least by that part or aspect of them which is *vipāka*.¹⁰¹¹

b) Besides, as this basis-of-existence is taught to be Suffering (*duḥkha*) on account of being stricken with (*-upagata*) or having the nature of (*-svabhāva*) Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*)¹⁰¹² which in its turn consists of Seeds (*bīja*),¹⁰¹³ it becomes plausible that '*ālaya*', even in the traditional sense of the five *upādāna-skandhas* or basis-of-personal-existence, can be listed as a quasi-synonym of 'Seed' (*bīja*): because, at this stage of development, it is the psycho-physical basis-of-existence as a whole that is regarded to contain the Seeds, and may even be called to be the Seed(s)¹⁰¹⁴ in so far as the Seeds are not understood as separate entities¹⁰¹⁵ but rather as designations of the fact that the basis-of-personal-existence itself is capable of producing its own future development.¹⁰¹⁶

c) Apart from the fact that the passage under discussion (viz. Y 26,18f.) does not, originally, refer to *ālayavijñāna* at all, it would, even if it did, only document the aspect of the

result (*duḥkha*), or of the o b j e c t of Clinging (*ālaya* and *upādāna* in the sense of *satkāya*), but hardly serve as proof for the assumption that *ālayavijñāna* originally also included an aspect of c a u s e in the sense of consisting in, or being directly associated with, the a c t of C l i n g i n g (to Self). To be sure, Seeds, being the source both of acute forms of Suffering and of Defilements, have also a causal aspect. But this has to be clearly distinguished from *samudayasatya* proper, viz. a c t u a l Clinging or Defilements. And what the passage wants to indicate by equating *ālaya* with *s a t k ā y a d ṛ ṣ ṭ y - a d h i ṣ ṭ h ā n a* and *asmimānādhiṣṭhāna* is certainly n o t that it is the basis of the notion of Ego in the sense of being its " s u b j e c t ". Such a statement, it is true, would not be entirely wrong if *ālaya* is the *ātmabhāva* because the notion of Ego would of course arise within or on the basis of this *ātmabhāva*. But there would be no reason for stating this for *satkāyadrṣṭi* and *asmimāna* s o l e l y, because it holds good for a l l Defilements and even for good (*kuśala*) mental factors. Thus, the text wants rather to state that *ālaya* (i.e., according to my interpretation, the *ātmabhava*) is the o b j e c t of the notion of Ego¹⁰¹⁷, or, more precisely, the objective basis which *satkāyadrṣṭi* erroneously takes as Self or as one's own and to which the feeling of identity (*asmimāna*) refers; and this, special instances apart, does n o t hold good for a l l Defilements and is thus rightly stated with s p e c i f i c reference to *satkāyadrṣṭi* and *asmimāna*. This interpretation is confirmed both by the explanation given in the *Yogācārabhūmi-vyākhyā*¹⁰¹⁸ as also by other instances of '*adhiṣṭhāna*' being used in a sense close to "object".¹⁰¹⁹ What is more, the text of the *Manobhūmi* itself had, a little earlier, expressly taught that the basis-of-personal-existence (*ātmabhāva*) is conceived of by foolish people as 'I' or 'Mine' (corresponding to *satkāyadrṣṭi*) or in the form of "I am [this]" (corresponding to *asmimāna*), but is known by the Noble Ones to be Suffering (*duḥkha*),¹⁰²⁰ i.e. that the *ātmabhāva* - which is qualified as containing all S e e d s in the adjoining

sentences¹⁰²¹ - is (in reality) S u f f e r i n g but also the o b j e c t i v e b a s i s o f s a t k ā y a d ṛ ṣ ṭ i a n d a s m i m ā n a , which is precisely the same as what I take Y 26,18f. to mean.

7.1B.2.1.4 1. As for the commentary on the Paramāthagāthās, Suguro, in his paper under discussion, realizes that ālayavijñāna, being comprised in *duḥkha(satya)*, represents the aspect of result (果) only.¹⁰²² But he still asserts that the text propounds, in the verses + commentary on spiritual practice (*dharma-caryā*),¹⁰²³ a kind of central subject or depth layer ("8th *viññāna*")¹⁰²⁴ consisting of one single *viññāna* which comprises b o t h the aspect of r e s u l t (*duḥkha(satya)*, corresponding to ālayavijñāna) a n d the aspect of c a u s e (*samudaya-(satya)*, corresponding to *kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ*).¹⁰²⁵ This central subject comprising both ālayavijñāna and *kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ* is, according to Suguro, even the subject of practice, which attains liberation by means of the *pratipakṣa*¹⁰²⁶ - a view which is in accordance with the fact that Suguro takes the Paramāthagāthās to teach that Defiled Mind (*kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ*) is non-different from "mind radiant (i.e. pure) by nature" (*prakṛti-prabhāsvaraṃ cittam*).¹⁰²⁷

2.a) Yet, as I understand the text, it does not at all support such an interpretation. The pertinent verses + commentary do not, as Suguro suggests, focus on ālayavijñāna and *kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ* as two aspects of one and the same (continuous) central subject but clearly stress quite the opposite point of view, viz. the fact that there is, in reality, n o s u b j e c t , neither of "transmigration" (*saṃsāra*) nor of liberation,¹⁰²⁸ neither a person nor even a dharma.¹⁰²⁹ And, though using the same term, they do not speak of anything akin to the specific Yogācāra concept of *kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ*, let alone a depth layer of mind of which *manas* and ālayavijñāna are only two aspects.

b) To be sure, the commentary on PG 37¹⁰³⁰ mentions ālayavijñāna, but by characterizing it as Suffering (*duḥkha*) and equating it with the "lake" (*saras*) to be dried up by spiritual practice the author shows that he is, in this passage, concerned

with ālayavijñāna not as a central subject but as a representative and source of misery, and that he is not interested in its continuity but in its eradication.

c) Similarly, PG 38 - provided that I understand this difficult verse correctly - focusses upon the falseness and the ensnaring effect of the notion of 'I'¹⁰³¹ which is taught to refer to (what is in reality nothing but) Suffering (*duḥkha*). Thus, supposing that we are, in view of the preceding verse, actually entitled to equate, from the point of view of the commentary, this Suffering (*duḥkha*) with ālayavijñāna although the commentary, this time, refrains from expressly doing so, what is stressed in PG 38 would, once again, not be its function as a continuous entity in the conventional sense of a series of moments, let alone its being an aspect of the subject which attains liberation, but rather its negative character: its ultimate unsatisfactoriness and its not being Ego - a point of view which is in full agreement with the title of the verses, viz. "Stanzas on Ultimate Reality" (*paramārtha-gāthāḥ*), Ultimate Reality being, in the commentary, expressly defined as "lack of Self in the sense of Person" (*pudgala-nairātmya*).¹⁰³²

d) This point of view is even radicalized in the subsequent verses (PG 39-41, on understanding the "process" of liberation¹⁰³³) the sole and emphatically expressed purport of which is to show that there is - from the ultimate point of view, of course - no "subject" which could be liberated, not even mind, let alone Self, and that therefore liberation cannot be understood as a process proper happening to one and the same substratum, as a transition of an identical subject from the state of Pollution into the state of Purity, but rather as a replacement of a defiled (state-of-)mind by another one which is pure.¹⁰³⁴ The (unexpressed) reason is, of course, the momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) of all dharmas, which had been stressed in the initial portion of the Paramārthagāthās.¹⁰³⁵ Defiled mind (*kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ*), being, from the ultimate point of view, a defiled moment of mind, has to be

regarded as arising and ceasing, invariably, together with the Defilements¹⁰³⁶ (i.e. the mental associates - momentary they, too - which constitute its being defiled). Due to its momentariness, defiled mind cannot pre-exist nor survive the Defilements; it was thus never free from them before, nor can it be freed from them in future,¹⁰³⁷ but rather it is defiled "for ever",¹⁰³⁸ i.e. for the whole of its existence (which, however, lasts but one moment). Similarly, the pure (moment of) mind was not defiled before¹⁰³⁹ (because on account of its momentariness it did not yet exist at the time when the Defilements were there) and is thus pure by nature (*prakṛtibhāsvara*).¹⁰⁴⁰

e) This interpretation of PG 39-41 is, as far as I can see, the only one which both fits the wording and yields a sequential argument and is at the same time in full harmony with the general purport of the Paramārthagāthās and their commentary; and in keeping with it, '*kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ*' is clearly nothing but a metrical equivalent of '*kliṣṭaṃ cittaṃ*', which would mean a ny "defiled [moment of] mind" in the traditional sense of sense-perception and - especially - *manovijñāna*.¹⁰⁴¹ There is no indication in the text, nor any need in the argument, for taking '*kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ*', in PG 39-41, as referring to an aspect of the depth layer of mind prefiguring the *kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ* of later Yogācāra dogmatics.¹⁰⁴² Similarly, the pure mind which is "radiant by nature" is any moment of supramundane (*mano*)*viññāna* in the traditional sense but does not involve anything like the *prabhāsvaram cittaṃ* of the Tathāgatagarbha tradition or Paramārtha's *amalaviññāna*.

7.1B.2.2.1 1. Another point in Suguro's interpretation of the Paramārthagāthās and their commentary which needs discussion - and this brings me to the second issue, viz. the interpretation of the Yogācārabhūmi passages on which Suguro bases his new explanation of the term '*ālayaviññāna*' - is his interpretation of the term '*nīveśana*' and its relation to *ālayaviññāna* in the vicinity of which it occurs in the commentary on PG 33(-34).¹⁰⁴³ Suguro stresses the semantical closeness of '*nīveśana*' and '*ālaya*', stating that both of them may mean "dwelling

place, residence" (住居) as well as "clinging to" (執着) and "sticking in" (付着).¹⁰⁴⁴ Now, '*niveśana*' is explained, by the commentary itself, as '*ātmabhāva-parigraha*' which Suguro takes, in the present context concerned with the formation of a (new) *ātmabhāva*, i.e. with the result (i.e. *duḥkha(satya)*) and not with the cause (i.e. *samudaya(satya)*),¹⁰⁴⁵ to mean "maintenance of the body" (肉体を維持すること).¹⁰⁴⁶ Hence he concludes that '*niveśana*' is, in this passage, used in the sense of "sticking in the body" (肉体に付着している)¹⁰⁴⁷ and that therefore, in view of the equivalence of '*niveśana*' and '*ālaya*', '*ālayavijñāna*' should mean "*vijñāna* which sticks in the body".¹⁰⁴⁸

2. Yet, there are at least two problematic issues involved here.

a) One is that, as far as I can see, '*ātmabhāvaparigraha*' is hardly ever used in the sense of biological appropriation (implying maintenance of the body) but usually¹⁰⁴⁹ refers to the moment of Linking up (*pratisandhi*) and means "taking possession of a [new] (basis of) personal existence",¹⁰⁵⁰ the term '*ātmabhāva*' being, in this connection, not restricted to the body but used in a broader sense including, e.g., an existence in the Immaterial Sphere (*ārūpya-dhātu*).¹⁰⁵¹

b) The second issue is the equivalence of '*niveśana*' and '*ālaya*'. To be sure, both '*niveśana*' and '*ālaya*' can mean "coming to stick in"; the participles '*niviṣṭa*' and '*ālīna*' are in fact used in Buddhist texts as quasi-synonyms in the sense of "sticking to".¹⁰⁵² But the present passage poses problems from the syntactical point of view. For it appears that Suguro equates '*niveśana*' with '*ālaya*' because he regards *niveśana* as the (typical) function of *ālayavijñāna* on the understanding that, in the sentence '*tad dhi* (or *tad(-) vi-*) *niveśanaṃ kṛtvā tenôpaiti prapañcitam*', the pronoun '*tad*', representing *ālayavijñāna*, is the grammatical subject of '*niveśanaṃ kṛ-*'¹⁰⁵³ (which in this case is best taken as a unified verbal expression). This assumption is, however, not very probable and would at any rate be irreconcilable with the verse text, where the

s u b j e c t is without doubt " p e o p l e " (*lokaḥ*: PG 33a), whereas that which is ultimately Suffering, i.e., according to the commentary, *ālayaviijñāna*, is the logical o b j e c t of '*niveśanaṃ kṛ-*' (PG 34ab; for details see App. II, especially n. 1474(A)).

3. As far as I can see, the passage can be interpreted more or less in Suguro's sense only if it is admissible to take, in '*tad dhi* (or *tad(-) vi-*) *niveśanaṃ kṛtvā*', '*(vi)niveśana*' in a c a u s a t i v e sense and to render the expression by "after having made it (sc. *ālayaviijñāna*) enter [upon a new existence], or s t i c k or h i d e in [a new body]" (see n. 1474(C.c)). At least under the latter aspects '*niveśana*' would, if its causative function is disregarded, in fact come close to '*ālaya*' in the sense of "coming to stick, or hide, in"; the more so since in the *Madhyamakakārikās* '*saṃ- n i - v i ś -*' is actually used to denote the settling down of *viijñāna* in a new existence¹⁰⁵⁴ and even seems to be equated with '*saṃ-mūrch-*' (see § 3.3.1.1 + n. 239) by Candrakīrti.¹⁰⁵⁵ On the other hand, '*niveśana*' would also come close to '*ālaya*' if it is, in the sentence '*tad dhi* (or *tad(-) vi-*) *niveśanaṃ kṛtvā*', taken in the locative/objective sense, viz. as "what one sticks to (i.e. takes possession of)"¹⁰⁵⁶ or "abode" (see n. 1474(C.a)); indeed, this alternative may even be the more probable one in view of the fact that what is stuck to, viz. *duḥkha* (equated, in the PG comm., with *ālayaviijñāna*!), occurs as the object of *ā-lī-* in canonical passages like MN I 233 (see n. 1444(A)). Thus, though not denying the semantic affinity between '*niveśana*' and '*ālaya*' nor the fact that this affinity was probably realized by the commentator and may even have stimulated him to avail himself of *ālayaviijñāna* (see § 6.7.2.2.b), I still find it o p e n t o d o u b t that it was, in the present passage, under the aspect of s t i c k i n g i n t h e b o d y that this affinity was felt.

7.1B.2.2.2 According to Suguro, the remaining references to *ālayaviijñāna* in the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* are too fragmentary to yield any useful information with regard to

the question of the original meaning of the term, but he draws attention, in this connection, to a passage from the Śrāvakabhūmi where not *ālaya vijñāna* but at least *ālaya* occurs in connection with *āśrayasanniviṣṭa*, i.e. sticking in the basis-of-existence. The passage specifies one of the five foremost characteristics of a person not "destined" for Extinction and runs as follows:¹⁰⁵⁷

... *aparīnirvāṇadharmasya pudgalasyāḍita evālayatrṣṇā sarve-
ṇa sarvaṃ sarvathā ca sarvabuddhair āśrayasanniviṣṭā aprahā-
ṇadharminī bhavaty anutsādyā* (Y_t , Y_c) *dūrāṇu>gatā* (Y_c) *pra-
gāḍhasanniviṣṭā* / ...

Though admitting that the sequence of words, especially the position of '*āśrayasanniviṣṭā*',¹⁰⁵⁸ is somewhat strange, I should, making a reasonable sense my guideline, propose the following translation:

"In the case of a person who by nature will never attain Extinction, *ālayatrṣṇā*, sticking in his basis[-of-personal-existence] from the very beginning, is not at all, by any means, liable to be abandoned and cannot be eradicated, [not even] with [the help of] all the Buddhas, [since it has] deeply permeated¹⁰⁵⁹ [it] (or: permeated [it] for a long time) [and] sticks [in it] most firmly."

Suguro suggests that we understand '*ālaya-trṣṇā*' as a synonym compound,¹⁰⁶⁰ which means that the sentence would express the idea that desire = *ālaya* sticks in the basis-of-existence (i.e. in the *śaḍāyatana* or even in the body). My own impression is rather that the expression '*ālaya-trṣṇā*' alludes to MN I 167 etc. (*ālayārāmā pañāyaṃ pajā*, etc.)¹⁰⁶¹, referring to people as unable to understand the salvific Doctrine and thus somehow related to the *aparīnirvāṇadharmāḥ pudgalāḥ* of the present passage. At MN I 167, however, I should prefer to understand '*ālaya*' in the "objective" sense of "what one clings to", i.e. the sense-objects or sensual pleasures (*kāmaguṇa*) and (one's basis of) personal existence (*ātmabhāva*).¹⁰⁶² Thus, in the present passage, too, '*ālaya-*

-*trṣṇā*' probably means "desire for objects-of-Clinging [like sensual pleasures or (one's basis of) personal existence]".

This would seem to be confirmed, in substance, by a passage from the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*¹⁰⁶³ where Thirst (*trṣṇā*) is taught to arise, with regard to neither-painful-nor-pleasant sensations (or what goes with them), in the form of "continuous attachment to the object-of-Clinging consisting in (the basis of) personal existence"¹⁰⁶⁴ (**nityānubaddhātmabhāvālaya-sneha*). If we understand - as Ch. (... 而藏愛) appears to do - '*ālaya-sneha*' as a synonym compound, it will not be easy to indicate a reason for the use of the redundant '*ālaya*' because '*ātmabhāva-sneha*' (which is actually met with at Y 18,21) would have sufficed. On the other hand, if we start from '*ālayasneha*' as an expression related to the '*ālayā-rāma*', etc., of MN I 167 and take '*ālaya*', like Tib. (*gzi*), in the "objective" sense, there is good reason to qualify it by '*ātmabhāva-*' because in the present passage desire for o t h e r objects of Clinging, viz. sensual pleasures or sense-objects, is n o t intended since they have already been dealt with in the preceding sentences.¹⁰⁶⁵ In the Śrāvakabhūmi passage under discussion, however, '*ālaya*' is n o t qualified and should therefore include sense-objects, too.

If this interpretation of the Śrāvakabhūmi passage is correct, it would, to be sure, document that d e s i r e (*trṣṇā*)^{1065a} may, like Badness (*daṣṭhulya*) or the Seeds (*bīja*),¹⁰⁶⁶ be said to stick in the basis-of-personal-existence, but it would n o t prove the same idea for *ā l a y a*.

Although I have thus to disagree with Suguro as regards the conclusiveness of the Yogācārabhūmi passages he adduces in favour of "*viññāna* sticking in [the body]" as the original meaning of '*ālayaviññāna*', I am nevertheless convinced that his view is substantially correct because it is supported not only by Saṃdh V.3 but also by my *Initial Passage* from the *Samāhitā Bhūmiḥ* (see § 2.1) of which, however, Suguro has made no use.

7.2 In an attempt to contribute to the solution of the problem of the origin of ālayavijñāna (in the wider sense: cp. § 1.4), Y. Sasaki¹⁰⁶⁷ has presented a detailed investigation of the notion of *upādāna* and its relation to *viññāna*, especially in the concept of *sopādānaṃ viññānaṃ*, in older Yogācāra literature, in order to clarify its impact on the formation of the ālayavijñāna theory.

7.2.1 According to Sasaki, the notion of *sopādānaṃ viññānaṃ* had, in early (i.e. "pre-ālayavijñānic") Yogācāra thought (mainly represented, in this context, by the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī and the Abhidharmasamuccaya [in so far as the latter has preserved some old materials]), come to combine four distinct elements: 1. containing Seeds (*bīja*); 2. leading to rebirth or "taking possession" (*ādāna*)¹⁰⁶⁸ of a new existence; 3. appropriating (*upādā-*) corporeal matter or the material sense-faculties; 4. being defiled (*kliṣṭa*).¹⁰⁶⁹ Sasaki then ventures the hypothesis that this defiled *viññāna* containing Seeds was, in view of its function of taking possession of [a new existence] (*ādāna*) and of biologically appropriating [corporeal matter] (*upādāna*), called '*ādāna viññāna*'. Later on, it received the name of '*ālayavijñāna*' in order to stress the aspect of Defilement, i.e. Clinging (執著), including Clinging to Self, as Sasaki makes clear by referring to Suguro's (earlier) view that the original meaning of '*ālaya*' (in '*ālayavijñāna*') was "Clinging to Self" (我執).¹⁰⁷⁰ Afterwards, *ādānaviññāna* and *ālayavijñāna* were made use of in the context of unconscious states like *nīrodhasamāpatti*, and it was only then that they were transformed into a non-defiled neutral (*anivṛtāvyākṛta*) entity, subliminal and different from the ordinary six kinds of *viññāna*, the defiled aspect being rendered independent as *kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ*.¹⁰⁷¹

7.2.2 I substantially agree with Sasaki's view in so far as he, too, regards the origin of ālayavijñāna, as a kind of *viññāna* different from the ordinary six, to be linked up with

reflections on unconscious states like *nīrodhasamāpatti*. But I doubt if he is right in thinking that the term was already in existence before, having first been used in an altogether different meaning, viz. "mind [characterized by the subjective act of] Clinging". Such an alleged original meaning of the term is, as has already been shown in § 7.1A.2.3, neither necessary nor supported by any textual evidence and thus, to say the least, handicapped by *kalpanāgaurava*.

On the contrary, if one follows the evidence of the oldest sources in chronological sequence (see § 1.6) – as one will, in the absence of cogent reasons to the contrary, certainly have to –, one will have to start from the fact that the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* contains only instances of *ālayavijñāna* being associated with *upādāna* in the biological sense of appropriation of the body or the material sense-faculties (see §§ 2.13.4, 3.2, and 4.4.1). This function, however, has to be strictly distinguished from *sopādānaṃ vijñānaṃ*. For although in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* passage treated in § 4.3¹⁰⁷² and adduced by Sasaki¹⁰⁷³ both are declared to be functions of *vijñāna* as Nourishment (*āhāra*), they are clearly distinguished as two different functions, and neither expressly nor implicitly characterized as mutually dependent or co-extensive. On the contrary, they are quite obviously not co-extensive, because in the Saint (*arhat*) *vijñāna* does still appropriate the body (in the sense of still keeping it alive) but is no longer *sopādāna*¹⁰⁷⁴ because this term always implies one's being under the sway of Clinging or Defilements and thus bound to be reborn.

Now, as already pointed out in § 7.1A.2.3.c, in the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the extension of *ālayavijñāna* covers also the Saint (*arhat*), as long as he is alive, and thus coincides with the extension of *upādāna* in the sense of biological appropriation.

Thus, it is only the *upādāna* semantically hardly equivalent to *ālaya* (see § 2.9) which is associated with *ālaya*-

viññāna in the oldest pertinent layer of Yogācāra literature, whereas the spiritually negative kind of *upādāna* (as in *sopādānaṃ viññānam*), which could be synonymous with *ālaya*, is not yet connected with it. This means that *sopādānaṃ viññānam* (be it directly or by mediation of the term '*ādānaviññāna*') is hardly the starting-point of the concept of *ālayaviññāna* but rather came to influence it only at a somewhat later stage of development.

Actually, a kind of first step in this direction - manifested also by a change of terminology ('*ādānaviññāna*') - can be found in the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* (see § 4.4), but a theory of *ālayaviññāna* in which the word '*sopādāna*' is actually referred to *ālayaviññāna* and in which the latter, being missing in Arhats, is actually co-extensive with *sopādānaṃ viññānam* (and not with *upādāna* in the biological sense) is only found in the *Nivṛtti Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* (§ 4.7). Even in this text, *ālayaviññāna* is not defiled (*kliṣṭa*), thus not identical with *sopādānaṃ viññānam* in so far as this concept may involve direct association with actual Clinging.

All evidence thus telling, also from the point of view of *upādāna* and *sopādānaṃ viññānam*, against the possibility that *ālayaviññāna* was ever understood in the sense of actual Clinging (to Self, etc.), the assumption that (*kliṣṭaṃ*) *manaḥ* originated as a kind of breaking away of *ālayaviññāna*'s defiled aspect does not receive corroboration from this side either. What can, however, be said is that in the *Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya* (§ 4.10.1) *manas*, afterwards, seems to have taken over the role of *ālayaviññāna* as a kind of principle of Pollution (*saṃkleṣa*) which the close association of the latter with *sopādānaṃ viññānam* had entailed in the *Nivṛtti Portion* but which conflicted with its original function (see § 4.9).

7.3.0 Another context which has recently been examined as to whether it may have played a decisive role in the formation of the *ālayaviññāna* theory is the exegesis of the canonical statement that *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa* are mutually depend-

ent. In the Mahāyānasamgraha,¹⁰⁷⁵ this mutual dependence is in fact used as a proof for the existence of ālayavijñāna. As the comparison of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa* with two reed bunches mutually supporting each other shows, the canonical source the author has in mind, at least primarily, is the Naḍakalāpikāsūtra.¹⁰⁷⁶ But *Asvabhāva's commentary makes use of passages from other Sūtras as well, one of them stemming from the Mahānidānasūtra,¹⁰⁷⁷ the other from the Nagarasūtra.¹⁰⁷⁸

7.3.1 In a recent contribution F. Enomoto¹⁰⁷⁹ - obviously realizing the importance of clarifying, in quest of the origin of ālayavijñāna, the earliest occurrences of this term in a given context (cp. § 1.5) - has tried to find out if the connection between the exegesis of these Sūtras or the mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa* on the one hand, and ālayavijñāna on the other, can be traced back to the Yogācārabhūmi. The result is largely negative. In the exegesis of the Nagarasūtra¹⁰⁸⁰ and the Naḍakalāpikāsūtra¹⁰⁸¹ (and also that of the Mahānidānasūtra)¹⁰⁸² found in the Vastusamgrahaṇī, ālayavijñāna is not even mentioned, let alone its being explicitly introduced as a means for solving an exegetical or dogmatic difficulty. The same is true of an analysis of the twelve-membered *pratītyasamutpāda* found both in the Vastusamgrahaṇī¹⁰⁸³ and in the Savitarkādi-bhūmi of the *Basic Section*¹⁰⁸⁴ (henceforward: *Pratīty. Analysis*) - a passage which includes an interpretation of the mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa*¹⁰⁸⁵ and an express reference to the reed bunch comparison.¹⁰⁸⁶ Nor does ālayavijñāna appear in another passage of the Savitarkādi-bhūmi of the *Basic Section* concerned with the exegesis of the mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa*¹⁰⁸⁷ and with the exegesis of the Nagarasūtra.¹⁰⁸⁸ What is most important is that the context of the mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa* does not even figure among the proofs for the existence of ālayavijñāna presented in the *Proof Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*.¹⁰⁸⁹ Therefore, Enomoto surmises that it was only in the Mahāyānasamgraha that this mutual dependence was, for the first time, made use of in order to prove the existence of

ālayavijñāna.¹⁰⁹⁰ The Nagarasūtra, according to Enomoto, even seems to have come in as late as *Asvabhāva.¹⁰⁹¹

To be sure, this does not necessarily mean that the context of the mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa* did not, even earlier, contain starting points which could be developed into, or later on be connected with, ālayavijñāna. Enomoto himself points to the fact that in the *Pratīty. Analysis viññāna* depending - *yathāyogam* - on *nāman* (i.e. the immediately preceding moment of *viññāna*) and *rūpa* (i.e. the corresponding material sense-faculty), even though it is expressly identified with the six (ordinary) kinds of *viññāna*, is said to arise, on this basis, as long as life lasts,¹⁰⁹² and he thinks that such a statement may, in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, have come to be realized to imply the necessity of assuming ālayavijñāna,¹⁰⁹³ especially when it came to be understood in a strict sense, requiring application even to unconscious states like *nirodhasamāpatti*.¹⁰⁹⁴

7.3.2 According to Y. Kajiyama, however, the significance of the *Pratīty. Analysis* for the origin of the ālayavijñāna theory is much greater. In his view - provided I understand him correctly - the exegesis of the relation between *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa* played an important if not the decisive role in the formation of the concept of ālayavijñāna. To be more precise, what he considers as a major or even the main cause of this concept is the problem of the implicit "doubling" of *viññāna* on account of its being also included in *nāman*¹⁰⁹⁵ according to a canonical definition of *nāmarūpa*:¹⁰⁹⁶ a problem that became particularly acute in the context of the mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa*¹⁰⁹⁷ as exposed in the *Naḍakalāpikāsūtra* and, according to Kajiyama, especially in the *Nagarasūtra*.¹⁰⁹⁸ To be sure, Kajiyama is aware of the fact that *Asvabhāva - whose commentary on MSg I.36 seems to be the oldest document we possess for an explicit proof of ālayavijñāna on the basis of the *Nagarasūtra*¹⁰⁹⁹ - is comparatively late;¹¹⁰⁰ but he expresses the opinion that the argument may reflect the situation of the origin of ālayavijñāna

because it is presented by *Asvabhāva in connection with his interpretation of Asaṅga's proofs for the existence of ālayavijñāna.¹¹⁰¹

It is in accordance with this view that Kajiyama is inclined to a somewhat different evaluation of the *Pratīty. Analysis*. To be sure, he too, though hesitatingly,¹¹⁰² accepts that the *pratisandhiphala-* or *vipāka-vijñāna* is, in this text, not distinguished from the six ordinary kinds of *vijñāna*, and is thus not yet ālayavijñāna.¹¹⁰³ But he finds it somewhat strange that this *vipākavijñāna* at the moment of conception - which he regards as subliminal - is identified with the ordinary *vijñānas*,¹¹⁰⁴ and he thinks that it was therefore, by way of fusion with the continuous flow of subconscious Impressions (*vāsanā*) of former thoughts and actions, transformed into a continuous subliminal entity different from the ordinary *vijñānas*, and thus became *sarvabījakaṃ vijñānam*, i.e. ālayavijñāna.¹¹⁰⁵

7.3.3 Even *ceteris paribus*, the mere fact that textual evidence, at least explicit textual evidence, for a connection of ālayavijñāna with the context of the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* is not found before the Mahāyānasamgraha, and, as regards its being specifically connected with the exegesis of the Nagarasūtra, even not before *Asvabhāva, would seem to render Kajiyama's hypothesis less probable than mine, viz. that the concept of ālayavijñāna was introduced (in the strict sense of § 1.4) in the context of *nīrodhasamāpatti* - an assumption for which unambiguous textual evidence is available in the earliest pertinent source (see § 2.1). There is no guarantee that *Asvabhāva, in commenting upon the arguments of the Mahāyānasamgraha, has always preserved the original meaning or had recourse to ancient materials only; it is quite usual for Indian commentators to interpret the basic text in terms of their own ideas or at least of the philosophical or dogmatic developments of their own time.

Apart from this, as far as I can see, the context of the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* does not satisfy the requirements stipulated in § 1.7 as perfectly as the *nīro-*

dhasamāpatti context does. I shall present my arguments, preliminary though they are, in the following paragraphs (§§ 7.3.4 and 7.3.5).

7.3.4 F i r s t l y , I so far fail to see, in the context of the mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa* and particularly of the "doubling" of *viññāna*, a reason that made the introduction of a new kind of *viññāna* as imperative as in the case of *nirodhasamāpatti*.

7.3.4.1 1. To be sure, in the latter case, too, the earliest Yogācāras seem to have simply kept, without any sense of difficulty, to the doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins who maintained, equally without any difficulty, that *nirodhasamāpatti* is unconscious (*acittikā*) in the strict sense that in it all kinds of mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) temporarily cease to arise.¹¹⁰⁶ But their own version of the Dharmadinnāsūtra (etc.), decisively diverging from that of the Sarvāstivādins by expressly postulating the presence of *viññāna* in *nirodhasamāpatti*, soon forced the Yogācāras to reconsider the matter and to introduce a new kind of *viññāna* (§ 2.3-4).

2. In the case of the mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa*, the Sarvāstivādins/Vaibhāṣikas, though amply discussing the question why, in the Nagarasūtra, *pratītyasamutpāda* as the principle of origination-and-continuance (*pravṛtti*)¹¹⁰⁷ is not carried on beyond *viññāna*¹¹⁰⁸, do not seem to have felt substantial difficulties either, at least as far as the problem of "doubling" of *viññāna*¹¹⁰⁹ is concerned. They simply said that in this context¹¹¹⁰ *nāmarūpa* means the four [entities attached] to which mind persists [in *saṃsāra*] (*viññānasthiti*)¹¹¹¹, i.e. the remaining skandhas¹¹¹² e x c e p t v i j ñ ā n a¹¹¹³. Thus, they regarded, in the present context, *viññāna* as n o t being included in *nāman*¹¹¹⁴.

3.a. As for the earliest Yogācāras, I have to admit that the statements on the mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa* in the Yogācārabhūmi - some of which I do not find to be, in every regard, clear and coherent - need more careful investigation. But

I fail to perceive any indication, let alone explicit statement, to the effect that the "doubling" of *viññāna* was felt to be an inevitable consequence of the mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa* or, at least, to entail serious difficulties. For although the pertinent passages do not deny that *nāman* includes, or even primarily consists of, *viññāna*¹¹¹⁵, at least some of them *de facto* (though not explicitly) avoid the difficulty of a "doubling" of *viññāna* by interpreting the mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa* less strictly than the Vaibhāṣikas (who stress simultaneity)¹¹¹⁶; rather, similar to certain Sautrāntikas¹¹¹⁷ who denied causal relations between simultaneous entities,¹¹¹⁸ they distribute the mutual relation as a whole,¹¹¹⁹ or at least the correlates *viññāna* and *nāman*, to different phases of time.

b) As for the dependence of *viññāna* on *nāmarūpa*, one passage - closely following the wording of the Mahānidānasūtra¹¹²⁰ - merely states that *viññāna* is dependent on *nāmarūpa* in the sense that it comes to be established in the latter.¹¹²¹ This statement might seem to imply a "doubling" of *viññāna*,¹¹²² but in a more elaborate explanation of the same Sūtra as well as in the closely related *Pratīty. Analysis* the dependence of *viññāna* on *nāmarūpa* - expressly stated to obtain from Linking up onward (**pratisandhim upādāya*¹¹²³) - is rather stated to mean that *viññāna* (i.e. the six ordinary kinds of *viññāna*) arises on the basis of, respectively,¹¹²⁴ the (corresponding) simultaneous material sense-faculty (= *rūpa*) and the immediately preceding *viññāna* (= *mana-indriya*) identified with *nāman*.¹¹²⁵

c) In the case of the dependence of *nāmarūpa* on *viññāna*, there is a certain ambiguity as to whether the latter is taken to be α) the *viññāna* of the prior existence which, being under the sway of karmic Impressions, is the cause (*hetu*) of the *viññāna* at the moment of Linking up (*pratisandhi-(phala-)**viññāna*)¹¹²⁶ and thereby of the *nāmarūpa* of the new existence, or β) the *pratisandhi-(phala-)**viññāna* itself, or γ) both of them¹¹²⁷. In the former case,¹¹²⁸ *viññāna* clearly

p r e c e d e s *nāmarūpa*. But - in contrast to later sources¹¹²⁹ - in some Yogācārabhūmi passages¹¹³⁰ even the *pratisandhi*-(*phala*-)*viññāna* would seem to admit of being understood as p r e - c e d i n g , by one moment, the formation of *nāmarūpa*, of which it is the condition (*pratyaya*) by way of taking possession of [pre-embryonic matter consisting in] semen-cum-blood. To be sure, this *nāmarūpa* is, in one passage, stated not to perish as long as it is not devoid of *viññāna*,¹¹³¹ but this is, more probably, merely a lax formulation where *nāmarūpa* means m a t t e r i n s o f a r a s i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e d b y m i n d , i.e. l i v i n g c o r p o r e a l m a t t e r .

d) In any case, the pertinent statements of the Yogācārabhūmi, though occasionally somewhat imprecise, do not, at least not necessarily, involve a "doubling" of *viññāna*, let alone indicate a clear awareness of unsurmountable difficulties which might have rendered the introduction of a new kind of *viññāna* inevitable. Such difficulties were bound to arise only under additional restrictions (e.g. that *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa* must be, in accordance with the reed bunch simile,¹¹³² strictly simultaneous a n d that *nāman* has to include *viññāna*), or when unconscious states like *nirodhasamāpatti* came to be taken into consideration in this context (as, however, does n o t seem to be the case in any of the pertinent Yogācārabhūmi passages).

7.3.4.2 Even such a consideration of unconscious states would not seem, however, to have necessarily entailed the assumption of a new kind of *viññāna*. To be sure, if the mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa* was understood in a very strict sense, i.e. as obtaining a l w a y s¹¹³³ in its e n - t i r e t y , it would have led to such a consequence. But it would then likewise have entailed the existence of corporeal matter in the case of beings living in the immaterial sphere (*ārūpyadhātu*), as is said to have in fact been accepted by some schools or masters like the Sarvāstivāda teacher Buddhadeva¹¹³⁴. The earliest Yogācāras, however, were content with having, in *ārūpyadhātu*, *viññāna* based on (*nāman* and) the S e e d s o f

matter (*rūpabīja*) only.¹¹³⁵ So one would have to show what prevented them from proposing a similar solution, viz. corporeal matter being based on the S e e d s of mind, in the case of *nīrodhasamāpatti*, by resorting, e.g., to the theory that mind and corporeal matter contained the Seeds of each other (§ 2.5).

7.3.4.3 Yet, one might suspect that the Yogācāras, in their exegesis of the mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa*, were forced to subscribe to additional restrictions by specific elements of the wording of their recension (i.e. the Mūlasarvāstivāda version) of the pertinent¹¹³⁶ Sūtras. However, as far as I can see, the Mūlasarvāstivāda version of these Sūtras (Naḍa-kalāpikā^(c)-, Nagara- and Mahānidānasūtra¹¹³⁷)¹¹³⁸ does not seem to have contained any element which might have required or suggested such restrictions and at the same time was missing in the version of the Sarvāstivādins. In the case of the Nagarasūtra, the Mūlasarvāstivāda version is even l e s s strict than the Sarvāstivāda version, because, in contrast to the latter,¹¹³⁹ it simply stops with *viññāna* and states that the Bodhisattva's mind returned from that point¹¹⁴⁰ but, l a c k i n g as it does the decisive phrases on the dependence of *viññāna* on *nāmarūpa*, does n o t express m u t u a l dependence.¹¹⁴¹

7.3.4.4 Therefore, my impression is that it was not exegetical difficulties in the interpretation of the mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa* that led to the introduction of ālayaviññāna; the latter was rather - enabling as it does a more elegant solution - made use of in this context only a f t e r it had already come to be introduced for some o t h e r reason; and the various restrictions¹¹⁴² on which the conclusiveness of the proof for the existence of ālayaviññāna based on the mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa* rests would seem to have been introduced somewhat wilfully precisely in order to turn this dependence into such a proof.¹¹⁴³

7.3.5 S e c o n d l y , apart from the fact, discussed in the preceding paragraph (7.3.4), that in the context of the mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa* the introduction of a new kind of *viññāna* does not appear to have been as imperative as in the context of *nirodhasamāpatti*, it would also seem difficult to explain why, if, for all that, such a new kind of *viññāna* was in fact introduced in the former context, it was called precisely ' ā l a y a viññāna '. As far as I can see, this name would in this connection make good sense only in the s p e c i a l context of *viññāna* merging into (*saṃ-mūrch-*) (pre-)embryonic matter, i.e. of *viññāna* at the moment of conception (see §§ 3.3.1.2-3 and 6.3.2), and perhaps also of *viññāna* in the early embryonic state, but I should consider this *viññāna* to be, on account of its faintness, a problem on its own,¹¹⁴⁴ irrespective of whether the mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa* was felt to provoke exegetical difficulties or not.¹¹⁴⁵

7.3.6.1 In this connection, Kajiyama's suggestion¹¹⁴⁶ that the *vipāka-* or *pratisandhiphala-viññāna* of the *Pratītya*. *Anal-* *ysis* may have needed reconsideration is quite important. But I doubt that the problems which he finds to be involved in this *vipākaviññāna* were also felt by the earliest Yogācāras to such an extent as to become, so to speak, the igniting spark which - by way of fusion of this *vipākaviññāna* with the continuous flow of subconscious Impressions (*vāsanā*) or Seeds (*bīja*) - led to its transformation into a continuous subliminal entity different from the ordinary *viññānas*, i.e. into M i n d - c o n t a i n i n g - a l l - S e e d s (*sarvabījakam viññānam*) e q u a t e d , by Kajiyama, with ā l a y a v i j ñ ā n a (一切種子識つまりアーラヤ識).¹¹⁴⁷

7.3.6.2 One of my reasons for doubt is that the (admittedly preliminary) inquiry into the only passage of the *Basic Section* where ālayaviññāna occurs in the context of Linking up (*pratisandhi*) (see § 6.3) does not furnish any clue for the assumption that it was actually in this context that ālayaviññāna

was introduced for the first time, but rather creates the impression that ālayavijñāna was, in this context, only made use of after it had already been established.

7.3.6.3 Another reason is that I hold a somewhat different view as to the nature of Mind-containing-all-Seeds (*sarvabīja-kam vijñānam*) and its relation to ālayavijñāna:

7.3.6.3.1 If I see it correctly, the *Pratīty. Analysis* contains a somewhat archaic doctrine of Seeds (*bīja*)¹¹⁴⁸ according to which *vijñāna* - still understood as the [mental series constituted by successive moments of one or the other¹¹⁴⁹ of] the six ordinary kinds of *vijñāna*¹¹⁵⁰ - "approaches" or "follows" (*-upaga-*)¹¹⁵¹ karman,¹¹⁵² i.e. comes under its sway by being somehow "impressed" by it so that it becomes the cause¹¹⁵³ or Seed¹¹⁵⁴ of the (*vipāka-*)*vijñāna* which is the initial factor of a new existence. At the same time, it (or the Seed of the future *vijñāna*)¹¹⁵⁵ contains the Seed of future *nāmarūpa*, and this Seed of future *nāmarūpa*, in its turn, contains the Seed of future *ṣaḍāyatana*, etc.¹¹⁵⁶ This [series of] *vijñāna* [moments] loaded with Seeds continues until death.¹¹⁵⁷ Thereupon¹¹⁵⁸ it produces, in the mother's womb, the *vipākavijñāna* which is the initial factor of the new existence and develops, step by step, into *nāmarūpa*, etc.¹¹⁵⁹

7.3.6.3.2 There is no reason to doubt that the *vipākavijñāna* is nothing but the first of a whole series consisting of one or the other of the ordinary six kinds of *vijñāna*,¹¹⁶⁰ which, while probably continuing as *vipāka* for a time, will, in due time, again "follow" or come under the sway of karman (which, to my mind, implies that it does not preserve the quality of *vipāka* throughout life), and accumulate new *bījas*. According to some passages of the text,¹¹⁶¹ such *bījas* as are not actualized in the new existence continue to exist as *bījas*. This seems to imply that the *vipākavijñāna* at the moment of conception inherits the Seeds of the *hetuvijñāna*, at least those not yet actualized, and passes them on to the new

existence, i.e. to imply that the *vipākavijñāna* too contains Seeds, nay a l l Seeds, both those which, according to which karman has become effective, are going to actualize themselves during the new existence and those which are not going to do so.

7.3.6.3.3 This would mean that it is not too large a step from this theory to the notion of Mind-containing-all-Seeds (*sarvabījakam vijñānam*), which is considered to receive and pass on the Impressions of karman and Defilements¹¹⁶² and at the same time expressly connected with the moment of conception¹¹⁶³ and characterized as *vipāka*¹¹⁶⁴; the more so since there is, as far as I can see, no clue suggesting that this Mind-containing-all-Seeds was, before being superseded by and incorporated in ālayavijñāna, conceived as a new kind of *vijñāna* different from the ordinary six. Rather, it will, originally, have been nothing but the series of (ordinary) *vijñānas* (including dim moments, as in the embryonic state) in so far as this series was regarded to contain Seeds,¹¹⁶⁵ or, more precisely, to take in and pass on (karmic Impressions turning into the) Seeds (of future existence and its arrangement).

7.3.6.3.4 If this interpretation of *sarvabījakam vijñānam* is correct, the decisive step in the development is n o t (as Kajiyama seems to think) the transition from the *vipākavijñāna* of the *Pratīty. Analysis* to *sarvabījakam vijñānam* but rather the transition from *sarvabījakam vijñānam* to ālayavijñāna. However, the pertinent passages of the *Basic Section* do n o t - neither, as has already been pointed out (§ 7.3.6.2), in the context of Linking up (*pratisandhi*) nor in the context of the *bījāśraya* of perceptions and cognitions (see § 6.1) - appear to provide any unambiguous clue which would justify the assumption that the latter step took place by way of a f i r s t c r e a - t i o n of the concept of ālayavijñāna; rather they tell in favour of its having only been m a d e u s e o f a f t e r it had already been established. A derivation of ālayavijñāna from *sarvabījakam vijñānam* would thus be less probable than its origin

in the *nirodhasamāpatti* context for which a passage satisfying both the criteria of § 1.7 is available and would in any case leave the *onus probandi* with him who advocates the former derivation. This would also hold good for the view that *sarvabījakam vijñānam* was already clearly conceived (and not but dimly felt) as a new type of mind different from the ordinary *vijñānas* and that the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* was hardly more than giving *sarvabījakam vijñānam* a more specific name. Besides, even such a renaming might involve a new motive, which would, once again, dissociate the question of the origin of *ālayavijñāna* in the s t r i c t sense of § 1.4 from that of the origin of *sarvabījakam vijñānam*. And, what is more, if, for all that, one would adhere to a direct derivation of *ālayavijñāna* from *sarvabījakam vijñānam*, one should still have to explain certain striking features of the early *ālayavijñāna* materials which would not seem to be easily deducible from such a starting-point: e.g. the fact that in my *Initial Passage* (§ 2.1) *ālayavijñāna* is stated to stick in the material s e n s e - f a c u l t i e s - and not, as would be equally possible and as one would expect from the context of mind at the moment of conception, in the b o d y as a whole -; or the strange lack of references, in the earliest sources, to *ālayavijñāna* as containing the Seeds of (corporeal) matter (see § 3.13), whereas *sarvabījakam vijñānam*, as the successor of the *vijñāna* of the *Pratīty. Analysis* (see § 7.3.6.3.1-3), will have from the outset contained the Seeds of corporeal matter (*nāma-r ū p a , ś a ḍ āyatana*) also.

7.4 According to K. Y o k o y a m a ,¹¹⁶⁶ an important motive for the discovery of *ālayavijñāna* was the question of what is the subject of *saṃsāra*, but its direct and main cause (直接の要因) was rather psychological experience (心理体験) or psychological analysis (心理分析) in the course of y o g i c p r a c - t i c e (ヨーガの実践における).

Apart from the difficulty how in this case the precise nature of the interaction of philosophical or dogmatic speculation

on the one hand and direct experience or its psychological analysis on the other would have to be determined, the thesis that ālayavijñāna was first discovered in yogic experience (or in the subsequent conceptual analysis of such experience) needs textual support, which I for one do not find in the oldest material. It is only in the *Nivṛtti Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* - which closely associates ālayavijñāna and Badness (*daṣṭhūlya*) (cp. § 4.7.2) - that we find the idea that ālayavijñāna is, after *darśanamārga*, directly experienced by the mystic and then made into a kind of collecting tank of Badness, with the aim of dispelling or dissolving it by means of the insight into True Reality (*tathatā*).¹¹⁶⁷

Besides, we find, in the *Proof Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*, the idea that the existence of ālayavijñāna can be inferred from certain bodily sensations¹¹⁶⁸ as well as from the fact that its cognitive functions (continuous perception of the corporeal basis of personal existence and of the surrounding world) are actually experienced.¹¹⁶⁹ But at least the latter argument must be comparatively late since the passage appears to imply the concept of *manas* as another new kind of *viññāna*.¹¹⁷⁰ Besides, the sensations and perceptions referred to are obviously not mystical experience but rather some kind of background experience which is not the focus of attention and therefore usually remains unnoted¹¹⁷¹ (cp. § 5.8.2).

I am not sure what kind of intuition N. Hakamaya has in mind when he asserts that the primary motive for the introduction of ālayavijñāna was intuition (真観) into the continuous flow of mind (called ālayavijñāna) in its entirety (アーラヤ識とよばれる意識の流れ全体);^{1171a} but since he takes this intuition to be hidden behind (の背後に秘められていた)^{1171b} and prior to (より先に)^{1171c} any theoretical motive like the problem of the subject of *saṃsāra*,^{1171d} it can hardly be (or at least be based on) anything else but a kind of direct yogic or psychological experience, untrammelled by considerations of theory. Yet, as has already been stated, there is no evidence for such an experience in the

Basic Section. In fact, Hakamaya bases his view on a passage from the Mahāyānasamgraha^{1171e} (which may or may not involve such an intuition) and on Saṃdh V.7^{1171f} (which to my mind does not contain any unambiguous clue to such experience).

Therefore, I do not think that textual evidence supports the view that the concept of ālayavijñāna was derived from direct yogic or psychological experience by way of a more or less immediate conceptualization, verbalization and dogmatization of the contents of such an experience. To be sure, according to my own hypothesis, too, ālayavijñāna was derived from a certain yogic state (viz. *nirodhasamāpatti*), but only indirectly, through the medium of additional dogmatical and exegetical factors.¹¹⁷²

8. Supplement I: Reconsideration of some aspects of the methodology of exploring the history of early Yogācāra literature

8.0 As the main target of Hakamaya's most stimulating article "Methodological note on the study of Early Vijñaptimātra Literature" (= H 1977) is my own article on early Yogācāra literature (viz. S 1969), I may be allowed to discuss a few of the points raised by the article.

8.1.1 The most serious charge Hakamaya raises against me concerns my decision to concentrate on the text of the Yogācārabhūmi itself and leave aside "tradition",¹¹⁷³ i.e. the information, found in Paramārtha's biography of Vasubandhu and later sources as well as in introductory stanzas and in colophons, that the Yogācārabhūmi (Y) was composed by A s a ṅ g a , or at least "published" by him on the basis of an instruction received from the celestial Bodhisattva Maitreya.¹¹⁷⁴ According to Hakamaya, such a leaving aside of "tradition", implying lack of reverence, is inadmissible.¹¹⁷⁵ To be sure, Hakamaya does not go so far as Mukai who gives the impression of advocating the view that "tradition" (critically sifted, it is true)¹¹⁷⁶ has absolute precedence over textual analysis and that the latter may only be applied within the limits set by "tradition".¹¹⁷⁷ Hakamaya rather seems to admit the independence of textual analysis, but at the same time he advocates a kind of *svataḥprāmāṇya*, an intrinsic validity, of "tradition", to be annulled only in case that and only in so far as it is c o n t r a d i c t e d¹¹⁷⁸ (by other evidence, obviously including the results of textual analysis). In the present case, this may well mean that we are not entitled to call Asaṅga the author (in the strict sense) of Y (because this is contradicted by textual analysis) but that we have to accept that he was at least its c o m p i l e r (because this much is not at variance with textual analysis).¹¹⁷⁹

8.1.2 In contrast to this position, my own attitude towards the historical reliability of "traditions", i.e. legends, etc., is rather to be sceptical. Indian tradition teems with legends of little or no historical truth and with false ascriptions of texts to famous or purely mythical authors to an extent that, from the historical point of view, scepticism seems to be justified as a matter of principle.

This does not mean that legends, etc., have no evidential value at all. They may, on the contrary, be very valuable documents, e.g. for learning what, in a given period or ambience, a saintly person's secular and spiritual life was expected to have been like, i.e. for understanding the religious ideals of such a period or ambience. For these "traditions" were not composed and transmitted as historical documents in our sense, but mainly in order to extol the achievements of a saintly person and to establish his vita as a model or ideal, and many an element will have been added *bona fide* because one thought that such a person must of course have lived thus or achieved that.

Traditions about a text and its ascription to a famous or mythical author will often be motivated by the wish to increase or explain its authoritativeness, especially when the real author (or authors) was (or were) not known.¹¹⁸⁰

Of course, some ascriptions are certainly justified, some legends may contain a kernel of truth, especially if they can be traced back close enough to the period of the putative author. But even then we can, without additional, independent evidence, hardly be sure (because, e.g., legendary elements may already have arisen during a person's lifetime, or even been circulated on purpose by him himself).

Therefore, I do indeed understand and, in a sense, respect the religious attitude behind Hakamaya's position that "tradition" compels us to accept that Asaṅga was at least the compiler of Y; but as an outsider brought up in sceptical Western scholar-

ship (as well as in the historical view of things to which scepticism would seem to be integral), I am unfortunately altogether unable to join him in his position. For me, his view, resting on the assumption that, to this extent, "tradition" is reliable, can only be a hypothesis. The question is whether such a hypothesis is heuristically useful, for it may blind one to the possibility that the process of compilation of Y may, as it in fact appears to, have been more complicated, involving several stages (cp. § 1.6.5-7). I for one prefer to confine myself to the statement that it is possible (perhaps even probable)¹¹⁸¹ that Asaṅga compiled Y or, as Hakamaya himself puts it in a later article,¹¹⁸² somehow participated in its compilation (i.e. that "tradition" may, in this case, in fact contain a kernel of historical truth in our sense). But this possibility still needs verification, and for the time being I for one cannot exclude the opposite possibility. A final decision, if at all possible, can in my opinion be only reached by further careful and unbiased investigation into the structure, style, terminology (see § 8.2) and ideas of the pertinent texts themselves.¹¹⁸³ Of course, these texts, too, are traditions¹¹⁸⁴ - though not in the sense of transmitted documents containing information on some other text but only in the sense of transmitted documents as such - and may therefore have undergone modifications after their composition. But as far as I can see, it is probable that, in the case of most early Yogācāra texts, this did not happen to such an extent that we have to regard the situation - however complicated it may be - as altogether hopeless.

8.1.3 I do not want the preceding remarks to be misunderstood as advocating an uncritical, whole-hearted support of modern Western scholarship or of Western attitudes in general, though nowadays they are being adopted almost everywhere. The disastrous consequences, either already come about or imminent, of Western science and technology and their application, e.g. nuclear war, overpopulation, and pollution and devastation of nature, foreseen

only by a few great minds, are now clear to anybody who is not blind or biased. Even pure scholarship, driven only by the desire to know and to understand, is rightly charged with not having considered, and still scarcely considering, and even belittling, the disastrous consequences of its discoveries. Therefore, even an Indologist or Buddhologist may come to ask himself whether what he is doing is beneficial and not baneful.

As for benefit, there are certainly more vital problems than finding out how, precisely, the Yogācāra system took shape, and how or by whom a certain Yogācāra text was composed. Yet, understanding the thoughts of other human beings and their motives may never be altogether meaningless. And f o r u s , stricken with the "historical sense" as we are, understanding will by necessity include knowledge of how and why ideas o r i g i n a t e d and d e v e l o p e d ; and such knowledge, in its turn, can, at least in the case of the Yogācāra system, hardly be dissociated from a critical analysis of texts.

Yet such a critical analysis, though, unlike the dissection of animals in zoology or animal tests in medicine, not doing any physical harm to the object analyzed, will tend nevertheless to call into question the consolidated system of beliefs and evaluations of a full-grown religious community, and thus may offend the feelings of its members or even undermine their self-confidence. The Yogācāra school (and its Far Eastern successor, the Hossō school) is, however, hardly a living religious system anymore. And even if it were that (and some of its elements at least, as e.g. reverence for its great masters like Asaṅga, quite clearly still have religious significance even for several contemporary Buddhist groups), one may ask whether it could justly claim not to deserve to be dissected with the razor of critical research.

For even though it is only due to modern science and technology that a ruthlessly anthropocentric civilization could construct the means that have enabled it to aggravate its destructive activities to point of imminent disaster, I am inclined to subscribe to the view that, in a sense at least, the Fall of man goes

back to the neolithic revolution of domesticating animals and plants.¹¹⁸⁵ The so-called world religions, especially institutionalized Christianity,¹¹⁸⁶ can hardly be exonerated from the charge of having, in various ways, paved the way for the modern attitude of ruthless exploitation of nature, in which they have been in some measure even actively involved. To say the least, they have not been able to prevent or stop it. Even Buddhism, at least in Japan, but increasingly in other Buddhist countries as well, does not seem to have any significant effect in this regard. Though Buddhist tradition has always stressed non-injury to animals and even to plants,¹¹⁸⁷ it has, on the other hand, over-emphasized the (undeniable) dark aspects of nature - impermanence, suffering, greed -, and there is hardly any incentive intrinsic to it to actively promote the protection of animals and plants not only as individuals but also as species,¹¹⁸⁸ say for the mere beauty no less undeniably inherent in them.

Therefore, what is, to my mind, required is to recover or re-integrate the "conservative" attitude of archaic religiosity, or at least that current of it to which, as e.g. to the North American Indians,¹¹⁸⁹ t h i s e a r t h i s h o l y and essentially to be preserved, along with all its species of animals and plants, its rivers and mountains. From such a point of view, religions and religious elements are worthy of respect only in so far as they have preserved, or at least are favourable to, this attitude. But in so far as they have, by dissociating god (or the absolute), man and salvation from nature, led us away from the perception of the earth's holiness or have even promoted its exploitation, their self-confidence d e s e r v e s to be thoroughly undermined.

8.2 Against my attempt to prove the special position and chronological priority of Y with regard to the remaining works of the "Maitreya Asaṅga complex" by showing that several k e y t e r m s (and doctrines) of the latter works are not (yet) found in Y, at least not in their technical meaning,¹¹⁹⁰ Hakamaya

objects that I have wilfully chosen only such terms as were suitable to prove my point, and that there are, on the other hand, also terms common to both Y and the other works, and that these might call for a different judgement.¹¹⁹¹

Of course I admit that the absence of such key terms does not, by itself, necessarily imply chronological priority. It may also be due to non-acquaintance with sources using them or to deliberate ignoring.¹¹⁹² But in the case of Y the absence of the terms in question seems, on the whole,¹¹⁹³ to be due to the chronological priority of Y which I tried to show, in the above-mentioned paper,¹¹⁹⁴ by a comparative evaluation of related text passages.

Certainly, I do not pretend that my arguments have settled the matter in every regard and once for all, and I do not exclude the possibility that my conclusions might require modification. But I believe that, by producing some significant evidence, I have demonstrated the probability of my hypothesis that Y is, on the whole, prior to the other texts of the "Maitreya Asaṅga complex", and I think that this hypothesis cannot be sublated by pointing out that I have chosen my key terms to my convenience but only by adducing at least equally significant counter-evidence. Now, the mere fact that there are also common terms and doctrines does not prove anything; for of course it is entirely natural that there should be various terms, even specific terms, common to all texts that belong to one and the same school.¹¹⁹⁵ What would be conclusive evidence disproving the priority of Y is, e.g., text passages in Y that can be shown to presuppose one or several of the other works of the "Maitreya Asaṅga complex"; or key terms of the later Yogācāra school occurring in Y but missing in one or several of the other works (provided that deliberate ignoring or other reasons for their non-occurrence in these works can be excluded)¹¹⁹⁶; or terms explained in Y in a more advanced way than in another text of the complex. But even such cases, especially if in conflict with other evidence, would probably be

conclusive with regard to the chronological relation not of the entire texts but only of the corresponding passages, or, more precisely, of the materials on which they are based,¹¹⁹⁷ the more so as at least some of the remaining works of the complex (e.g. the Hsien-yang-shêng-chiao-lun and even the Abhidharmasamuccaya) do not lack compilatory features either.¹¹⁹⁸

To be sure, common terms may, on principle, even serve to show, or at least render probable, the identity of the author of several texts, provided that they, or a specific use of them, can be shown to be peculiar to the author, so to speak his finger-prints, as has been shown for Śaṅkara in an exemplary way by P. Hacker.¹¹⁹⁹ But such a method will hardly work in the case of a compilation, at least as long as the compiler did not add much of his own. Besides, the method does not work if one cannot establish contrastive evidence on the basis of the works of closely related authors (as, e.g., Sureśvara and Padmapāda in the case of Śaṅkara). This, however, would be quite out of the question in the case of early Yogācāra literature¹²⁰⁰ if the traditional view is accepted that there is, in this complex, hardly any Śāstra that is not by Asaṅga – be it directly or on the basis of Maitreya's instruction or inspiration –, because no sufficiently close contrast material would be available. In other words: What one might be inclined to regard as a peculiarity of a single author (Asaṅga) may as well be a peculiar term or usage or doctrine of a whole group or even of all early Yogācāras.

8.3 Among the key terms missing in Y is 'abhūtaparikalpa'.¹²⁰¹ Hakamaya questions the truth of this observation on the basis of the apparent exception, pointed out and discussed in my paper,¹²⁰² of Y_c 713b29 where Hsüan-tsang's version (虛妄分別) suggests 'abhūtaparikalpa' whereas the Tibetan rendering (*log par yōṅs su rtog pa* instead of the usual equivalent of *abhūtaparikalpa*, viz. *yaṅ dag pa ma yin pa kun tu rtog pa*)¹²⁰³ points to '*mithyāparikalpa'. According to Hakamaya the Tibetan

rendering does not exclude '*abhūtaparikalpa*' because even in Ye śes sde's terminology occasional deviations from the norm can be found.¹²⁰⁴ But is it not much more probable that Ye śes sde's translation is, as usual, accurate and that rather Hsüan-tsang it is who, not perceiving any material difference, rendered '**mithyā-parikalpa*' by the same equivalent he uses for the familiar term '*abhūtaparikalpa*'? Surely this is the natural conclusion in view of other Y passages, collected by Yokoyama,¹²⁰⁵ where Hsüan-tsang's 虛妄分別 demonstrably corresponds not to '*abhūtaparikalpa*' but to other terms like simple '*vikalpa*' or '*parikalpa*'. Of course, it is not altogether impossible that, in this case, Hsüan-tsang is, contrary to what is usually the case, more precise than Ye śes sde, but this is extremely improbable, and the *onus probandi* would therefore be incumbent on him who advocates this latter position. And even if, in the present case, Hsüan-tsang's version were in fact precise and Ye śes sde's aberrant, this one exception in 600 Taishō pages would hardly impair the observation that the term '*abhūtaparikalpa*' is virtually absent in Y.

8.4 In order to further substantiate his reserves against my method of attempting a classification of early Yogācāra literature on the basis of the presence or absence of typical terms and doctrines, Hakamaya also discusses my interpretation of the definition of *śūnyatā* in AS 40,10-16.¹²⁰⁶ I had used this definition as a support for my observation that many parts of the Abhidharmasamuccaya do not express or presuppose the Yogācāra theory of the non-existence of external objects or the Mahāyāna view of the emptiness or ultimate unreality of dharmas as such but only the traditional doctrine, shared by most Śrāvaka-yānists, of the non-existence of a permanent Self (*ātman*).¹²⁰⁷ To Hakamaya such an interpretation of the passage seems to be entirely unjustifiable. As the matter is excellently suited for demonstrating how different attitudes (e.g. with regard to "tradition") entail different ways of understanding or even observation (i.e.

form different heuristic points of departure), I may be permitted to restate my view in contrast to Hakamaya's interpretation, which he has elaborated in a later article,¹²⁰⁸ confirming that he considers the definition of AS to be basically in harmony with that of the Bodhisattvabhūmi.¹²⁰⁹

To be sure, the pattern '*yad yatra nāsti ...*' with which the passage starts is common to both texts (as also to several other early Yogācāra works) and is, as is well known,¹²¹⁰ inherited from the (Skt. version of the) Cūḷasuññatasutta.¹²¹¹ But nobody can reasonably deny that the interpretations differ considerably, at any rate in their wording, but in all probability also in their content (see below).

As for the Abhidharmasamuccaya, its explanation clearly says that *skandhas*, *āyatana*s and *dhātu*s (i.e. the dharmas) are empty (*śūnya*) in so far as there does not exist, in or among them, a permanent, unchangeable¹²¹² Self (*ātman*) or Mine (*ātmiya*, i.e. anything which such a Self would permanently possess).¹²¹³ Although such an assertion is altogether traditional,¹²¹⁴ nay, canonical,¹²¹⁵ Hakamaya adds the statement that of course these skandhas, etc., though it seems as if they were, provisionally, affirmed, are [in reality] merely like a lump of foam, etc., because they have no peculiar or inherent essence (固有の本質).¹²¹⁶ Accordingly, Hakamaya understands the *nairātmya*, which is taught by the text to be "that which is left over there" (i.e. in the skandhas, etc.),¹²¹⁷ to mean the lack of a fixed essence (固定的実体),¹²¹⁸ i.e., obviously, *dharmā nairātmya*, although the wording of the text itself suggests that *nairātmya*, contrasting with *ātman* and *ātmiya* (cp. also the subsequent opposition **ātmano 'bhāvo nairātmyasya ca bhāvaḥ*)¹²¹⁹, does not mean anything else but traditional (i.e. *puṇḍgalā -*) *nairātmya*.

In my opinion, it is advisable not to interpret the text in a Mahāyānist sense merely because, guided by the tradition that Asaṅga was a Mahāyāna teacher, one expects him to propound Mahāyāna tenets only; surely one should keep to the

w o r d i n g of the text instead, m a r k what it actually says, be astonished if this does not fit in with one's expectations, and not too readily interpret it away but keep it in mind and find out whether it is isolated or, on the contrary supported by further evidence.

In the present case, such further evidence is, as I have shown,¹²²⁰ in fact available. One additional case is precisely the explanation AS itself offers for the (canonical!)¹²²¹ comparison, alluded to by Hakamaya, that the skandhas are like a lump of foam, etc. According to AS,¹²²² this refers to the a b s e n c e o f a S e l f , the absence of purity, the fact that they give little pleasure, and their instability and pithlessness. No doubt, this interpretation is, again, traditional, for even the fact that the skandhas are instable and pithless is nothing but the traditional emphasis on impermanence and substancelessness, and does not necessarily involve *dharmanairātmya*.

To be sure, after the definition of *śūnyatā* discussed above AS adds a n o t h e r definition in which three kinds of emptiness are distinguished and referred to the three *svabhāvas* (*parikalpita*, etc.)¹²²³. Again, Hakamaya¹²²⁴ takes a Mahāyānist interpretation for granted, and moreover states that the three kinds of emptiness as presented by the text seem to exactly correspond to the three aspects involved in the canonical formula (viz. what is absent, where it is absent, and what remains). But though such a correspondence appears reasonable one should realize, once again, that the text itself does n o t at all e x p r e s s such a parallelism but simply j u x t a p o s e s (*yañ = *api khalu*)¹²²⁵ this second definition of *śūnyatā* without explicitly stating or even indicating any relation of its elements to those of the canonical formula of the preceding definition. Besides, though the terms of the second definition of *śūnyatā*, including the three *svabhāvas*, are no doubt of Mahāyāna provenience, one still cannot but notice that the text does n o t make the Mahāyāna ontology they suggest e x p l i c i t by a corresponding explanation.¹²²⁶ Nay, in another passage,¹²²⁷ a similar

set of terms is unambiguously interpreted in terms of traditional *p u d g a l a - n a i r ā t m y a* only,¹²²⁸ although this set too is no doubt of Mahāyāna origin, stemming as it does from a Mahāyāna source, viz. the Maitreya chapter of the Large Prajñāpāramitā (Byams 'zus kyi le'u').¹²²⁹

To be sure, in a later passage¹²³⁰ of AS the three *svabhāvas* occur in the context of interpreting the essencelessness of all dharmas as taught in Vaipulya, i.e. Mahāyāna. In such passages, the Mahāyāna tendency of the author is undeniable. But in other passages like the one under discussion, any observer who, in an unbiased way, keeps to what the text itself *e x p l i c i t l y* states cannot but admit that the author, even when using Mahāyāna *t e r m s*, does his best to *a v o i d* specifically Mahāyāna *i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s*, seeming to prefer rather definitions acceptable to Śrāvakayāna readers too, i.e. definitions based on doctrinal elements common to both vehicles (for *pudgala-nairātmya* is, of course, accepted by Mahāyānists too). Thus, in spite of the common use of the canonical formula (which of course does not prove anything because it was available to any author of the school), the *e x p l a n a t i o n* of this formula in AS is, not only in its wording but also in its contents, essentially different from its decidedly Mahāyāna interpretation in the Bodhisattvabhūmi. I have to refrain from discussing, on this occasion, the question whether this difference is such as to allow the conclusion that AS and BoBh must have been composed by different authors,¹²³¹ but anyway it can hardly be used to prove the identity of their author.

9. Supplement II: Preliminary analysis of the Proof Portion

9.1 A closer inspection of the arguments in the *Proof Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* reveals that they do not all of them start from the same presuppositions. Proof v (see n. 630) clearly seems to presuppose that *manas* had already been introduced as another new kind of *viññāna*, since it mentions an (at least largely) continuous cognition of "I" (*aham iti viññaptiḥ*) accompanying every perception or cognition of an object, which I for one (against Ui 1965, 341) cannot refer to anything but the new *manas* (cp. also H 1978, 24f.). On the other hand, proof vii (see § 3.2.1 + n. 227) is obviously not aware of *manas* as another new kind of *viññāna* (as is, by the way, also true of Y_t zi 10b1-6),¹²³² for at least as far as *asaṃjñisamāpatti* is concerned (cp. n. 220) the argument would clearly be inconclusive if the new *manas* had already been introduced; cp. also Ui 1965, 731; Hakamaya's criticism (H 1978, 24f.) does not convince me, for the fact that the text is concerned with proving the existence of *ālayaviññāna*, and not of the new *manas*, does not alter anything with regard to this inconclusiveness. In view of the archaic character of the argument on the one hand (i.e. the fact that it is fairly close to my *Initial Passage*) and, on the other, the curious "intercalatedness" of most of the references - fairly few, at that - to the new *manas* even in the *Pravṛtti Portion*,¹²³³ I for one am convinced that especially in this case the new *manas* is not taken into account not because it was deliberately ignored but rather because it had not yet been introduced when proof vii was evolved, at any rate in substance. And I find it highly probable that the same thing holds good for the other proofs (except proof v) as well.

9.2 In a preliminary way, I should divide the proofs of the *Proof Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* into the following groups:

- A1. Proofs i (*upātta*), vi (*kāyiko 'nubhavaḥ*), vii (*acitte samāpat-ti*), and viii (*cyuti*).

These proofs are all concerned with what one may call the "somatic" aspect of ālayavijñāna: its function of appropriating the body at the moment of conception (i.a-c); of keeping it appropriated, as a whole (i.d) and throughout life (i.e), even in unconscious absorption (vii); of making its presence in the body felt by corporeal sensations even in the absence of tactile sense-perception (vi); and of gradually abandoning the body at death (viii). All these functions are either already expressed in the *Basic Section* of the Yogācārabhūmi or they are organic developments (cp. §§ 3.3.2.2 and 3.7.1) keeping to the same conception of ālayavijñāna and not presupposing the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and its innovations (see §§ 3.8.3ff.).

- A2. Proof iv (*bīja*)

This proof is dissociated from the group A1 by being wedged in between the other two groups, viz. B1 and B2. It is unrelated to A1 from the point of view of content also, since it is not concerned with the "somatic" aspect of ālayavijñāna but with its function as the Seed (*bīja*) of ordinary forms of mind, based on the argument that the latter cannot be one another's Seed. From the point of view of doctrinal development, however, this proof, too, does not seem to go, substantially, beyond what is already found in the *Basic Section*, viz. the neutral (*avyākṛta*) ālayavijñāna as the Seed or *bījāśraya* of good, bad and neutral pravṛttivijñānas (§§ 2.1; 2.13.1; 3.13.1; 6.1; 6.4), present even in the states where the latter are interrupted (§§ 2.1; 3.2.2).

- B1. Proofs ii (*ādi*) and iii (*spaṣṭatva*)

These two proofs do not prove the existence of ālayavijñāna but rather the fact that several *vijñānas* can arise simultaneously, and this would seem to presuppose the system of Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra V (see § 3.8.3). At any rate, the present group of proofs is, in this regards, on the same

level as Saṃdh V and decisively advanced over the situation met with in the *Basic Section* (see § 3.8.1).

B2. Proof v (*karman*)

This proof is, from the formal point of view, close to the group B1, for it too is presented in proof not of the existence of ālayavijñāna directly but rather of the simultaneity of several *vijñānas*. But on the other hand it is separated from B1 by the intercalation of A2 (= proof iv). Moreover, it does not, as proofs ii and iii do, prove the simultaneity of several *vijñānas* by referring to (allegedly) obvious cases in the sphere of pravṛttivijñānas, but does so rather by pointing out the simultaneity of experiential phenomena of which some - viz. the (at least largely) continuous perception of the surrounding world and of one's corporeal basis (see § 5.6.2) - most probably (cp. n. 631a) have to be directly referred to ālayavijñāna. Proof v would thus seem to differ from group B1 in that it could equally well have been used as a direct proof of the existence of ālayavijñāna. Moreover, the concept of ālayavijñāna as an actual perception goes not only beyond the *Basic Section* of the Yogācārabhūmi but even beyond Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra V and, as regards perception of one's corporeal basis, even beyond the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra as a whole. Hence, and also in view of the fact that it obviously presupposes the new *manas* (see § 9.1) which is not yet found in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (cp. n. 942), proof v represents rather a stage of development quite close to the *Pravṛtti Portion*.

A1	i	vi	vii	viii
A2	iv			
B1	ii	iii		
B2	v			

10. Supplement III: Mystical experience, elimination of ālayavijñāna and the question of vijñāptimātratā in the ālayavijñāna Treatise in the beginning of the Vinīścayasamgrahaṇī

10.1 In the *Nivṛtṭi Portion* (see n. 226) of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* (see § 1.5), the process of elimination of ālayavijñāna is described as follows:¹²³⁴

"(0)¹²³⁵ This ālayavijñāna which is thus¹²³⁶ the root of Pollution should be understood to cease through the cultivation of the [spiritually] wholesome factors¹²³⁷ (*≈ *evaṃ saṃkleśamūlasyāśyālayavijñānasya*¹²³⁸ *vinivṛttir veditavyā yaduta (?) kuśaladharmabhāvanayā*).

(1a) In the case of ordinary persons who strive for the stability of mind by means of [a *kuśaladharmabhāvanā* consisting in] a contemplation that has 'forthcoming' mind (*pravṛttivijñāna*) for its object, this cultivation of wholesome factors has the result that [such a person finally] attains, for the first time, Full Comprehension of (the) Truth(s) (*≈ *sā ca kuśaladharmabhāvanā pṛthagjanānām pravṛttivijñānālambanena manaskāreṇa cittasthityartham prayujyamānānām tatprathamataḥ satyābhisamaya-praveśāya*).

(1b) [But it does not yet immediately entail the cessation of ālayavijñāna;] for [a person] who has not yet seen Truth (**adṛṣṭasatya*), who has not yet attained the faculty of vision (**apratilabdha cakṣus*) to [perceive] the [four Noble] Truths (i.e. not yet attained *darśanamārga*), cannot have penetrating insight (**pratīvidh-*) into ālayavijñāna containing all Seeds [, much less can he eliminate it].

(2a) When, after having cultivated such practice (**evaṃ pratipannaḥ*), [this person] has acquired guarantee of Salvation (**samyaktvaniyāmaṃ avakrānta*) either as a Śrāvaka or as a Bodhisattva and attained penetrating insight (**pratīvidhya*)¹²³⁹ into the True Essence (*dharmadhātu*) of all dharmas, then he

attains penetrating insight (*pratividhyati*) into *ālayavijñāna*, too.

(2b) On this [occasion] (?),¹²⁴⁰ he views¹²⁴¹ all [constituents of] Pollution (*saṃkleśa*) in [their] entirety(?); he [then] personally (*adhyātmam pratyātmam*) experiences himself to be [on the one hand] outwardly (*bahirdhā*) fettered by the fetter of objective phenomena (*nimitta-bandhana*), and [on the other hand] inwardly (*adhyātmam*) by the fetter of Badness (*dauṣṭhulya-bandhana*).

(3a) Since *ālayavijñāna* contains (Hts.: is) the element(s) (*dhātu*, i.e. Seed(s)) of all these [various] kinds (?) of conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) comprised in [pollutive] proliferation¹²⁴² (**prapañca*),¹²⁴³ he concentrates [them]¹²⁴⁴ in *ālayavijñāna*, lumps [them] together, makes [them] one heap [there] (**ekadhyam abhisamkṣipaty ekaṃ puñjam ekaṃ rāśiṃ karoti*)¹²⁴⁵.

(3b) After having made [them] into one heap (**ekaṃ rāśiṃ kṛtvā*), he Transmutes the Basis (**āśrayaṃ parivartayati* (?)) by means of continuous cultivation of¹²⁴⁶ insight which has True Reality for its object (**tathatā lambana(sya(?)) jñān(asy(?)) āsevanānvayād bhāvanānvayāt*)¹²⁴⁷.

(3c) As soon as the Basis is Transmuted (**samanantaraparivṛtte āśraye* (?))¹²⁴⁸, *ālayavijñāna* can be declared to be [definitively] abandoned (*prahīṇa*).

(3d) Due to [*ālayavijñāna*] being abandoned, all [constituents of] Pollution (*saṃkleśa*), too, can be declared to be abandoned."

(o) *de ltar na*¹²⁴⁹ *kun nas ñon moñs pa'i rtsa ba kun gñi rnam par śes pa de ni 'di*¹²⁴⁹ *ltar*¹²⁴⁹ *dge ba'i chos bsgoms*¹²⁵⁰ *pas rnam*¹²⁴⁹ *par*¹²⁴⁹ *ldog par rig par bya'o //*^{1250a}

(1a) *dge ba'i chos bsgom*¹²⁵¹ *pa de yañ so so'i skye bo sems gnas par bya ba'i phyir 'jug pa'i rnam par śes pa la dmigs pa'i yid la byed pas brtson par byed pa ni*¹²⁵² */ de'i dañ por bden pa mion par rtogs pa la 'jug par bya ba'i phyir sgom*¹²⁵³ *ste /*

(1b) bden pa ma^{1253a} mthoñ ba bden pa rnams la mig ma thob pas ni kun gñi rnam par šes pa sa bon thams cad pa¹²⁵⁴ rtogs par mi nus pa'i phyir ro //

(2a) de de ltar žugs šin ñan thos kyi yañ dag pa ñid skyon med pa la žugs sam / byañ chub sams dpa'i yañ dag pa ñid skyon med pa la žugs te¹²⁵⁵ chos thams cad kyi¹²⁵⁶ chos kyi dbyiñs rtogs par byed pa na / kun gñi rnam par šes pa yañ rtogs par byed de /

(2b) der kun nas ñon moñs pa thams cad la yañ dag par 'dus par blta (read lta ?) žiñ / de nañ gi so so'i bdag ñid la phyi rol gyi mtshan ma'i 'chiñ ba dañ / nañ gi gnas ñan len gyi 'chiñ bas bdag ñid beñs par rtogs¹²⁵⁷ par byed do //

(3a) kun gñi rnam par šes pa ni¹²⁵⁸ 'du byed kyi rnam pa (?)^{1258a} spros par bsdus pa de dag¹²⁵⁹ thams cad kyi khams pa¹²⁶⁰ yin pa'i phyir / kun gñi rnam par šes pa la¹²⁶¹ gcig tu sdud¹²⁶² pa dañ / gcig tu spuñs pa¹²⁶³ dañ / gcig tu sogs par byed de /

(3b) gcig tu bsags^{1263a} nas de bžin ñid la dmigs pa'i šes pas (?)¹²⁶⁴ kun tu bsten¹²⁶⁵ ciñ goms par byas pa'i rgyus gnas 'gyur bar^{1265a} byed do //

(3c) gnas gyur¹²⁶⁶ ma thag tu kun gñi rnam par šes pa spañs par¹²⁶⁷ brjod par bya ste /

(3d) de spañs pa'i phyir kun nas ñon moñs pa thams cad kyañ spañs par¹²⁶⁸ brjod par bya'o //

10.2 The above passage was discussed by A. Ō s a k i in an article entitled "What is meant by destroying the *Ālaya-vijñāna*?"¹²⁶⁹ According to Ōsaki's interpretation, the perception of *ālayavijñāna* means "not to grasp, not to see, ..., not to cling to the object of cognition outside the Mind", in the sense of *V i j ñ a p t i m ā t r a v ā d a*¹²⁷⁰ - a state in which "the *ā l a y a v i j ñ ā n a* sees not the object but the subject, the *ālayavijñāna* itself".¹²⁷¹ And "to destroy the *ālayavijñāna* ...

means to cut off the two types of adherence (*grāhya*, *grāhaka* ...);¹²⁷² it "does not mean to destroy the ālayavijñāna itself" but only "to destroy the seeds ... of afflictions and false knowledge".¹²⁷³

10.3.1 In the parallel passage MSA XIX.51,¹²⁷⁴ insight into True Reality is, to be sure, qualified as being free from *grāhya* and *grāhaka*. But these terms do not occur anywhere in the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*, nor is there, in this text, any mention or indication of *vijñaptimātratā*.¹²⁷⁵

1. According to statement (1a) of the passage translated in § 10.1, preparatory spiritual practice consists in, or at least includes, contemplation (*manaskāra*) having *pravr̥ttivijñāna* for its object. Preparatory practice consisting in contemplation of mind is described in the VIIIth chapter of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*.¹²⁷⁶ In this text, contemplation of or concentration on the contemplating mind itself (which is, of course, a special form of conscious mind, hence of *pravr̥ttivijñāna*) is taken to be - or to prepare - Tranquility (*śamatha*),¹²⁷⁷ which is defined as stability (*sthitī*) or stabilization (*sthāpanā*) of mind (*citta*).¹²⁷⁸ Alternating with Discernment (*vipaśyanā*), Tranquility finally results in the comprehension of True Reality in the form of *vijñaptimātratā*,¹²⁷⁹ and in *Samdh VIII.37.2*¹²⁸⁰ (with which statement (1a) of the *Nivṛtti Portion* may even be genetically connected)¹²⁸¹ this comprehension, too, is called "stability or stable dwelling (**sthitī* or **sthāna*) [of mind]". It would thus be tempting to interpret the contemplation of *pravr̥ttivijñāna* and the "stability of mind" in statement (1a) as implying the doctrine of *vijñaptimātratā*. But it is a striking fact that the text nowhere uses this term. Indeed, (1a) may just as well be interpreted in a different way. For preparatory practice consisting in contemplation of mind is also found in the *Śrāvaka bhūmi*.¹²⁸² In this text, the contemplation which has contemplating mind itself for its object realizes the transitoriness, etc., of the latter,¹²⁸³ and hence is, to be sure,

not Tranquility (*śamatha*) but rather Discernment (*vipaśyanā*), and its aim is the removal of gross *asmimāna*.¹²⁸⁴ But since this *asmimāna* is the last obstacle to Full Comprehension (*abhisamaya*) of the four Noble Truths and since this Comprehension includes the aspect of Tranquility¹²⁸⁵ (i.e. stability of mind), the statement of (1a) that the contemplation which has *pravṛttivijñāna* (i.e. the contemplating mind itself) for its object is practised for the purpose of stability of mind (**citta-sthiti*) would not be incompatible with the ("pre-idealist") system of the Śrāvakabhūmi either. The more so since the aim of this practice is, in (1a), expressly specified to be the attainment of *s a t y a b h i s a m a y a*, a t r a d i t i o n a l term which nobody will, in the absence of explicit additional evidence to the contrary, refer to anything but the Full Comprehension of the f o u r N o b l e T r u t h s (in fact alluded to in (1b) !) or, at best, to insight into "non-analyzed Truth" (**avyavasth(āp)ita-satya*), i.e. *tathatā*, which is not necessarily to be interpreted as *vijñaptimātratā*, still less in the Yogācārabhūmi.¹²⁸⁶

2.a) In (2b), the text quoted in § 10.1 mentions the two f e t t e r s , viz. *nimitta*- and *dauṣṭhulya-bandhana*. As this pair of terms is first met with in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra but does not seem to occur in the Basic Section of the Yogācārabhūmi,¹²⁸⁷ it would not seem unreasonable to interpret, in this connection, the term '*nimitta*' against the background of Mahāyāna "ontology", i.e. in the sense that all external phenomena, being (at least co-)conditioned by subjective concepts (*vikalpa*), are ultimately i l l u s o r y . Since (2b) may even be taken to be somehow connected with Saṃdh VIII.37.3,¹²⁸⁸ one may even be inclined to understand the term '*nimitta*' as implying the doctrine that phenomena are *vijñaptimātra*, i.e. nothing but i m a g e s i n m i n d ;¹²⁸⁹ the more so since this view had been alluded to in the preceding sentence of the Sūtra.¹²⁹⁰ But once again the latter presumption, at least, is not corroborated by the wording of (2b) nor by the use of the term '*nimitta*' in other parts of the Yogācārabhūmi.¹²⁹¹ And once again, the idea of objective or exter-

nal phenomena (or their characteristics) as a f e t t e r (*bandhana*) would seem to make good sense even from a traditional, Śrāvakayāna point of view. For to apprehend, i.e. pay attention to, the characteristic features (*nimitta*) of the objects of perception may cause the intrusion of unwholesome psychic states,¹²⁹² and external phenomena are liable to arouse wrong attitudes like the notion of "mine".¹²⁹³ Thus, when a passage of the *Basic Section* states that mind is tied to objective phenomena or to the specific features of objects (*viṣaya-nimitta*) by the fetter of perception/cognition (*viññapti-bandha*),¹²⁹⁴ this may be understood to point to the danger of distraction¹²⁹⁵ and of the arising of wrong attitudes or Defilements, which are in fact taught, in the subsequent sentence of that passage,¹²⁹⁶ to tie the mind - still tighter, one may add - to these objects by the fetter of Sticking to them (*abhiniveśa*).

b) It is perhaps in this sense that yet another statement of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* admits of being interpreted,¹²⁹⁷ viz. the statement that *manovijñāna* is said to be based on *m a n a s*, because as long as *manas* has not ceased, it (sc. *manovijñāna*) is not freed from the fetter of cognition with regard to *nimittas*¹²⁹⁸ (i.e. from being fettered, by cognition, to *nimittas*). For belief in and attachment to Ego implies belief in and attachment to an e n t i t y - experienced or imagined, but anyway a *nimitta* (in a broader sense including a l l data of experience, imagination or conceptualization) - with which the Ego is identified. Therefore, as long as *manas*, consisting in or associated with subtle Clinging to Ego, does not stop functioning, *manovijñāna* is unable to entirely transcend attachment to entities, and this holds good not only for the Mahāyāna way of transcending entities t h e m - s e l v e s (and hence attachment to them) by penetrating into their essencelessness through a t r a n s p h e n o m e n a l (*animitta*) and transconceptual (*nirvikalpa*) e x p e r i e n c e : it holds equally good for the traditional, Śrāvakayāna insight into impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and non-ego-ness - an insight which does n o t , to be sure, transcend, here and now,

the experience of entities but at any rate entails overcoming attachment to them and the realization of the excellence of Nirvāṇa-after-death as a state in which their experience too will be transcended.¹²⁹⁹

3. Even the fact that in another passage of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*¹³⁰⁰ ālayavijñāna is stated to be the root (*mūla) = cause (*skyed par byed pa*) not only of living beings (*sattvaloka*) including their material sense-faculties and bodies (*sā-dhiṣṭhānendriya) but even of the external world (*bhājanaloka*) does not necessarily imply that corporeal matter, or even the external world, is *viññaptimātra*, i.e. nothing but a mental image; for the statement is equally well explicable by the fact that ālayavijñāna, containing all Seeds, contains also the Seeds of *karman* which, as is well-known, even according to Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma¹³⁰¹ participates in the production or at least differentiation not only of the bodies of living beings but also of the external world. Such an interpretation is, after all, strongly supported by a passage from the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*¹³⁰² where both living beings and the external world are taught to be differentiated by *karman*, viz. by common (*sādhāraṇa*) and peculiar (*asādhāraṇa*) *karman*, respectively.¹³⁰³

4. When the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* states that ālayavijñāna operates by means of a twofold object, viz. *upādānaviññaptitaḥ* and *bhājanaviññaptitaḥ*,¹³⁰⁴ this does not necessarily imply that we have to follow the interpretation of a later author like Vinītadeva¹³⁰⁵ and to take *viññapti* in the sense of **nirbhāsa/ābhāsa/prati-bhāsa* (*snan ba*) or *ākāra* (*rnam pa*), which would in fact mean that corporeal matter and the external world, as the object of ālayavijñāna, were nothing but mental images in ālayavijñāna, and would thus imply *viññaptimātratā*. Instead, it is equally possible to understand *viññapti* in its traditional meaning, viz. as the act of "making known", of cognizing or perceiving these objects¹³⁰⁶ which, in the absence of contrary evidence, are, as a matter of course, to be taken as really existing outside cognition. In other words, I should prefer to understand the passage to

mean that "ālayavijñāna operates by means of a twofold object (or:¹³⁰⁷ from the point of view of object, ālayavijñāna operates in a double way): viz. a s a p e r c e p t i o n o f *upādāna* ... and as a perception of the external world ...".¹³⁰⁸ The more so since in the case of the concluding résumé of the subject matter¹³⁰⁹ this appears to be the o n l y natural interpretation.

10.3.2 Thus, the text does not express or unambiguously indicate *vijñaptimātratā*. Nay, it even seems to take particular care to a v o i d such terms and statements as would unequivocally express Mahāyāna ontology i n g e n e r a l .

Even in the expression '*parikalpita-svabhāvābhiniṣṣa-vāsanā*',¹³¹⁰ the term '*p a r i k a l p i t a - s v a b h ā v a*' , though generally referring to the Mahāyāna view that all things as they appear, and even *dharma*s as they are conceived, are merely imagined, can also be interpreted in a traditional (Śrāvaka-yāna) sense as referring to the imaginary notion of a Self (*ātman*).¹³¹¹

Similarly, *t a t h a t ā*¹³¹² and *d h a r m a d h ā - t u*¹³¹³ , though, to be sure, mostly used in the Mahāyāna sense of True Reality implying *d h a r m a nairātmya*, are traditional terms which even in Yogācāra philosophy do not exclude the aspect of *p u d g a l a nairātmya*, and hence may, if required, also be understood in this sense. Actually, insight into *dharmadhātu* is, in the text, obviously equivalent, among other things, to attaining a vision of the [four Noble] Truths,¹³¹⁴ and is thus perhaps to be interpreted in the sense of insight into the "non-analyzed" (**avyavast(āp)ita*: see § 10.3.3.3.a) equivalent of the latter, i.e. into *nairātmya*, which in the case of Śrāvakas probably¹³¹⁵ means: into *p u d g a l a nairātmya*. That insight into *dharmadhātu* is, in our text, intended to be common to both Vehicles is evident from the fact that it is expressly connected with acquiring guarantee of Salvation (*samyaktvaniyāma*) as a Bodhisattva o r as a Ś r ā v a k a .¹³¹⁶ And a little bit later¹³¹⁷ the state of lacking (i.e. having eliminated) ālayavijñāna is expressly attributed to Buddhas and to Bodhisattvas not liable to turning back a s w e l l a s to A r h a t s and to Pratyekabuddhas.

10.3.3 1. For this reason, and also as a matter of principle, we should not, to my mind, lightly interpret our text on the lines of later sources and developments. We should even refrain from internal over-systematization (which may easily go beyond what the author or compiler himself was aware of). We should rather keep to what the text actually says and take it seriously, and first try to understand, as far as possible, each passage by itself or, at most, by resorting, with utmost caution, to closely related¹³¹⁸ materials.

2. In this sense, we simply have to accept that the text ((3c)) declares that, as soon as the process of Transmuting the Basis is completed (i.e. at the moment of attaining Arhatship), ālayavijñāna itself is abandoned, and not merely emptied of unwholesome Seeds but preserved in some other form; i.e. we have to accept that ālayavijñāna is, in the *Nivṛtti Portion*, essentially bound up with, or even nothing but a hypostasis of, Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*).¹³¹⁹ The problems that would seem to arise from such a position - e.g. how, after the extinction of ālayavijñāna, physical life can continue at all (especially in *nirodhasamāpatti*: see § 4.9), or what would then be or contain the Seed(s) of the pravṛttivijñānas - were, so it appears, simply not envisaged by the author/compiler.

3. Moreover, the text does not furnish any clue to Ōsaki's view that ālayavijñāna is perceived by itself. The text only states the bare fact that ālayavijñāna is not perceived before insight into *dharmadhātu* ((2a)), i.e. *darśanamārga*, has been attained, and that thereupon the yogin, after having lumped together all constituents of Pollution (*saṃkleśa*) in ālayavijñāna [by realizing (?) that] it contains the Seeds of all of them ((3a)), gradually dispells it by means of repeated practice of insight which has True Reality for its object (*tathatālabhaṇam jñānam*) ((3b)). The text does not say by which kind of insight ālayavijñāna is perceived, nor how, precisely, insight which has True Reality for its object sublates ālayavijñāna..

a) As for the first question, viz. by which kind of insight ālayavijñāna is perceived (for the first time), it may be to the point to call attention to the fact that the text, in an earlier paragraph,¹³²⁰ states that ālayavijñāna, containing (or consisting of) all Seeds, is by nature *duḥkhaśatya* in that these Seeds are Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*) in the sense of subliminal unsatisfactoriness and thus constitute *saṃskāraduḥkhatā*, i.e. *duḥkhatā* in the essential, ultimate sense.¹³²¹ Ālayavijñāna would thus necessarily be included in the content of Full Comprehension (*abhisamaya*) of Truth, not so much, to be sure, of non-analyzed Truth (**avyavasth(āp)ita-satya*), i.e. *dharmadhātu* or *tathatā*,¹³²² as of Truth analyzed [into four] (**vyavasth(āp)ita-satya*), i.e. of the four Noble Truths, Full Comprehension of which is, according to some other passages of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*,¹³²³ regarded to be something like a subsequent analysis of the insight into *tathatā* or non-analyzed Truth. There is no indication that this Full Comprehension of Truth is not, as usual, an insight associated with *manovijñāna*.

b) As for the second question, i.e. how insight which has True Reality for its object sublates ālayavijñāna, one should remember that ālayavijñāna is not only *duḥkhaśatya* but is also the cause of *saṃudayaśatya*¹³²⁴ (especially of the *kleśas*) in that it contains (or consists of) all Seeds also in so far as they are Badness in the sense of latent wickedness; accordingly, ālayavijñāna is, in a sense, itself part of *saṃudayasatya*,¹³²⁵ constituting its deepest layer; and as such, it is not only (a part of) the content of Full Comprehension of Truth (or its subsequent analysis) but is also sublated by it (or by its repeated cultivation), more precisely by insight into *tathatā*, i.e. non-analyzed Truth (**avyavasth(āp)ita-satya*), which our text, like some other passages of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*,¹³²⁶ seems to regard as that which actually effects the eradication of Defilements along with their Seeds (i.e. Badness).

Yet, one may still ask how, p r e c i s e l y , it is that insight into *tathatā* brings about the elimination of Badness or ālayavijñāna. Our text ((3a), (3b), (3c)) s u g g e s t s the idea that, in the form of their Seeds, i.e. Badness (*daṣṭhulya*), all constituents of Pollution are, so to speak, piled up in ālayavijñāna like a heap of fuel, and that insight into True Reality is somehow a p p l i e d to this heap of Badness like fire to the fuel and finally burns or dissolves it to nothing,¹³²⁷ thereby destroying ālayavijñāna which is, in most of the *Nivṛtti Portion*, hardly anything other than this heap of Badness.¹³²⁸

In the parallel passage in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra,¹³²⁹ this "application" of *tathatājñāna* to Badness seems to be even conceived of as a c o g n i t i v e act: when non-conceptualizing insight into True Reality [at the same time?] directly p e r - c e i v e s the "heap of Badness"¹³³⁰ (*daṣṭhulyakāya-pratyakṣa*), it leads to the extinction (*kṣaya*) of the latter. Yet, precisely how this idea has to be understood and whether it tallies with the intention of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* would require further investigation which is beyond the limits of the present essay.

11. Supplement IV: Two Remarks on the Structure of the Nivṛtti Portion

11.1 According to the final résumé of the *Nivṛtti Portion*,¹³³¹ establishing ālayavijñāna as the root of pollution (**saṃkleśamūla*)¹³³² is to be followed by establishing [its cessation in terms of] **praveśa-prativedha-bhāvanā-manaskāra-vyavasthāna* ('jug pa dañ rtogs pa dañ bsgom pa'¹³³³ dañ yid la byed pa rnam par g'ag pa; Hts.: < 建立 ? > 趣入通達修習作意). In the Tibetan translation, **manaskāra* is taken as the last element of a four-membered dvandva. Although it appears that this interpretation depends on some specific exegetical tradition of our text,¹³³⁴ it would seem to presuppose a rather uncommon use of the term '*manaskāra*' as specifically denoting the consummate stage (*niṣṭhā*) of *bhāvanāmārga*.¹³³⁵ Moreover, in contrast to the other terms which can be located in the text proper of the *Nivṛtti Portion* in the same sequence as in the résumé,¹³³⁶ the term '*manaskāra*' does not occur in the text proper at the point where one would expect it if it were in fact intended, by the concluding résumé, as a fourth step of spiritual practice, i.e. after *bhāvanā*. Rather, *bhāvanā* is immediately followed, in the text proper, by the final result, viz. *āśraya-parivṛt-ti*,¹³³⁷ which in the final résumé follows **praveśa-prativedha-bhāvanā-manaskāra* as an item on its own. On the other hand, **manaskāra* does occur in close connection with the first item, viz. **praveśa*, the text pointing out that with the aim of entering (or attaining) *abhisamaya* a specific *manaskāra* is practised.¹³³⁸ In view of these facts, I prefer not to follow the Tibetan rendering of the expression **praveśa-prativedha-bhāvanā-manaskāra* - nor Paramārtha's dichotomic interpretation¹³³⁹ -, but to take **manaskāra* as the final member of a determinative compound, to be connected with each of the preceding items, i.e. in the sense of "contemplation (*manaskāra*) [aiming at] attaining

(*praveśa*) [Full Comprehension of, i.e. penetration into, Truth], contemplation [consisting in] penetration (*prativedha*) [into Truth], and contemplation [consisting in] repeated cultivation (*bhāvanā*) [of this insight penetrating into Truth]". This would be in accordance with the terminology of other parts of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*¹³⁴⁰ where the term '*manaskāra*', with the corresponding qualifications, is actually used with reference to different stages of the whole Path of Liberation. For the passage here in question, such an interpretation of the item **praveśa-prativedha-bhāvanā-manaskāra* implies a tripartite arrangement, corresponding to the Preparatory Path ((*sambhāra*- and ?) *prayogamārga*), the Path of [first] Insight (*darśanamārga*), and the Path of Repeated Cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*). Such an arrangement is in fact easily verified in the pertinent part of the text (see § 10.1: (1), (2),¹³⁴¹ and (3), respectively).

11.2.1 Yet, what I have called the "pertinent part of the text" is only the second portion of what ought to be covered by the items **praveśa*-, **prativedha*- and **bhāvanā-manaskāra*. Actually, the treatment of these items only starts with § (5.b.)B.2¹³⁴² of the text, whereas the preceding § B.1¹³⁴³ does not deal with anything that could be called "contemplation [aiming at] attaining [Full Comprehension of Truth]", let alone the other items.

B.1 consists of four statements:

(a) The statement that *ālayavijñāna* in so far as it contains the Seeds of the *mokṣa*- and *nirvedhabhāgīya-kuśalamūlas* is not the cause of pollution (*Y_t* zi 8b4-6);

(b) the intramundane¹³⁴⁴ positive effects of these *kuśalamūlas* (*Y_t* zi 8b6-8);

(c) an interpretation of the canonical list of the 18 *dhātus* (taken as Seeds)¹³⁴⁵ and the *akṣarāśi* simile (of *SĀ_c* No. 444)¹³⁴⁶ as referring to *ālayavijñāna* (*Y_t* zi 8b8-9a3);

(d) the sentence *de ltar na kun nas ñon moñs pa'i rtsa ba kun gñi rnam par šes pa de ni 'di ltar dge ba'i chos bsgoms pas rnam par ldog par rig par bya'o //*, which I should restore to something like **evam saṃkleśamūlasyāsyālayavijñānasya* (or: *tasyai-vam saṃkleśamūlasyālayavijñānasya*) *vinivṛttir veditavyā yaduta(?) kuśaladharmabhāvanayā* (see § 10.1 (o)).

11.2.2 Among these statements, it is only (d) that can, without violence, be subsumed under the heading **praveśa-prativedha-bhāvanā-manaskāra* because it speaks of the cultivation of "[spiritually] wholesome factors" (*kuśala-dharma*), which constitutes not only the *bhāvanā-mārga* proper (where *kuśala-dharma* would mean the supramundane *tathatālabhāvanā-jñāna*) but, as the text itself expressly states in the next sentence,¹³⁴⁷ also the preparatory phase leading to the attainment (*praveśa*) of the first Full Comprehension of Truth¹³⁴⁸ (**sā ca kuśaladharmabhāvanā pṛthag-janānām ... tatprathamataḥ satyābhisamayapraveśāya*: see § 10.1 (1a)). Thus statement (d) can - if we disregard, for the time being, the problem of what **evam* refers to - be connected without any difficulty with the subsequent discussion of **praveśa-manaskāra*, etc. (viz. § B.2 and C.1), in the beginning of which (*dge ba'i chos bsgom pa de yañ*, i.e. **sā ca kuśaladharmabhāvanā*) it is in fact expressly referred to.

11.2.3 On the other hand, statements (a)-(c) can hardly be subsumed under the heading **praveśa-prativedha-bhāvanā-manaskāra* because they simply do not deal with actual contemplation (*manaskāra*), i.e. cultivation of spiritually wholesome factors, aiming at attaining (*praveśa*) penetration into Truth, not to mention penetration (*prativedha*) itself or its repeated cultivation (*bhāvanā*).¹³⁴⁹ They only deal with the Seeds of the preparatory - spiritually wholesome factors ((a) and, implicitly, perhaps also (c)) and with their intramundane effects ((b)). They are therefore not covered by the heading **praveśa...* *manaskāra*; nor, of course, by the preceding heading **saṃkleśamūla*, because they do not deal with pollution but (at least clauses (a)

and (b) with aspects of purification, and because the item *saṃkleśamūla has already received its concluding résumé in § A.5.¹³⁵⁰ Not being covered by any heading, the clauses (a)-(c) are heterogeneous elements, and are suspect of having been added after the composition of the nuclear text including the final résumé.¹³⁵¹

11.2.4 This suspicion is confirmed by the cumulative force of several observations:

1. The doctrine set forth in § B.1 (esp. (a)) does not fit the ālayavijñāna concept of the rest of the *Nivṛtti Portion* (see § 4.8).

2. In contrast to the - on the whole - consistent and continuous train of thought in the material confirmed by the final résumé, the logical connection between the statements B.1(a) and (b) is rather lax, and the transition from (b) to (c) appears altogether abrupt. This intrinsic disparity of B.1.(a)-(c) is easily accounted for if these statements are regarded as a set of but loosely related supplements.

3. *evam in the beginning of statement (d) is, on closer inspection, not easily understood as referring to the preceding statements of § B.1. To begin with, I do not see any logical connection, calling for *evam, to obtain between (d) and the immediately preceding statement (c). Thus, one will have to explain *evam by recurring to statement (a) or (b) which seem to deal with the same spiritually wholesome factors the cultivation of which is said, in statement (d), to effect the cessation of ālayavijñāna. Yet - apart from the fact that the mokṣa- and nirvedhabhāgiya-kuśala mūlās of statement (a) are probably only one part of the kuśala-dharmas of statement (d) which will also include supramundane insight - *evam can hardly be construed with *kuśaladharmabhāvanā (not to speak of kuśaladharma-, which as a pure noun without verbal force would require evaṃvidha-, still less of kuśala- alone), for in this case one would expect it to immediately precede

this expression. Such a position of **evam* is, however, excluded by all the versions. Besides, a *b h ā v a n ā* of wholesome factors is mentioned neither in (a), which is only concerned with the Seeds of these factors, nor in (b) which does, to be sure, mention the actual occurrence (*de b y u ṇ na*) of the *kuṣālamūlas* but is only interested in their intramundane by-effects and does not speak of their repeated cultivation. It might appear a reasonable alternative to construe **evam* in statement (d) with the whole sentence (i.e., more strictly, with **vinivṛttiḥ* or **vedīṭavyā*) and take it to signalize that because¹³⁵² the wholesome factors are, as is stated in (a), opposed to the continuation of *saṃsāra*, their cultivation leads to the cessation of *ālayavijñāna*. But since the wholesome factors arise from Seeds contained in *ālayavijñāna*, the conclusion that their cultivation leads to the destruction of *ālayavijñāna* is not plausible except if it were restricted to *ālayavijñāna* in so far as it is the root of pollution (i.e. if **saṃkleśamūlasya* were taken not as a predicative but as a limitative adjunct). This is no doubt possible, but it is not confirmed by the subsequent part of the text which does not in any way restrict the pollutive nature of *ālayavijñāna* nor its eradication at the time of the attainment of Arhatship (cp. § 10.3.3.2). Thus, there would seem to be no satisfactory way of understanding **evam* in statement (d) as referring to the preceding clauses (a)-(c).

4. On the other hand, there is not the least difficulty if (B.1)(a)-(c) are regarded as intrusive and if statement (B.1)(d) is consequently taken as having, originally, immediately followed upon § A which determines *ālayavijñāna* as the root of all Pollution, ending with the words: ... *kun g'zi rnam par śes pa ni kun nas ṇon moṇs pa thams cad kyi rtsa ba yin par blta bar bya'o //* (i.e. **... ālayavijñānaṃ sarvasaṃkleśamūlaṃ draṣṭavyam*).¹³⁵³ With this, statement (B.1)(d) (**evam saṃkleśamūlasyāsyālayavijñāna-*

sya ...) connects easily, **evam* belonging to the - logically p r e d i c a t i v e - apposition **saṃkleśamūlasya* and referring to the determination of ālayavijñāna as the root of all Pollution in § A.

5. In the quasi-quotation of the *Nivṛtti Portion* in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra-vyākhyā,¹³⁵⁴ statement (B.1)(d) a c t u - a l l y f o l l o w s i m m e d i a t e l y u p o n § A , statements (B.1)(a)-(c) being entirely a b s e n t . This does not, of course, necessarily mean that the text of the Yogācāra-bhūmi used by the author of SaṃdhVy actually lacked statements (a)-(c), since he may (and probably will) have quoted his source in an abbreviated form.¹³⁵⁵ But even so his way of quoting the passage undoubtedly proves that he considered statements (a)-(c) to be intrusive to the main thread of presentation and t h a t h e t o o k s t a t e m e n t (d) t o l i n k u p d i - r e c t l y w i t h § A .

12. Supplement V: Remark on two quotations from the Nagarasūtra

12.0 According to Enomoto¹³⁵⁶ and Kajiyama,¹³⁵⁷ in contrast to the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī which clearly presupposes the M ū l a - s a r v ā s t i v ā d a version of the Nagarasūtra (see n. 1140),¹³⁵⁸ two other passages in Yogācāra texts, viz. Y 230,1off. and MSgU ad I.36, make use of the S a r v ā s t i v ā d a version (see n. 1139), or at least of a version which, like the latter, contained an express statement of the mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa*. Though not denying such a possibility in principle, I yet do not find that the evidence so far adduced is conclusive.

12.1 As for Y 230,1off., it only quotes a part of the sentence common to both versions, viz. *tasya mama viññānāt praty-udāvartate mānasam*, and asks why this "turning back" of the Bodhisattva's mind takes place just in the case of *viññāna* but not in the case of the other members. The answer is: because the Bodhisattva perceives that *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa*, but not the other members, are mutually dependent.¹³⁵⁹ There is, however, no evidence that this explanation is based on a corresponding phrase in the wording of the version of the Nagarasūtra the author of this Yogācārabhūmi passage had in mind, and not rather on the more explicit exposition of the matter in the subsequent Naḍakalāpikā⁽²⁾sūtra or, at best, in the Sarvāstivāda exegesis of the Nagarasūtra.¹³⁶⁰ Actually, the wording of the Yogācārabhūmi passage may even indicate that mutual dependence was not expressed in the version of the Nagarasūtra made use of; for the Yogācārabhūmi says that "[the Sūtra] states that [the Bodhisattva's mind] turned back from it (viz. *viññāna*) [to *nāmarūpa*] because [the Sūtra wants to] show or suggest¹³⁶¹ (*-saṃdarśanatayā*) that in this one case there is mutual dependence".¹³⁶² Provided I am right in taking '*saṃdarśana*' as "showing" or "suggesting",^{1362a} it would

hardly be the right expression if mutual dependence had been expressed in the wording of the Sūtra. Besides, the affiliation of this Yogācārabhūmi passage to the Mūlasarvāstivāda version is confirmed by the fact that it alludes, towards the end, to the next sentence of the Sūtra by using the word 'pareṇa',¹³⁶³ which appears to be typical of the Mūlasarvāstivāda version,¹³⁶⁴ whereas the Sarvāstivāda version, at least of the Mahāvādānasūtra, has 'parataḥ'.¹³⁶⁵

12.2.1 *Asvabhāva's commentary ad MSg I.36¹³⁶⁶ may be divided into three parts:

- ① An interpretation of the phrase '*viññāna-pratyayaṃ nāmarūpaṃ*'.
This phrase is, to be sure, frequently met with in the canonical sources, but in the present case it will, in view of the fact that the basic text¹³⁶⁷ refers to the mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa* and to the reed bunch simile, have been taken primarily from the Naḍaḥkalāpikā⁽⁻⁾-sūtra. According to *Asvabhāva, in this phrase *viññāna* - which he understands to operate, by way of a continuous sequence of moments (**kṣaṇa-paramparayā*), as the basis of *nāman* (= the four immaterial skandhas) and *rūpa* (= proto-embryonic matter (*kalāla*)¹³⁶⁸)¹³⁶⁹ - can only mean ālaya viññāna, since the pravṛttivijñānas are included in *nāman*.
- ② The passage on which Enomoto bases his view that *Asvabhāva presupposes the Sarvāstivāda (or a similar) version of the Nagarasūtra (see § 12.2.2).
- ③ A quotation from the Mahānidāna-sūtra¹³⁷⁰ which too is asserted to be inexplicable without the existence of ālaya viññāna.

12.2.2 The passage ②, which Enomoto takes to refer to the Nagarasūtra, runs as follows:

Tibetan: 1371

- (a) *rnam par śes pa las ni bdag gi (D) yid bzlog na rnam par
śes pa las 'das pa ni ma yin no śes gañ gsuñs pa de yañ
kun gāi rnam par śes pa yod na 'thad de /*
- (b) *'di ltar de ni lus kyi gnas ñid du rgyun mi 'chad par 'jug
go //*
- (c) *de ñid kyi phyir de miñ dañ gzugs kyi rkyen du gsuñs te /*
- (d) *des lus la khyab pa'i phyir ro //*

Chinese: 1372

- (a) 又如經說，齊識退還。識者，即是阿賴耶識。
- (b) 自體爲依無間轉故。
- (c) 是故說此名色爲緣。
- (d) missing

The original from which both versions can be explained may have looked something like this:

- (a) **yad uktam "tasya mama vijñānāt pratyudāvartate mānaṣam,
na vijñānāt (Sūtra: ataḥ) pareṇa (Sa.: parato) vyativarta-
ta" iti, tad api saty ālayavijñāna upapadyate /*
- (b) **tathāhi tad ātmabhāvāśrayatvenāvicchedena (or: nirantaram)
(pra)vartate /*
- (c) **ata eva tasya nāmarūpapratyayatvam uktam /*
- (d) **tena (or: tasya) kāya-¹³⁷³ (or: ātmabhāva-¹³⁷⁴) -vyāpa-
nāt¹³⁷⁵ //*

12.2.3 Enomoto bases his view that this passage presupposes a version of the Nagarasūtra¹³⁷⁶ which contained a sentence expressing the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa*, i.e. the *Sarvāstivāda* version or a similar one, on two reasons. One is that in (b) the "turning back" at the member *vijñāna* is accounted for by the fact that (*ālaya*) *vijñāna* is, in its turn, based on the *ātmabhāva* (i.e. *nāma* -

r ū p a)^{1377.1378} The other reason is that (c), which according to Tibetan *gsuñs* has to be taken as pointing to a Sūtra utterance, explicitly confirms, according to Enomoto,¹³⁷⁹ that the Nagarasūtra used by *Asvabhāva also contained the statement that *viññāna* is dependent on *nāmarūpa* ('*nāmarūpa-pratyayaṃ viññānam*'), which is found in the Sarvāstivāda version¹³⁸⁰ but missing in that of the Mūlasarvāstivādins.¹³⁸¹

12.2.4 This evaluation is, however, based on the Chinese version only. For the Tibetan version would seem to presume a different interpretation of the material. In it, both **ātmabhāvāśraya-* in (b) and **nāmarūpapratyaya-* in (c) appear to be rendered not as *bahuvrīhis* but rather as *tatpuruṣas*.¹³⁸² I.e. the Tibetan version would seem to take the passage to mean that the reason why the Bodhisattva's mind "turns back" at the member *viññāna* is the fact that *viññāna*, which can only be *ālaya viññāna*, operates uninterruptedly not on the basis but rather as the basis of the *ātmabhāva* - as its deepest layer, so to speak, for which no further foundation has to be sought, and that it is for this very reason that the Sūtra states that *viññāna* is the condition of *nāmarūpa*. This means that according to the Tibetan version the passage would only refer to the dependence of *nāmarūpa* on *viññāna* and not to the dependence of *viññāna* on *nāmarūpa*, and thus not to mutual dependence. Taken in this way the passage does not, of course, support Enomoto's thesis that *Asvabhāva used not the Mūlasarvāstivāda but the Sarvāstivāda version of the Nagarasūtra (or a similar one).

12.2.5 Yet, I admit that Enomoto, though not offering any argument for it, is probably right in dismissing the interpretation suggested by Tibetan in favour of that of the Chinese version. To be sure, there is no problem in taking *ālayaviññāna* to be the basis of the *ātmabhāva*, the more so since this idea is expressly stated by **Prthivībandhu*.¹³⁸³ Nor does it appear that in this case (d) would not fit in with the argument. For if '*lus*' renders '*ātmabhāva*', (d) may be taken to further substantiate the

assertion that (*ālaya*)*viññāna* is the basis ((b))¹³⁸⁴ and condition ((c)) of *ātmabhāva* \equiv *nāmarūpa*¹³⁸⁵ by pointing out its presence throughout life and in all kinds of existence.¹³⁸⁶ And even if - as may be more probable - '*lus*' stands for '*kāya*', it would not seem impossible to understand (d) as corroborating (b)¹³⁸⁷ (and thus (c)) because the fact that *ālayaviññāna* pervades the body is the presupposition for its being capable of biological appropriation¹³⁸⁸ and because by way of appropriating corporeal matter *ālayaviññāna* would seem to be the basis and condition of the latter¹³⁸⁹ and, indirectly, also of the mental functions based thereon.¹³⁹⁰ But in spite of all this, it would be fairly odd if, as implied in the interpretation suggested by Tibetan, **Asvabhāva* really were to have focussed, in his explanation of MSg I.36, only on the dependence of *nāmarūpa* on *viññāna*, entirely disregarding the complementary dependence of *viññāna* on *nāmarūpa*; for the fact remains that the basic text refers unambiguously to m u - t u a l dependence.

12.2.6 Therefore, it may indeed well be that the interpretation of the Chinese version, followed by Enomoto, deserves to be preferred. In it, both **ātmabhāvāśraya-* in (b) and **nāmarūpa-pratyaya-* in (c) are understood as *bahuvrīhis* (and in the case of *nāmarūpapratyaya-* this has the advantage of being in accordance with how the expression is used in the Sūtra). This means that according to the Chinese version **Asvabhāva* states, in (b), that the reason why, in the *Nāgarasūtra*, the Bodhisattva's mind "turns back" at the member *viññāna* is indeed, as Enomoto assumes, the fact that *viññāna* - i.e. *ālayaviññāna* - continually arises, in its turn, on the basis of the *ātmabhāva* (= *nāmarūpa*), and that **Asvabhāva* states in (c) that for the same reason [the Sūtra] declares that *viññāna* i s d e p e n d e n t o n *nāmarūpa*.

In this context, even the sentence (d), though missing in the Chinese version, would fit in fairly well, especially if '*lus*' represents '*kāya*' (or '*ātmabhāva*' in the sense of "body") and provided that *ātmabhāva* in (b) (and *nāmarūpa* in (c)) is, in this connection, understood as l i v i n g o r a n i m a t e c o r p o r e -

a l m a t t e r ;¹³⁹¹ for the idea that p e r v a d i n g the body is more or less equivalent to b e i n g b a s e d o n the (whole living) body is confirmed by various other sources.¹³⁹²

12.2.7 Yet, even this interpretation of the text does not appear to imply, by necessity, Enomoto's conclusion. For (b) merely presupposes an e x p l a n a t i o n of the "turning back" of the Bodhisattva's mind i n t e r m s o f mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa*. This, however, does not, just as at Y 230,11ff. (see § 12.1), imply *eo ipso* that the Sūtra itself contained a t e x t u a l element e x p r e s s i n g this mutual dependence. And (c), though, to be sure, referring to the wording of a Sūtra, is by no means bound to refer to the N a g a r a sūtra. It may just as well refer - once again - to the N a ḍ a k a l ā p i k ⁽⁻⁾ sūtra. For in (1), only the first of the pertinent phrases of this Sūtra (viz. '*viññānapratyayaṃ nāmarūpaṃ*'), which it shares with the Nagarasūtra, had been quoted and explained (see § 12.2.1). Therefore, it would seem reasonable that now (in (2)(c)) the complementary phrase (viz. '*nāmarūpapatyayaṃ viññānam*') too is adduced in order to confirm the exegesis (in (2)(a)-(b)) of the Nagarasūtra passage, and explained as implying the existence of ālayaviññāna. Even if one follows the Chinese version of (1),¹³⁹³ which already contains the idea of ālayaviññāna b e i n g b a s e d o n *nāmarūpa*, and if one takes it, in spite of the absence of an explicit quotation, as a *de facto* explanation of the phrase '*nāmarūpapatyayaṃ viññānam*', yet nothing would tell against the possibility that in (2)(c) the author, with the aim of confirming his exegesis of the Nagarasūtra passage, r e f e r s b a c k to this phrase of the Naḍakalāpik⁽⁻⁾sūtra and to its interpretation in (1).

Thus, even if the interpretation offered by the Chinese translation is followed, there is no c o n c l u s i v e evidence for the assumption that *Asvabhāva made use of a version of the Nagarasūtra which, like that of the Sarvāstivādins, contained an express statement of the mutual dependence of *viññāna* and *nāmarūpa*, and not rather, as one would expect him to have done, of that of the Mūlasarvāstivādins, where such a statement is missing.

Appendix I: The Sacittikā and Acittikā Bhūmiḥ of the Yogācārabhūmi

Introductory remark:

The text of the Sacittikā and Acittikā Bhūmiḥ, which is the combined 8th and 9th chapter of the Basic Section of the Yogācārabhūmi, was first edited, on the basis of the Śrāvakabhūmi manuscript (ŚrBh_m), by A. Wayman in IBK 8.1/1960, pp. (31)-(33) = 378-376 (reprinted in Wayman 1984, 327f.) As Wayman remarks, ŚrBh_m is sometimes very difficult to decipher, and the pertinent folio is, moreover, damaged on the upper and on the right margin, which means that the last two or three akṣaras of each line as well as parts of the first line of the verso are missing (in my text, these akṣaras are underwaved). In addition, ŚrBh_m has some faulty readings and gaps. Hence, understandably enough, Wayman's edition does not always present a satisfactory text. Therefore, I have thought it useful to publish a new edition, making use, in addition to ŚrBh_m, of the Yogācārabhūmi manuscript (Y_m). Unfortunately, my photograph of the pertinent folio of this ms. is not always distinct either, especially on the verso, which shows, besides, a large gap (left blank in the ms.!) in § 5 of the text.

In my edition, I have refrained from carrying out sandhi rules if this has not been done by both the mss. (or, in the case of lacunae, by the one extant). As for the punctuation and the critical apparatus, see remarks on pp. 228 and 234.

Sigla: Ch. = Y_c (344c16-345a16)

Śr = ŚrBh_m (15A7,6-15B7,5)

T = Y_t (dzi 182b7-183b8)

Y = Y_m (83a5-b5).

Text:

0. *sacittikā acittikā ca bhūmiḥ katamā / sā dvivi¹dhāpi pañca-
bhir ākārair veditavyā /² bhūmiprajñāptivyavasthānato 'pi, citta-
bhrāntya³ bhrāntivyavasthānato 'pi, utpattyanutpattivyavasthānato
'pi, avasthāvyavasthānato 'pi, paramārthavyavasthānato 'pi //*

1. *tatra bhūmiprajñāptivyavasthānataḥ: pañcavijñānasamprayuktā
bhūmiḥ⁴ manobhūmiḥ savitarkā savicārā avitarkā vicāramātrā ca bhū-
mir ekāntena sacittikā / avitarkāyām avicārāyām bhūmau sa⁵-sa-
māpattyupapattikam āsamjñikam nirodhasamāpattiḥ ca sthāpayitvā
tadanyā sacittikaiva bhūmiḥ, sa⁶ samāpattyupapattikam āsamjñikam ni-
rodhasamāpattiḥ ca acittikā bhūmiḥ //*

2. *tatra cittabhrāntya⁷ bhrāntivyavasthānataḥ: yac caturbhir⁸
viparyāsair viparyastam cittam, tad⁹ bhrāntam ity ucyate / yat
punaś caturbhir viparyāsair aviparyastam, tad abhrāntam ity ucyā-
te / tatra yad bhrāntam cittam, tad acittam ity ucyate, prakṛti-
bhraṣṭatayā <;> yathā hi¹⁰ loke bhavanti vaktāraḥ unmattam kṣipta-
cittam drṣṭvā "acitto 'yam puruṣapudgalah unmattah¹¹ kṣiptacitta"
iti / tad anena paryāyeṇa yad bhrāntam cittam, tad acittikā bhū-
miḥ / yat¹² punar abhrāntam, tat sacittikā //*

-
- 1 Śr seems to omit the akṣara, but *i* may be there.
2 Y -vyāḥ.
3 Śr om. -bhrāntya-.
4 Y -ḥ /.
5 Śr om. sa-.
6 Śr om. sa-; in Y it has been inserted afterwards.
7 Śr om. -bhrāntya-.
8 Śr om. -bhir.
9 Y -da- or -t (indistinct).
10 Thus Y (cp. Ch. 如); Śr damaged but possibly tathā hi (cp. T. 'di ltar).
11 Not very clear in my copy of Śr (beginning of 15B7,2) and obviously followed by an additional akṣara.
12 Y tat.

3. *tatra utpattyanutpattitaḥ: aṣṭābhiḥ kāraṇaiḥ cittasya utpādo bhavaty anutpādo*¹³ *vā / tadyathā indriyaparibhedāt, viṣayānābhāsa-gamanāt, manasikāravaikalāyāt, apratīlambhāt, virodhāt, prahāṇāt, nirodhāt, utpādāc ca*¹⁴ */ etadviparyayād utpādo draṣṭavyaḥ iyadbhir eva kāraṇaiḥ / tatra ya*¹⁵ *utpādakāraṇaiḥ cittasyotpādāḥ, sā sacittikā bhūmiḥ / yaḥ*¹⁶ *punar an*¹⁷ *utpādakāraṇair anutpādāḥ, sā acittikā bhūmiḥ //*

4. *tatra avasthāvyavasthānataḥ: ṣaḍ avasthāḥ sthāpayitvā sacittikā bhūmir veditavyā*¹⁸ *ṣaḍ avasthāḥ katamāḥ*¹⁹ *tadyathā acittika*²⁰ *middhāvasthā, acittika*²⁰ *mūrchāvasthā asaṃjñā*²¹ *saṃpattīḥ, āsaṃjñikaṃ, nirodhasaṃpattīḥ, nirupadhiśeṣaś ca nirvāṇadhātuḥ / yā*²² *punar etāḥ ṣaḍ avasthāḥ, iyaṃ acittikā bhūmiḥ //*

5. *tatra paramārthavyavasthānataḥ: nirupadhiśeṣo nirvāṇadhātuḥ acittikā bhūmiḥ / tat kasya hetoḥ / tatra hy ālayavijñānaṃ niru*²³ *dham bhavati / tadanya*²⁴ *sv avasthā*²⁵ *su pravṛttivijñānaṃ niruddham bhavati, yena acittikā bhūmir ity ucyate; ālayavijñānaṃ tu na niruddham bhavati, ye*²⁶ *na pa*²⁷ *ramārthataḥ nācittikā bhūmir ity ucyate //*

*yogācāra*²⁶ *bhūmau sacittikā bhūmiḥ acittikā ca saṃpattā*²⁷ *//*

13 Śr om. *bhavaty anutpādo*.

14 Ch. reasonably supplies 心不得生 (**cittasyānutpādo* (*bhavati*)), but in Śr, Y and T. no such words are found.

15 Y *ye*.

16 Śr *yat* (?).

17 *an-* seems to be missing in Y (indistinct).

18 Y *-vyāḥ*; Śr *-vyāḥ* /.

19 Y and Śr *-mā*.

20 Cp. Wackernagel II,1, p. 134f.?

21 Y seems to have *-jñā-*, whereas Śr may read *-jñā-*, but definitely not *-jñi-*; cp. Y 78a8 (*asaṃjñāsaṃpattī*) and ŚrBh 458,19ff. and 460,10 (where *-jñi-* is only introduced by the editor).

22 Y, and probably also Śr: *yā*.

23 Śr adds an (illegible) *akṣara*.

24 Y *-nya-*.

25 Beginning of the lacuna in Y.

26 End of the lacuna in Y.

27 Śr, and probably also Y: *-ptāḥ*.

Appendix II: Paramāthagāthās 28-41 and their Commentary

Introductory Remark:

This Appendix offers a new edition and annotated translation of that part of the Paramāthagāthās and their commentary – both form part of the Cintāmayī Bhūmiḥ of the *Basic Section* of the Yogācārabhūmi – which proved to be relevant to the present study. I found this necessary because A. Wayman's edition and translation of this text, contained in his "Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript" (ŚrBh_W, in this App. abbreviated as W.), 167ff., and reprinted – without corrections, as far as I can see – in "Buddhist Insight" (= Wayman 1984), are not entirely satisfactory.¹³⁹⁴ Even Suguro's Japanese translation of the passage¹³⁹⁵ does not go far beyond Wayman's.

The part relevant are verses 28-41 of the Paramāthagāthās and their commentary. The materials I use are not only Wayman's own (ŚrBh_m,¹³⁹⁶ Y_t¹³⁹⁷ and Y_c¹³⁹⁸), but also Y_m¹³⁹⁹ which proves quite helpful in a considerable number of passages. In a few cases, however, both manuscripts show identical mistakes.¹⁴⁰⁰

As for my translation, I hope it is an improvement on Wayman's, but I admit that it is still provisional in quite a few cases, as are also my notes. Some of the notes are, to be sure, rather lengthy, but in order to facilitate further studies I have taken pains to reproduce my understanding and its limits as precisely as possible, and I have not hesitated to present and discuss alternatives when I found the text difficult or ambiguous.

Since there is evidence that at least some of the Paramāthagāthās stem from canonical sources while others seem to have been regarded as at least paracanonical,¹⁴⁰¹ and since there are a few cases where the commentary obviously or most probably misinterprets the verses (at least from the point of view of their original meaning),¹⁴⁰² the author of the commentary was certainly not the a u t h o r of the verses (at least not of a l l of them). Rather they were compiled – either by him or even earlier,¹⁴⁰³ as authoritative utterings at the level of ultimate

truth, from various (canonical or paracanonical) sources or (oral) traditions. In translating and interpreting them, one should therefore not follow the commentary all too confidently, except if one intends to render them not in their original meaning,¹⁴⁰⁴ but only according to how they were understood by the commentator. To the present study, however, both aspects are relevant. In my translation of the verses, I therefore try to understand them - as far as possible - by themselves, referring to diverging interpretations of the commentator in the notes.

A d d e n d u m

1. With regard to the metre of vs. 34-38 (vs. 28-33 and 39-41 are ordinary śloka (pathyā)), it is a pleasure for me to thank Dr. Junko Sakamoto-Goto for her most valuable remarks (letters dated 29th April, 27th May and 31st May, 1987) and for kindly permitting me to rephrase them as follows from the original German:

Vs. 34 is a śloka with a vaitālīya pāda in d; vs. 35 is a vaitālīya but probably mixed with śloka (pāda a); 36 is vaitālīya throughout. The presupposition is that some words of the text were, originally, not read (i.e. recited) as they are found written in the transmitted text but rather in line with the allowances of MI prosody.

There are no serious problems in the case of vs. 36, which is a regular vaitālīya provided that we read (i.e. recite) *saktā* for *saktāḥ* at 36a, *mahatī* for *mahati* at 36b, and *sarvatrāgaḥ* for *sarvatragah* at 36d, such metrical variants of endings and compositional sandhi being common in MI (and BHS) verse.

In vs. 35, the metrical situation is less clear. Pāda b is a regular vaitālīya as it stands. Pāda d too becomes a regular vaitālīya if *-patyayaṃ* is read for *-pratyayaṃ*; the opening pattern √ - - √ √ √ (*ahaṃkārasukha-*) is however rare. 35c would, in order to be scanned as a vaitālīya,

require the readings *bhoti* for *bhavati* and *bālānām̐* (- ∪ -) for *bālānām̐*; the latter (gen. pl. -[∪]ānām̐) is, however, uncommon; but cp. Apabhraṃśa -*ahā* beside -*āhā* in nominal and pronominal inflection (Pischel §§ 363, 370, 425, etc.). 35a is probably in the śloka metre, with *pari-* (∪ ∪) instead of one long syllable (-), such a resolution (- → ∪ ∪) in the pāda middle being rare but not impossible, particularly at the beginning of a word.

As for vs. 34, pāda b is definitely in the śloka metre (a fact confirmed by its being taken from an identifiable canonical source (see n. 1428) where it occurs in pure śloka surroundings [L. S.]). 34d is *vaitālīya*, with *upaśamikena* to be read as *upaśāmikena*. 34a and c are problematic but can be taken as śloka pādas, if *duḥkhitā* at 34c is read *dukhi-tā* ∪ ∪ - (i.e. modified to agree with *sukhita-*) and ∪ ∪ taken as a resolution of one long syllable, and if 34a is accepted as an instance of the cadence ∪ - ∪ - which is however very rare in uneven śloka pādas (but cp. the Vedic *anuṣṭubh*).

The metre of vs. 37 and 38 is difficult to identify but may be an extension or remodelling of *vaitālīya* or *jagatī*/*-triṣṭubh* lines. In fact, 37cd (forming one sentence) is most probably in the *jagatī* metre, requiring ∪ - ∪ for *naitad* (to be read as *na etad*, the hiatus being admissible in MI) and ∪ ∪ ∪ (like *anyato* or *anyathā*) instead of *anyatra* (which however can hardly be scanned accordingly). 38b too can be scanned as a *jagatī* with the reading *puna* for *punar* although the opening pattern ∪ ∪ - - is very rare; the possibility cannot be excluded however that this line is a secondarily enlarged *vaitālīya*. A similar ambiguity is found also in 38d which may, e.g., be based on a *triṣṭubh* pāda like *sa tasmā(j) jātas tā janeti cāpi* or on a *vaitālīya* pāda like *tasmāj jātas taj janeti 'pi* (without *sa* and with elision of *a-* in *api*), but these are merely uncertain possibilities.

2. It may be difficult to decide to what extent vs. 34-38 are based on metrically flawless MI (or BHS) materials or are rather merely more or less awkward imitations of archaic metres. At any rate, the śloka pāda 34b is (as just noted) definitely taken from a canonical source also preserved in the Pāli canon (see n. 1428). Though vs. 34a gives the impression of being a kind of connecting link between vs. 33 and the (demonstrably canonical) pāda 34b, the cadence ॐ - ॐ - in vs. 34a looks archaic (cp. the frequency of this cadence in uneven śloka pādas in the Aṭṭhakavagga and Pārāyana: Oldenberg, *Kleine Schriften*, 1202 and 1204); it is thus more probable that the combination of 34b with 33 remounts to some older source. Mrs. Sakamoto-Goto suggests that vs. 35 might be a transmissional supplement to vs. 36 in view of its metrical unsatisfactoriness and of its content which looks somewhat dogmatic and less archaic than that of vs. 36 with its elephant simile. In fact, the allusion, at 35a, to the "etymology" of *citta* (see n. 1433) would seem to point to a post-canonical source. On the other hand, 35cd is hardly more dogmatic or advanced than 36cd, and 35b is nothing but a metrical variant of a pāda actually attested in the canon (see n. 1433a). Thus, we should perhaps also envisage the possibility that at least some of the metrical problems are due to redactional operations by somebody (possibly the compiler) with no good sense of or no longer familiar with the *vaitālīya* metre. Vs. 34c, e.g., would become a perfect *vaitālīya* pāda if we presuppose that *bālāḥ* (excluding the Āryas!) was inserted by a redactor (or the compiler) in the place of a less specific word like *narāḥ*. For the same reason, at 35c too *bālānām* may have replaced a less specific word fitting the *vaitālīya* metre (e.g. *prāṇinām*). And even at 35a, *cittam* may have been secondarily introduced in place of a word conforming to the *vaitālīya* metre (like *mano*)¹ because *ācinoti* evoked the etymology *cinotīti cittam* (see n. 1433). In all these cases, a redactor/compiler inexperienced in metre could have changed the cadence of the original *vaitālīya* into the cadence of the more familiar śloka.

¹ In that case, one would, besides, have to read *-parigatam* as *-parīgatam*.

Sanskrit text of the v e r s e s : *

28. *prapañcābhiratir hetus¹ tathā karma śubhāśubhaṃ /
sarvabījo vipākaś ca iṣṭāniṣṭaṃ tathā phalaṃ //*
29. *sarvabīje vipāke hi jāyate ātmaadarśanaṃ /
pratyātmavedanīyo <'>sau arūpī anidarśanaḥ //*
30. *kalpayā<nt>ty² antarātmānaṃ taṃ ca bālā ajānakāḥ /
ātmaadarśanam āśritya³ tathā bahvyas⁴ ca drṣṭayaḥ //*
31. *piṇḍagrāhāt svabījāc⁵ ca pūrvābhyāsāt sahāyataḥ /
śravaṇād anukūlāc ca jāyate ātmaadarśanaṃ //*
32. *snehas tatpratyayaś caiva adhyātmam upajāyate /
anugrahābhilāṣāc⁶ ca bahiḥ⁷ sneho mamāyitaṃ //*

* R e m a r k : I have not, on the whole, noted merely orthographic variants like *ṃca* for *ñca*, *rvva* for *rva*, *śa* (?) for *sa*, *nsa* for *ṃsa*, nor absence of *daṇḍa* at the end of a line. Nor have I noted Wayman's readings if they are not supported by any source.

S i g l a : Y = Y_m; Śr = ŚrBh_m; T. = Tib.; Ch. = Chinese; W. = ŚrBh_w.

1. Śr -*tuḥ* (*ḥ* faint and seemingly added afterwards).
2. Śr and Y (?) -*yaty*.
3. Y *āśritya*.
4. Śr -*hvyoś* (?).
5. Śr *sa-* (?), but T. (*rañ*) and Ch. (自) confirm *sva-*.
6. Thus Y (cp. Ch. ... 故), but Śr -*śaś* (cp. T. 'dod pa, without ablative particle).
7. Y -*hi*.

T r a n s l a t i o n o f t h e v e r s e s :

28. Delight in worldly existence¹⁴⁰⁵ as well as good and evil deeds are the cause. Maturation¹⁴⁰⁶ containing all Seeds¹⁴⁰⁷ and [what is] agreeable and disagreeable are the result.¹⁴⁰⁸
29. The [Result-of-]Maturation containing all Seeds comes to be looked upon as Self.¹⁴⁰⁹ This [Result-of-Maturation] is accessible to personal experience [only], [for it is] shapeless¹⁴¹⁰ and invisible (/incommunicable).¹⁴¹¹
30. Not only¹⁴¹² do ignorant fools imagine this [Result-of-Maturation] to be [their] inner Self, but many [other false] views too¹⁴¹² arise on the basis of [this] view of Self.¹⁴¹³
31. The view of Self arises from apprehending solid things,¹⁴¹⁴ from its own Seed, from previous habit, from [bad] companion(s),¹⁴¹⁵ and from listening [to doctrines] which favour [the arising of the view of Self].¹⁴¹⁶
32. Conditioned by this [view of Self],¹⁴¹⁷ there arises, furthermore, attachment to oneself¹⁴¹⁸, and, because one is eager to benefit [oneself],¹⁴¹⁹ attachment [to what is] outside¹⁴¹⁸ [consisting in] claiming (or coveting) [it] as one's own.

33. *yato bibhetti loko 'yaṃ tan mohāt saṃharaty asau /
pūrvam niveśanam kṛtvā tenopaiti prapañcitam //*
34. *yat tan niveśanam kṛtam tad āryā duḥkhato viduḥ /
yena duḥkhitā⁸ sadā bālāḥ⁹ kṣaṇamātrānupaśamikena hi //*
35. *vaiṣamyaparigatam cittam
ācinoti¹⁰ duḥkham tathāvidham /
yad ācitam¹¹ bhavati¹² bālānām
ahamkārasukhaduḥkhapratyayaṃ //*
36. *yatra saktāḥ sarvabālīśāḥ
pañke mahati kuñjaro¹³ yathā /
saṃmohas¹⁴ tatra cādhikaḥ¹⁵
sarvatragah sarvaceṣṭite¹⁶ //*
37. *tat saraḥ sarvasrotasām vinirbhedāya¹⁷
yāni loke srotāṃsi viṣamāṇi /
naitad agnir¹⁸ na vāyur na bhāskaro
viśoṣayed anyatra dharmacaryayā //*

8. Thus both mss.! BHS § 8.78? Or to be read -tāḥ?
9. Y -lā.
10. Śr -ti /.
11. Both mss. *yadā cittam*, but T. *de ni kun bstas pas* and Ch. 積集 .
12. Śr. -ti /.
13. Y ro /.
14. Śr *samo-*; Ch. 由癡故 (-hāt ?).
15. Śr -kaḥ /.
16. T. *kun la spyod par byed*.
17. T. *dbyer m e d byed* ("makes i n distinguishable"), but Ch. 派 ... ("ramifies into").
18. Śr *a[sti]gnir* (*sti* deleted).

33. What these [foolish] people fear, [precisely that it is] that they attract,¹⁴²⁰ in [their] delusion.¹⁴²¹ Having stuck [to it]¹⁴²² before,¹⁴²³ they¹⁴²⁴ fall a prey to conceptual proliferation (/worldly existence)¹⁴²⁵ thereby.¹⁴²⁶
34. That which¹⁴²⁷ has been stuck to [by them], that the Noble Ones know to be Suffering (i.e. unsatisfactory);¹⁴²⁸ on account of this [Suffering], the fools are always miserable,¹⁴²⁹ for it does not cease (or: allow of peace?) even for a single moment.¹⁴³⁰
35. [When] mind [is] befallen¹⁴³¹ with Unevenness,¹⁴³² it accumulates¹⁴³³ such Suffering^{1433a} as, when having been accumulated, becomes, for [these] fools,¹⁴³⁴ the cause of¹⁴³⁵ the notion of Ego, and of pleasure and pain.
36. In it all fools remain stuck, as an elephant [remains stuck] in a large mire.¹⁴³⁶ And with this [Suffering as its object] delusion is exceeding [strong], [being] omnipresent, [i.e.¹⁴³⁷ present] in every activity.¹⁴³⁸
37. That is the lake which entails the branching off of all streams - of what[ever] adverse¹⁴³⁹ streams [there are] in this world.¹⁴⁴⁰ Neither fire nor wind nor the sun could dry it up,¹⁴⁴¹ but only the practice of the Doctrine.¹⁴⁴²

38. *duḥkhī duḥkhito 'ham asmīty ātmānaṃ*¹⁹
*sukhito vā punar*²⁰ *duḥkhaṃ*²¹ *vyavasyati /*
*parikalpo dṛṣṭisamutthāpakaḥ*²²
*sa tasmāj jātas*²³ *taj janayaty api //*
39. *sahotpannaniruddhaṃ*²⁴ *hi kleśaiḥ kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ sadā /*
kleśebhyas tasya nirmokṣo na bhūto na bhaviṣyati //
40. *na tad utpadyate paścāc chuddham anyat tu jāyate /*
tac ca pūrvam asaṃkliṣṭaṃ kleśebhyo muktam ucyate //
41. *yat*²⁵ *kliṣṭaṃ tad ihātyantāc chuddhaṃ prakṛtibhāsvaraṃ*²⁶ */*
*na ceha śudhyate kaścit kutaścid*²⁷ *vāpi śudhyate*²⁸ *//*

19. Śr -naṃ /.

20. Thus both mss.; in Y *puna-* is added in the lower margin.

21. Y *dukhaṃ*; T. *bde* (**sukhaṃ*).

22. Śr, Y -kaḥ /; T. *lta bas bskyed pa* (-*pitah* ?).

23. Y -taḥ.

24. Śr -*viruddhaṃ*.

25. Y *tat*, but Śr *yat* (cp. T. *gañ*).

26. Śr -*ska-*.

27. Y does not seem to have -*scit kuta-* but is difficult to read; T. *gañ las kyañ nī* confirms Śr.

28. Śr -*ti*.

38. [By thinking, when one is] pained, "I am pained - or, on the other hand (*punar*), [by thinking,] when one is pleased, ["I am pleased"] -, one conceives¹⁴⁴³ as oneself (i.e. as one's Self?) [what is in reality nothing but] Suffering.¹⁴⁴⁴ [This] wrong idea calls forth a [false] view.¹⁴⁴⁵ Having arisen from it, it also engenders it.¹⁴⁴⁶
39. Defiled mind,¹⁴⁴⁷ of course (*hi*), is [something] that arises and ceases¹⁴⁴⁸ each time together with the Defilements.¹⁴⁴⁹ For it, liberation from the Defilements has [therefore] neither [already] happened nor will it [ever] happen.
40. [For¹⁴⁵⁰ it is] not that this [very same defiled mind] arises afterwards as a pure one, but [rather what] arises [afterwards is] a n o t h e r [mind which is pure].¹⁴⁵¹ And [it is] this [other mind that, although¹⁴⁵² it had] not [been] defiled before,¹⁴⁵³ is called 'liberated' from Defilements.
41. That which is defiled is, in this [system],¹⁴⁵⁴ a b s o - l u t e l y [defiled];¹⁴⁵⁵ [what is] pure is radiant b y n a t u r e .¹⁴⁵⁶ And [thus (?) there is], in this [system], no [person or even dharma which] is purified, nor is [he/it, *a fortiori*,] purified from anything.¹⁴⁵⁷

Text of the commentary :*

[I.] *evaṃ paramārthataḥ svāmīny asati kārake vedake vā hetuphalamātre ca sati codyaparihāraṃ hetuphalalakṣaṇaṃ tatra cātmaṇiparyāsaṃ¹ pañcabhir gāthābhiḥ (27-31) paridīpayati /*

A) ...

B) *dvitīyayā (28) hetuphalalakṣaṇaṃ /*

C) *tiṣṭhis² (29-31) tatrānātmani hetuphale yathātmadrṣṭiviparyāsaḥ / tat punar ālambanataḥ āśrayataḥ phalataḥ hetutaś ca paridīpayati /*

1) *tasyālabanam ekayā gāthayā (29) / tac ca pratyātma-vedanīyatvam arūpitvānidarśanatvābhyāṃ³ sādhayati /⁴ atarkyatvāt / rūpaṇā hi tarkaṇā⁵ sūtra uktā / anidarśanatvāc ca / parebhyo <'>deśanayā⁶ /*

2-3) *āśrayaṃ phalaṃ ca dvitīyayā (30) / bālā āśrayas, tadanyā drṣṭayaḥ phalaṃ </>*

* R e m a r k : Purely orthographic variants (see remark on p. 228) are not noted, likewise variants in the use of the daṇḍa (occasionally represented by colon or dash in my text) or deleted akṣaras (except for special cases). Y_m is often fairly indistinct.

In the t e x t , u n d e r l i n i n g indicates words and sentences literally quoted or repeated from the gāthās.

D i s c o n t i n u o u s u n d e r l i n i n g : words of the gāthas recurring in a different syntactical construction or with different endings. U n d e r w a v i n g : equivalents substituting gāthā words.

In the t r a n s l a t i o n , only underlining is used.

1. Śr -saṃ /; T. g ṛ ā n d u phyin ci log pa = *cānya-.
2. Y -bhiḥ; T. p h y i m a gsum gyis; Ch. 由後三頌 .
3. Śr -nābhyāṃ.
4. Śr, Y -ty.
5. Thus both mss.; T gzugs rnams ni brtag tu ruñ ba'o źes (mdo las byuñ ba)s; Ch. (經說) 色相爲尋思故 .
6. Thus Śr; Y illegible.

T r a n s l a t i o n o f t h e c o m m e n t a r y :

[I.] [Having] thus [proved that] there is, from the point of view of ultimate reality, no proprietor nor doer nor feeler but only cause(s) and effect(s), [the author/compiler of the stanzas now] elucidates, with five stanzas (28-31), A) how objections can be refuted, B) how cause and effect are characterized,¹⁴⁵⁸ and C) how this (viz. what is merely cause and effect) is wrongly conceived of as Self.

A) ...

B) With the second [stanza] (28) he elucidates how cause and effect are characterized.¹⁴⁵⁸

C) With three [stanzas (29-31) he elucidates] how this [complex of dharmas which are merely] cause and effect [but] not Self is wrongly viewed as Self. This [fact], to be more precise (*punaḥ*), he elucidates from the point of view of 1) object, 2) basis, 3) result, and 4) cause.

1) The object of the [wrong view of Self he elucidates] with one stanza (29) [, where the object of the view of Self, viz. the Result-of-Maturation containing all Seeds, is taught to be accessible to personal experience only,] and this accessibility to personal experience [only] he proves by [pointing out] that [the Result-of-Maturation containing all Seeds] is devoid of what can be grasped by speculation (*arūpin*),¹⁴⁵⁹ and is incommunicable; for [its nature] is not accessible to speculative inquiry - for what is taught in the Sūtra¹⁴⁶⁰ by *rūpaṇā* is speculative inquiry -, and it is incommunicable because [its nature] cannot be communicated to others by instruction.

2-3) With the second [stanza (30), he elucidates] the basis¹⁴⁶¹ and the result [of the wrong view of Self]: The fools are the basis, the other [false] views are the result.

4) hetuṃ tṛtīyāyā (31) / tatra saha-jātma-dṛṣṭi-⁷ pīṇagrā-
hāt⁸ svabījāc ca tadanuśayāj jāyate / parikalpitā tīrthi-
kātmadṛṣṭiḥ pūrvābhyāsād iti⁹ / sā ca tīrthikadṛṣṭiḥ abhya-
stā¹⁰ bhavati, ayoniśaś¹¹ ceha tarkayati, tadanukūlaṃ cā-
saddharmam¹² parataḥ śrṇoti - ity āśrayamanasikārālambana-
doṣaiḥ parikalpitasyātmadarśanas-yotpattiṃ darśayati /

[II.] ataḥ paraṃ yathā tad ātmadarśanam¹³ samudayānupūrvyā¹⁴ duḥ-
khaṃ ni<r>vartayati¹⁵, yathā ca tad duḥkhaṃ punaḥ sāhaṃkā-
rayor dvayor¹⁶ duḥkhatayoḥ kāraṇam bhavati, yathā ca mokṣa-
sya vibandhāya bhavati, tat pañcabhir gāthābhiḥ (32-36)
paridīpitam¹⁷ /

A) tatra prathamayā gāthayā (32) samudayaṃ darśayati /

B) dvitīyatṛtīyābhyām (33-34) duḥkha<m>¹⁸ saṃskāraduḥkhatāsaṃ-
grhītam ālayavijñānamayaṃ </> tad dhi¹⁹ niveśanam kṛtvā
tenopaiti prapañcitam bhaviṣyāmi na bhaviṣyāmiti evamādi /
niveśanam ity ātmabhāvaparigrahaṃ / tac ca duḥkhaṃ sarvakā-
lānuṣaktatvāt²⁰ kṣaṇamātram apy anupaśāntam /

7. Both mss. -ṣṭi, but cp. verse 31d, T. *de la lhan cig skyes pa'i bdag tu lta ba ni ril por 'dzin pa dan / ... ran gi sa bon las byun no*, and Ch. 俱生我見 由 ... 之所生起.
8. Śr seems to have -hat(sva-), Y -ha(sva-); but cp. verse 31a and T. (see preceding note).
9. Thus both mss.; T. *śnon goms pa l a s o g s p a l a s ' b y u n ste*; Ch. 由宿習等之所生起.
10. Y adds a deleted *ca*.
11. Y *ayo [?] niś*.
12. Y may also be read -laṃ vā-; Śr -laṃ vā-; see n. 1466.
13. Śr, Y -naṃ /.
14. Final akṣara damaged in Śr.
15. Śr *nivarttayati*; Y *nivarttate*; T. ('grub par byed pa) and Ch. (發生於 ...) confirm *nirvartayati*.
16. Y om. *dvayor*.
17. Y adds a deleted *bha*.
18. See n. 1472.
19. W. reads *vi*-; the akṣaras *dvi* and *ddhi* can hardly be distinguished in the photos. See n. 1473.

4) With the third [stanza (31) he elucidates] the cause [of the wrong view of Self]: The innate¹⁴⁶² view of Self arises from apprehending solid things, and from its own Seed, [i.e.] from the [latent] propensity to the [wrong view of Self]. The speculative¹⁴⁶² view of Self of the non-Buddhists [arises] "from former habit": [By indicating this cause and the following ones (31b-c)] he shows that the speculative view of Self originates on account of defects of α) basis,¹⁴⁶³ β) reflection and γ) object,¹⁴⁶⁴ in the sense (... *iti*) that α) this [false] view of the non-Buddhists had [previously] been habitually followed, that β) in this [existence?] one reflects incorrectly,¹⁴⁶⁵ and¹⁴⁶⁶ that γ) one hears, from other [persons], a wrong doctrine which favours this [false view of Self].¹⁴⁶⁷

[II.] Thereafter it is elucidated with five stanzas (32-36) how that view of Self, by [giving rise, in] due sequence[, to the] O r i g i n¹⁴⁶⁸ (A), brings about S u f f e r - i n g (B);¹⁴⁶⁹ how this Suffering becomes, in its turn (*punaḥ*), the cause of [the other]¹⁴⁷⁰ two kinds of Suffering¹⁴⁷¹ along with the conception of Ego (C); and how it is calculated to obstruct liberation (D).

A) With the first stanza (32), he shows the O r i g i n¹⁴⁶⁸ [of Suffering].

B) With the second and third [stanza (33-34) he elucidates] S u f f e r i n g¹⁴⁷² [as far as it is] comprised in unsatisfactoriness of conditioned factors [as such] and consists in ālayavijñāna; for¹⁴⁷³ "having stuck to it",¹⁴⁷⁴ they¹⁴⁷⁵ thereby fall a prey to conceptual Proliferation", [thinking/desiring] 'I shall be', 'I shall not be', etc.;¹⁴⁷⁶ "sticking to" means taking possession of a [new] (basis of) personal existence.¹⁴⁷⁷

That Suffering, moreover, does not cease even for a single moment, because it adheres [to one] all the time.¹⁴⁷⁸

- C) *caturthyā* (35) *yathā tad duḥkham anyayor duḥkhatayor*²¹
aḥaṃkārasya ca pratyayo bhavati /
- D) *pañcamyā* (36) *yathā punar mokṣasya vibandhāya bhavati* /
*saṃmohas*²² *tatra cādhikah itarābhyām duḥkhatābhyām*²³ *anti-*
*kāt*²⁴ / *sarvatragah sarvaveditānugatvāt*²⁵ / *sarvaceṣṭi-*
te kuśalākuśalāvyākṛte /
- [III.] *tasyedānīm* (37) *ālayavijñānasamgrhitasya duḥkhasya*²⁶ *sarāḥ-*
*sārūpyam*²⁷ *darśayitvā viśoṣaṇam*²⁸ *darśayati dharmaca-*
*ry<ay>saiva*²⁹ *śoṣāt* / *tatra viśamāṇi srotāṃsi cakṣurādīni*
*ṣaṭ pañca gatayaḥ trayo dhātava ity evamādīni*³⁰ /
tām ca dharmacaryām bandhamokṣaparijñayā darśayati (38
 ff.) /

-
20. Śr, Y -tvāt /; cp. also T. taking the sentence as one but construing *tac ca duḥkham* (ad sensum) with *sarvakālānuṣaktatvāt*.
21. Thus Y; Śr *duḥkhayor*; T. *sdug bsñal gzan gnīs* (no sign of an abstract suffix, but similarly in 236, 9, where both manuscripts have *duḥkhatayor*, and in 238, 4, where both mss. have *duḥkhatābhyām*); Ch. 苦樂 ("pain and pleasure": see verse 35d).
22. Ch. 由愚癡故 = **saṃmohāt*?
23. Y -bhyām?
24. Thus both mss. and Ch. (望 ...); T. (... *las lhag pa'o*) supplies *adhikah* but need not be taken to presuppose a different text.
25. Śr -gatatvāt.
26. Y *duḥkhatasya* but -ta- deleted.
27. Y *sarasārūpyam* /.
28. Y -śe- (cp. Ch. 差別).
29. See n. 1482.
30. Y -di iti (or -di ini).

- C) With the fourth [stanza (35) he elucidates] how [this] Suffering¹⁴⁷⁹ is [in its turn] the condition of the other two forms of Suffering¹⁴⁸⁰ and of the notion of Ego.¹⁴⁸¹
- D) With the fifth [stanza (36) he elucidates] how [this Suffering]¹⁴⁷⁹ is calculated, furthermore, to obstruct liberation.

"And with this [Suffering as its object], delusion is exceeding [strong]", [viz.] in comparison with [delusion having] the other two kinds of Suffering [as its object].

"Omnipresent": because it accompanies all sensations.

"In every activity": in good, bad and neutral [activity].

[III.] Now (viz. in stanza 37) he [first] shows that this Suffering comprised in ālayavijñāna is similar to a lake, and then (-tvā) shows how it is dried up; [this drying up is not achieved by fire, etc.,] for [that "lake"] dries only by the practice of the Doctrine.¹⁴⁸²

Among the [concepts used in this verse], the "adverse streams" [have to be explained as] the six sense-faculties - sense of vision, etc. -, ¹⁴⁸³ the five Destinies, the three [world-]spheres,¹⁴⁸⁴ etc.

He then (viz. in stanzas 38ff.) shows this practice of the Doctrine to consist in¹⁴⁸⁵ a thorough comprehension of A) bondage and B) liberation.

- A) *tatra bandhaparijñā* (38) *yad evaṃ parijānāti - duḥkham eva vyavasyati yo duḥkhitasukhito*³¹ *'smīti ātmānam vyavasyati / sa ca parikalpo dr̥ṣṭeḥ samutthāpakas* <-> *tata eva*³² *dr̥ṣṭer jātas*³³ *tajjanako bhavati /*
- B) *mokṣaparijñā*³⁴ *śeṣābhiḥ ṣaḍbhir*³⁵ *gāthābhiḥ*³⁶ (39-44) *paridīpayati /*
- (39:) *sahotpannaniruddhaṃ hi kleśaiḥ kliṣṭaṃ manāḥ sadā / kleśebhyas*³⁷ *tasya nirmokṣo*³⁸ *na bhūto yadā kleśais sahotpannaṃ na*³⁹ *bhaviṣyati yadā taiḥ saha niruddhaṃ* </>
- yadā tarhi muktam ucyate / tat saṃdarśayati* (40) - *na tad eva paścāc chuddhaṃ utpadyate, 'nyat*⁴⁰ *tu śuddhaṃ mano jāyate / tac ca pūrvam evāsaṃkliṣṭatvān*⁴¹ *muktam ity ucyate /*
- etam evārthaṃ punaḥ sādhayati yat kliṣṭaṃ tad ihātyantād ity anayā gāthayā* (41) </> ...

-
31. Śr *duḥkhitāḥ* su-; for T. and Ch. see n. 1486 (b-c).
32. Śr *eva* /.
33. Y -*taḥ* /.
34. Y -*jñā*.
35. Both mss. *saptabhir*, but T. *drug* and Ch. 六 .
36. Y -*bhi*.
37. Y -*bhyaḥ*.
38. Y -*kṣaḥ*, Śr -*kṣa*.
39. Śr om. *na*.
40. Śr may read -*te* 'nyat, but Y looks like -*te* / nyat in the photo.
41. Y -*tvāt*.

A) Thorough comprehension of b o n d a g e (→ stanza 38) [means] that one comprehends in the following manner: [A person] who thinks about himself: "I am pained[" or "I am pleased", does so with regard to "what is in reality] nothing but Suffering.¹⁴⁸⁶ This wrong idea calls forth, moreover, a [false] view:¹⁴⁸⁷ having itself arisen from this very same [false] view,¹⁴⁸⁸ it becomes [, in its turn,] its cause.

B) With the remaining six¹⁴⁸⁹ stanzas (39-44), he elucidates the thorough comprehension of l i b e r a t i o n .

(39:) "Defiled mind arises and ceases each time together with the Defilements. For it, liberation from the Defilements has [therefore] not [already] happened", [viz.] when it has arisen together with the Defilements,¹⁴⁹⁰ "nor will it [ever] happen", [viz.] when it has ceased together with these [Defilements].¹⁴⁹¹

Then [what is actually meant] when it is called 'liberated'?¹⁴⁹² This he explains [in the next stanza (40)]: [It is] not [that] this very same [defiled mind] arises afterwards as a pure one, but [rather what] arises [afterwards is] a n o t h e r mind [which is] pure. And [it is] this [other mind that] is called 'liberated',¹⁴⁹³ because¹⁴⁹⁴ even before it had not been defiled.¹⁴⁹⁵ This very fact he proves again with the next stanza (41), viz. "That which is defiled is, in this [system], absolutely [defiled] ...".

...

Addenda et Corrigenda to the Reprint

Part I:

p. 6–7, §§ 1.3.2 and 1.3.4.1: On aspects of *viññāṇa* in early Buddhism anticipating aspects or functions of *ālayavijñāna* see Tilmann VETTER, *The 'Khandha Passages' in the Vinaya-piṭaka and the four main Nikāyas*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 2000: esp. 66–73; Rita LANGER, *Das Bewusstsein als Träger des Lebens: Einige weniger beachtete Aspekte des viññāṇa im Pālikanon*, Wien: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien 2001; William S. WALDRON, *The Buddhist Unconscious*, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon 2003: 9–45.

p. 12,16: 本事分 → 本地分.

p. 98,22: The authenticity of the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* is questioned by some scholars; cf. the references in Keishō TSUKAMOTO et al. (eds.), *Bongo butten no kenkyū (A Descriptive Bibliography of the Sanskrit Buddhist Literature)* III (Kyoto 1990): 339 n. 116.

p. 117,15 f: The encircled number on the left side ought to be ② instead of ①.

p. 150,-9: worldly → worldly.

p. 192,6–16: Another example is AS 38,14 f (misleading reconstruction) = AS; 89a4, defining *anitya* in the sense of *asat* in terms of the permanent absence of *ātman* and *ātmīya* in the *skandhas*, *dhātus* and *āyatanas* (*gang phung po dang | khams dang | skye mched rnams la bdag dang bdag gi dus rtag tu med pa 'o*). This contrasts neatly with the 'Mahāyānist' definition of BoBh_D 188,16–18: *iha bodhisattvaḥ sarvasaṃskārāṇāṃ abhilāpyasvabhāvaṃ 'nitya-kālam eva nāsti' ity upalabhyānityataḥ sarvasaṃskārāṇ paśyati*. The VinSg (Y₁ zi 245a5; Y_c 672b2–3) is quite explicit in associating *anitya* in the sense of *asat* with the Mahāyāna and *anitya* in the sense of perishability with the Śrāvakayāna. One can thus hardly avoid the impression that the AS deliberately interprets *anityatā* in the sense of *asat* in such a way that it is compatible with the Śrāvakayāna.

p. 198,17–20: Perhaps better: “by means of insight, through continuously cultivating [it] (*°nena jñānena, āse°*). In this case, the text on p. 199 (3b) would be acceptable and n. 1264 unnecessary.

p. 198,25: “too” is to be deleted (after numbers or expressions of quantity (here: *thams cad kyang* = *sarvo 'pi*), *api* has the function of underlining completeness)

p. 240,7 ff: Cf. Saṃdh X.8 (p. 160,16–24).

Part II:

n. 51: Cf. also *Arthaviniścayasūtra-nibandhana* (ed. SANTANI) 119,2 f (*Sautrāntika-mata*, contrasted with the view (of the Vaibhāṣikas) that the *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* is the *pratisandhi-vijñāna*).

n. 66: Cf. also SN 22.87 (III 124,1–13). On *viññāṇa* as an unbroken stream established (*patiṭṭhita*) in this world as well as in the other world (i.e. continuing from one life into the next one) see DN III 105,20–22.

n. 68 (p. 256,5): read **āsaṃsārika°*.

n. 78: On the *vipākavijñāna*, cf. also Yoshihito G. MUROI, *Vasubandhus Interpretation des Pratītyasamutpāda*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 1993: 116 and 195 f (§ 14) with n. 358.

n. 132: See my article “On Three Yogācārabhūmi Passages Mentioning the Three Svabhāvas or *Lakṣaṇas*”, in: Jonathan A. Silk (ed.), *Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding*. The Buddhist Studies Legacy of Gadjin M. Nagao. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press 2000: 245–263.

n. 147: Cf. Ratnākaraśānti, *Sāratamā* (ed. P. S. JAINI, Patna 1979) 42,5: *taḥ parigrhātā adhiṣṭhātāḥ*.

n. 165: Cf. also DN II 338.

n. 238: On the form °*muccissatha* cf. Thomas OBERLIES, *Pāli*, Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter 2001: 111 (§ 19 rem.), referring to Heinrich LÜDERS, *Philologica Indica*: 184. AKVy 284,17 and *Arthaviniścayasūtra-nibandhana* 118,4 read *kalalatvāyābhisaṁmūr(c)chet*. Cf. n. 244.

n. 278: For a similar view in Jaina dogmatics (the way the soul leaves the body at death indicates future destiny) see Walther SCHUBRING, *Die Lehre der Jainas*, Berlin and Leipzig 1935: 100.

n. 341: At Saṁdh VIII.36.2.1, however, **ādāna* (contrasted with **anubhava*, **viññapti*, and **saṁkleśa/vyavadāna*) characterizes the function of *citta* with reference to the body (*smṛty-upasthāna* pattern!); cf. also Saṁdh VIII.22.

n. 352: In view of ŚrBh 300,17 and 19 (cf. also *Taishō daigaku sōgō bukkō kenkyūjo nem-pō* 26/2004: 90,17 and 92,2), the form *upādatta* (instead of *upātta*) would also seem possible. In the beginning, the reconstruction should run **tad* (or: *etad*) *viññānam ādāna*° (cf. Tib. *rnam par shes pa de ni len pa’i* ...).

n. 436: This etymology of *citta* seems to be taken from ŚrBh 496,18-21: *tasya dīrgharātram tac cittam* (ms. °*tram*) *rūpa-rataṁ śabda-gandha-rasa-spraṣṭavya-rataṁ ācītam upacītam* {...} *rūpa-śabda-gandha-rasa-spraṣṭavyaiḥ*.

n. 555 (p. 365,13–17: 1.a): Perhaps rather: “Because [*ālayaviññāna*, as] the cause for Suffering connected with rebirth in the future, has been abandoned (**āyati-paunarbhavika-duḥkha-hetu-prahāṇāt*), ...”. As for the expression *āyatipaunarbhavikam duḥkham*, see Y_t dzi 329a4 (*phyi ma la yang srid pa ’byung bar byed pa’i sdug bsngal*) = Y_m 154b5. For Paramārtha’s version of the passage, see Hidenori SAKUMA, *Die Āsrayaparivṛtti-Theorie in der Yogācārabhūmi*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 1990, II: 160–161 n. 851.

n. 568: The Tibetan reads “is not the cause of the origination-and-continuance of the Path”, which is also Paramārtha’s understanding of the passage (不爲聖道而作根本). But cf. the opposite case, viz. that *āśrayaparivṛtti* is basis for the *pravṛtti* of the Path and the basis for the *apravṛtti* of the Defilements, at Y_t ’i 30a7–b1 (see SAKUMA, op. cit., II: 190 ff [Text VinSg 15: 2.i–ii]).

n. 755: Read: “Apart from the quotation from the VinSg at ASBh 13,5 (see n. 630), I have so far not ...”.

n. 769: For details see my paper *On the Problem of the External World in the Ch’eng wei shih lun*, Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies 2005: 29 ff.

n. 1215: Cf. also VisM XXI.55 (from the *Cullaniddesa*): *cakkhu suññam attena vā attaniyena vā nīccena vā dhuvena vā sassatena vā avipariṇāmadhammena vā*. One could take *nīccena vā* etc. as alternative qualifications of *attena* and *attaniyena*. As for the Sanskrit version, cf. ASBh 99,15: *cakṣuḥ ... śūnyam nityena yāvad ātmīyena*; full wording: *Catuhśataka-īkā* (ed. Kōshin SUZUKI, *Candrakīrti’s Bodhisattvayogācāracaṭuhśatakaīkā*, Tokyo: The Sankibo Press 1994) 164,5 f: *cakṣuḥ ... śūnyam āmanātmīyena ca nityena dhruveṇa śāśvate-*

nâvipariṇāmadharmēṇa (cf. also Felix ERB, *Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 1997: 149 n. 454).

n. 1330 (p. 497,-3 ff): The expression *daṣṭhulya-sahagata* occurs indeed, as an attribute of *kāya* parallel to *praśrabdhi-sahagata*, at ŚrBh 292,2 (cf. also *Taishō daigaku sōgō bukkō kenkyūjo nempō* 25/2003: 34,11) .

n. 1440 sub-note 1 (p. 538,2–5): Cf.also, e.g., Y 40,17–41,1 or AKBh 162,19 f.

n. 1477 (p. 559, ad c and d): Cf. also VisM IX.54: *attabhāvo vuccati sarīram, khandha-pañcakam eva vā*.

n. 1492: For *yat tarhi* being expressly supplied by *tat katham*, cf. also AKBh 57,23.

p. 638: The lemma *–parigṛhīta* is misplaced.

p. 695,6: Add “in this life” before “is abandoned”.

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